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Part I
Dissertation Overview
1

Dissertation Overview
The general topic of this dissertation is technological change. This cumulative disser-
tation consists of four papers, that study four diﬀerent aspects of technological change
through an macroeconomic perspective. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics lays
out that technological change is rarely neutral, but usually biased towards increasing the
relative productivity of one specific factor of production. Hence, technological change
will always produce winners and losers within society in relative terms. However, on the
aggregate there is little doubt that society as a whole has been benefiting from techno-
logical progress tremendously. In fact, I believe our well-being to be closely intertwined
with technological change and hence decided to focus on this issue during my time as a
doctoral student at the University of Zurich.
The four essays (within this dissertation) focus on the determinants of technological
change and the consequences of it on economic welfare, the labor market and the en-
vironment. The first essay looks at structural change and the resulting determinants
of diﬀerential technological progress across disaggregated industries within the economy.
Both theoretically and empirically it assesses the direction of technical change and its
feedback on consumption behavior of agents. The second essay looks at labor market im-
plications that result from technological change. As outlaid above, each change is likely
to benefit some (types of labor) while making others worse oﬀ. The third essay relates
the process of technological progress to the increasing challenge for our environment to
cope with an ever rising demand for natural resources. Here it especially focuses on the
role of emerging markets such as China. Finally, the last essay is directly related to the
first study. Building on the theoretical implications of the first essay, it evaluates quanti-
tatively to what extent the rising middle class in China influences innovation behavior of
Chinese firms.
The remainder of this overview chapter provides a short summary of each of the four
essays.
The first paper Non-Homothetic Preferences and Industry Directed Technical Change
(joint with Timo Boppart), combines the theory of directed technical change with non-
homothetic preferences in order to reconcile changes in relative expenditures of diﬀerent
sectors with non-constancy in relative prices and the long-run trends in relative TFP
growth rates across sectors. The theoretical contribution of this paper is to provide a
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model of directed technical change in which structural change happens due to both rel-
ative price and income eﬀects. In contrast to the standard theory of directed technical
change, structural change is not only a transitional dynamic but a long-run process, being
present even asymptotically. In contrast to the existing literature that treated the two
possibly counteracting channels (which link expenditures to relative prices) separately, our
approach allows for both a substitution eﬀect and a market size eﬀect. The substitution
eﬀect makes consumers’ expenditures a function of relative prices, while the market size
eﬀect aﬀects the growth rate of relative prices through diﬀerential spending on industries.
Thus, there exists an endogenous interdependency between relative prices and the expen-
diture structure. Combining this with a non-homothetic preference structure allows us
then to reconcile the evolution of industry prices and expenditure shares for the US econ-
omy. Although the model replicates the rich, disaggregate production structure, it still
features balanced growth on the aggregate in line with Kaldor’s (1961) stylized facts and
can be solved by paper and pencil. In the empirical section of the paper, we use the model
to evaluate the market size eﬀect quantitatively. Using the input-output tables of the US,
our theory helps us to reconstruct how structural change in terms of final consumption
aﬀects the market size of industry value-added. Arguing that the structural change across
broad categories of final consumption is exogenous from the perspective of an individual
firm, this gives an instrument for the industrial market size (at the value-added level).
Testing for the market size eﬀect of induced innovation our findings suggest that a 1
percent increase in an industry’s market size (relative to GDP) leads to an increase in
the TFP growth rate of about 0.3 percentage points over five years or equivalently to a
decrease in the growth rate of relative prices of 0.6 percentage points.
My second project Employment Polarization and the Role of the Apprenticeship Sys-
tem, (joint with Michelle Rendall) analyzes in what way a specific education system fosters
the investment in specific human capital at the middle skill level (apprenticeship vs. gen-
eral schooling) and in turn incentives firms to adopt new (and potentially task-replacing)
technologies. Recent literature has documented that machines and (ICT) technology,
which are complementary to high skill workers, are increasingly replacing middle skill
labor in the US, which then in turn leads to labor market polarization. Comparing this
development to Germany this trend is much less pronounced, although, there exists large
variation within the country itself. Using regional variation in apprenticeship training
intensity (within Germany), we oﬀer a theory that reconciles the diﬀerential regional de-
velopments in labor polarization trends. The key element is the (dual) apprenticeship
system which provides incentives for firms to invest in industry- (or firm) specific human
capital of its workforce. As a consequence, the middle skill group, composed primarily of
skilled apprentices, has acquired a highly specific skill at the expense of firms/governments
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(in contrast to middle skilled that received general education like in the US). Apprentices
tend to be more productive than those without industry-specific training when operat-
ing machinery and processes learned during the training years. However, from the firms
perceptive, acquiring new machinery is more costly, since the old training (specific skills)
becomes obsolete and the comparative advantage acquired through specific training during
the apprenticeship is lost. Moreover, if ICT capital replaces middle skilled workers, firms
in apprentice-intensive regions have a smaller incentive to adopt new technologies. Based
on our theory we make use of a large German dataset with detailed regional variation
and evaluate the eﬀect of falling capital prices on technology adoption and the resulting
polarization the labor market. Finally, the model also oﬀers an explanation for the faster
structural transformation of the US (in terms of service sector growth) due to higher labor
mobility and labor replacement (by capital) in manufacturing.
The third paper Directed Technical Change, The Environment and the Role of Emerg-
ing Markets studies the consequences of lacking environmental standards in emerging
economies and its interaction with the form of technological progress (imitation vs. in-
novation). In particular, this study asks three questions: First, are the policies imposed
in industrialized economies suﬃcient to prevent a global environmental disaster? Sec-
ond, what happens when firms in emerging economies become innovators instead of mere
imitators? Third, what are the economic consequences for countries subject to tighter
environmental regulations? ls there a risk of a race to the bottom? The paper tries to
answer these questions in a directed technical change model, where entrepreneurs invest
either in “dirty” or “clean” production techniques. By extending the model into a global
perspective and introducing a negative pollution externality, I analyze the interaction
between unilateral environmental regulations and the direction of R&D investments that
are shaped endogenously. Specifically, assuming the enforcement of environmental poli-
cies in the North (i.e. the industrialized countries), I focus on the condition that makes it
profitable for entrepreneurs in emerging markets to invest in sustainable technologies. I
find that whenever the unregulated country is close to the technological frontier and eﬀec-
tive in innovation tasks, unilateral policies (only enforced in the industrialized countries)
fail to prevent an environmental disaster. In addition, only through the enforcement of
environmental regulations, the North loses its role as the technological leader. In con-
trast, whenever the unregulated country is unable to leapfrog ahead, unilateral regulations
within the technologically leading country ensure a sustainable growth path. Finally, I
present empirical evidence (on R&D expenditure and patents) suggesting that China is
indeed very close to the technological frontier. Hence, the paper calls for a stricter in-
ternational coordination to enforce regulations at the global rather than at the regional
level.
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What is the eﬀect of the rapidly growing middle class in China on innovation activ-
ities of Chinese manufacturing firms? Why do sectors diﬀer to such a large extent in
their development? Motivated by these questions, the fourth project Demand Forces of
Technical Change, Evidence from the Chinese Manufacturing Industry (together with An-
dreas Beerli, Fabrizio Zilibotti and Josef Zweimüller) analyzes the interplay between the
rapidly growing middle class of new consumers and the process of technical change in the
Chinese economy. Merging the insights of the two recent theories of “directed technical
change” and “non-homothetic preferences”, yields the prediction that economic growth
brings about demand-driven waves of technical progress. Thus, this paper investigates
the eﬀect of market size on innovation activities across diﬀerent durable good industries
in the Chinese manufacturing sector. In particular, we construct a measure of potential
market size that is driven only by changes in the Chinese aggregate income distribution
and exogenous to changes in prices and qualities of durable goods. Results indicate that
an increase in market size by one percent leads to an increase of 0.27% in firm-specific
total factor productivity and an increase in labor productivity by 0.42%.
Part II of this dissertation contains the four research papers, while all Appendices are
relegated to Part III. The bibliography is found in Part IV of this book. Finally, Part V
contains the curriculum vitae.
Part II
Research Papers
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1 Non-homothetic Preferences and Industry
Directed Technical Change
Joint with Timo Boppart
1.1 Introduction
Structural change – defined as changes in relative expenditures of diﬀerent sectors – is
according to Kuznets (1973) one of the six main features of modern economic growth and
development. In addition, diﬀerences in productivity growth rates across sectors gener-
ate systematic relative price dynamics. The literature provides two theoretically robust
mechanism which link the sector-specific expenditure structure to relative prices: on the
one hand, if sectors diﬀer in their total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates, relative
prices change over time and structural change can be the result. This mechanism was
emphasized by Baumol (1967), who illustrates that the nominal expenditure structure
is aﬀected by relative price changes whenever the elasticity of substitution is unequal to
unity. Ngai and Pissarides (2007) implement this channel in a neoclassical growth model
with intertemporal optimization and balanced growth on the aggregate.
On the other hand, the literature on directed technical change emphasizes that changes
in the relative market size of diﬀerent sectors translate into changes in sector-specific
R&D investments, which in turn determine the relative TFP growth rate and finally the
dynamics of the relative price. This second mechanism goes back to Schmookler (1962)
and Griliches and Schmookler (1963) and was first formalized in a dynamic general equi-
librium setting in Acemoglu (1998), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and Acemoglu (2002).
If expenditure shares change over time, a theory of induced innovation suggests that an
increasing fraction of total R&D activity concentrates on sectors with an increasing ex-
penditure share. This intensified R&D activity translates into an increase in the relative
TFP growth rate and consequently into a decrease in the relative price growth of sectors
with a rising output share.
Interestingly, in these two theoretical approaches above, the causality of the link between
expenditure shares and relative price dynamics runs in diﬀerent directions. This makes
empirical identification diﬃcult and has contributed to the fact that empirical quantifica-
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tion of the two channels remains relatively rare.1 As an additional (theoretical) challenge,
relative price changes are not the only driver of structural change. Whenever prefer-
ences are non-homothetic, income eﬀects also determine the demand structure, along any
growth path with increasing living standards. However, although there is ample evidence
that this channel is quantitatively important, we are not aware of any theory of directed
technical change which does allow for non-homothetic preferences.2
The theoretical contribution of this paper is to provide a model of directed technical
change in which structural change happens due to both relative price and income eﬀects.
In contrast to the standard theory of directed technical change, structural change will not
only be a transitional dynamic but a long-run process, being present even asymptotically.
Within the model, there are two final consumption goods which enter the instantaneous
utility function of households. Both final goods are produced using an identical set of
intermediate industries, varying only in the intensities with which these are used. Due to
these intensity diﬀerences, structural change in terms of final output goods trickles down
to a structural change in terms of industry value-added. Since the endogenous innovation
process takes place at the industry level, changes in industrial market sizes induce a shift
in industry-specific R&D investments, which finally determines the evolution of final out-
put prices. Although the model replicates this rich, disaggregate production structure, it
still features balanced growth on the aggregate in line with Kaldor’s (1961) stylized facts
and can be solved by paper and pencil.
In the empirical section, we use US industry level data to test the “market size hypoth-
esis” explicitly. In line with our theory, our strategy is to construct an industry-specific
exogenous variation in market size that allows to separate the market size eﬀect from
the (potentially counter-acting) substitution eﬀect. More specifically, we instrument the
industrial market size by structural change at the final output level. We use the input-
output relationship of the US economy (similar to Herrendorf, Rogerson and Valentinyi,
2009) in order to determine how shifts on the final output level aﬀect the industrial value-
added structure. The identifying assumption of this IV approach is that an individual
firm – which makes its R&D investment decision – takes variations in the potential indus-
trial market size, caused by aggregate demand shifts, as exogenously given.3 Our results
suggest that there is indeed a positive market size eﬀect and TFP growth tends to in-
crease in industries which inherently gain from the structural change on the level of final
1Acemoglu and Linn (2004) is a notable exception showing evidence for a causal link between market
size and innovation within the US pharmaceutical industry.
2Allowing for non-homotheticity of preference is for instance an important diﬀerence to the paper by
Ngai and Samaniego (2011).
3Note that in contrast to Acemoglu and Linn (2004), our strategy enables us to evaluate the market
size hypothesis across the complete set of US industries.
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consumption goods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section gives a motivating example
of structural change and directed technical change, before Section 1.3 proceeds with the
theoretical model. Our empirical test for the market size eﬀect is provided in Section 1.4.
Finally, Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Motivating Example
We motivate this paper’s main mechanism with US data of the durable and non-durable
good sector. Figure 1.1 plots the total nominal expenditures on non-durable goods relative
to total expenditures on durables on a logarithmic scale. Apart from the volatility due
to recessions and World War II, the series has a strong negative trend (see dashed line).
The annual growth rate of non-durable goods expenditures is on average 1.32 percentage
points lower than the one of durable goods.
The corresponding price of non-durable relative to durable consumption goods is plotted
in Figure 1.2. On a logarithmic scale, this series is clearly nonlinear, highlighting that the
growth rate of the relative price is systematically changing over time.4 The growth rate
of the relative price of non-durables (i.e., the slope of the series in Figure 1.2) increases
continuously, being slightly negative in the thirties and clearly positive around 2012. A
quadratic fit to the relative price series (see dashed line) suggests that the annualized
growth rate of the relative price increases each year by about 0.048 percentage points.
While it was minus 0.74 percent in 1930, it is plus 3.18 percent in 2012. As long-run
dynamics in relative sectoral prices are typically explained by diﬀerences in sector-specific
total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates, the convex relative price path (on a loga-
rithmic scale) depicted in Figure 1.2 indicates a huge shift in the direction of technical
progress. This view is confirmed by Figure 1.3 which displays the decreasing time trend
of the relative TFP growth rate of the non-durable compared to the durable sector. Con-
sequently, explaining the relative price path depicted in Figure 1.2 requires a theory of
sector-specific endogenous growth.
Combining Figures 1.1 and 1.2 demonstrates that a theory of structural change that relies
solely on substitution eﬀects is insuﬃcient to explain the data. First, the fact that nom-
inal expenditures of the durable sector – whose relative price decreases – expand faster
requires the elasticity of substitution to be larger than unity. In the structural change
literature this case is regarded as empirically less relevant. Second, although the relative
4The patterns outlined in Figure 1.1 and 1.2 are not an artifact of focusing on nominal personal
consumption expenditures. The facts are unchanged when plotting total output of the durable and non-
durable sector (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A.4). In addition, Figure A.2 in Appendix A.4 shows that
the non-durable good sector is also expanding in real terms at a slower rate than the durable good sector.
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Figure 1.1: Nominal personal consumption expenditures on non-durables
relative to expenditures on durables
Notes: The figure plots the nominal personal consumption expenditures devoted to non-durable goods relative to the one devoted to
durable goods in the US for 1929-2012 on a logarithmic scale. If we regress the logarithm of the relative expenditures on a constant
and the year, the slope coeﬃcient is -0.01316 with a standard error of 0.00078.
Source: BEA, NIPA table 2.4.5.
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Figure 1.2: Relative consumer price index of non-durables relative to
durables
Notes: The figure plots the relative price between non-durables and durables in the US for 1929-2012 on a logarithmic scale. If we
regress the logarithm of the relative price on a constant and the year in level and squared, the slope coeﬃcients are -0.92990 and
0.00024 respectively (with standard errors of 0.04609 and 0.00001). The relative price is normalized to one in the year 2005.
Source: BEA, NIPA table 2.4.4.
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Figure 1.3: Diﬀerence between TFP growth rates of non-durables and
durables
Notes: The figure plots the diﬀerence between the rate of TFP growth of non-durables and the TFP growth rate of durables for
the years 1978-2007 using input coeﬃcients from I-O tables as weights. The slope of the fitted line is given by -0.00069 with a
standard error of 0.00027. The information of input-output tables is used to calculate the value-added industry weights of final
non-durable/durable consumption. Then, the calculated TFP growth rate in terms of final consumption is the weighted average of
the industries’ value-added TFP growth (where the weights are these input-output coeﬃcients). For more details see Appendix A.3.
Source: EU KLEMS; BEA, NIPA table 2.4.5, own calculation.
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price barely changed over the first thirty years of the observed period, structural change
is present even then. These two facts require a theory which allows for non-homothetic
preferences and thus includes income eﬀects as an additional driver of structural change.5
Moreover, the sweeping change in the expenditure structure (see Figure 1.1), which per-
sists for more than eight decades, calls for a theory in which structural change is a long-run
phenomenon.
Motivated by this illustrative example, we proceed to present our theoretical model.
1.3 Theoretical Model
1.3.1 Terminology of “Sectors” and “Industries”
We develop a theory of directed technical change, where structural change is driven by
both an income and a relative price eﬀect. Preferences are specified over two final con-
sumption goods. A luxury good with an expenditure elasticity of demand larger than
unity, called the “durable” and a necessary good with an expenditure elasticity of demand
strictly smaller than unity, called “non-durable”. The durable and non-durable goods are
the two sectors. Both final goods are produced using the same set of intermediate in-
puts, which consists of diﬀerent industries i ∈ [0, 1]. And the production processes of the
two final consumption goods diﬀer in their intensities with which they rely on a specific
industry i.
1.3.2 Production
Production of the Final Good in the Two Sectors
Both durable and non-durable goods are produced competitively with Cobb-Douglas tech-
nologies defined over the same unit interval of intermediate inputs, {xi(t)}1i=0,
YD(t) = exp
[∫ 1
0
log [xi(t)] di
]
5Especially, in the context of durable and non-durable goods the importance of income eﬀects are
incontestable as food expenditures account for 48.1 percent of non-durable expenditures in the year 1929
and Engel’s law is regarded as one of the most robust empirical findings in economics (see Engel 1857,
Houthakker, 1957 and Browning, 2008). This view is confirmed by Figure A.4 in Appendix A.4, which
plots the fraction of goods expenditures devoted to durables for each income quartile of the US on a
logarithmic scale. Richer household devote a systematically larger fraction of their goods expenditures
to durable goods.
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and
YN(t) = exp [∆t] exp
[∫ 1
0
α(i) log [xi(t)] di
]
B.
The term ∆ ! 0 captures (potential) exogenous diﬀerences in the relative sector-specific
productivity growth rate and B is a normalizing constant
B = exp
[
−
∫ 1
0
α(i) log [α(i)] di
]
.
Production of both final goods relies on the same set of intermediate inputs. However, the
two sectors use them with diﬀerent intensities. While the output elasticity of intermediate
input xi(t) is unity in the durable good sector, it is α(i) ≥ 0 in the non-durable sector.
We have
∫ 1
0 α(i)di = 1 and we denote the variance of the α(i)’s by σ
2 ≥ 0, i.e. σ2 ≡∫ 1
0 α(i)
2di− 1. If σ2 = 0, the weights of the intermediate inputs are exactly the same for
both final good sectors. In contrast, the larger σ2, the more intensities diﬀer across the
two sectors.
Since final output markets are competitive the prices will be equal to the marginal cost.
We set the durable good as the numeraire, i.e., we have
1 = exp
[∫ 1
0
log [pi(t)] di
]
, (1.1)
and the (relative) price of the non-durable good is given by
PN(t) = exp
[
−∆t +
∫ 1
0
(α(i)− 1) log [pi(t)] di
]
, (1.2)
where pi(t) is the price of intermediate industry input i.6 The relative price between
non-durable and durable goods, PN (t), changes for two reason. First, if ∆ ̸= 0, there is
an exogenous diﬀerence in the productivity growth rates which leads to a trend in relative
prices. Second , as long as the two sectors use industries i ∈ [0, 1] with diﬀerent intensi-
ties, i.e., σ2 ̸= 0, dynamics in intermediate industry prices pi(t) also aﬀect PN (t).
In the following we explain industry-specific price changes by endogenous technical progress
at the intermediate industry level.
6The righthand sides of (1.1) and (1.2) represent the unit cost of the corresponding production func-
tions in terms of the numeraire.
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Production of Intermediate Inputs
The intermediate inputs are produced competitively according to a standard “lab-equipment
model” (see e.g. Acemoglu, 2009),
yi(t) =
ν
ν − 1
[∫ Mi(t)
0
χ(ωi, t)
ν−1
ν dωi
]
Li(t)
1
ν , (1.3)
where ν > 1. Li(t) denotes labor used in intermediate input production of industry i.
Labor is fully mobile across sectors and earns a wage rate w(t). χ(ωi, t) is the amount of
“machines” of variety ωi that is used in the production of intermediate i. At a given date
t, Mi(t) denotes the number of diﬀerent available machine varieties. The marginal costs
of a machine χ(ωi, t) are ψi(t) = ν−1ν pi(t), i.e.
ν−1
ν units of intermediate input yi(t). Each
machine producer acts as a monopolist. Under these assumptions, firms’ optimization
implies the results that are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1.1. Each machine producer sets its price at each point in time equal to
p(ωi, t) =
ν
ν − 1ψi(t) = pi(t), ∀ωi. (1.4)
Cost minimization and perfect competition at the intermediate industry level implies
χ(ωi, t) = Li(t), ∀ωi, (1.5)
and
pi(t) = (ν − 1) w(t)
Mi(t)
, ∀i, (1.6)
where w is the wage rate. Then, at a given point in time, each monopolist ωi earns a
profit flow of
π(ωi, t) =
ν − 1
ν
w(t)Li(t)
Mi(t)
, ∀ωi. (1.7)
The total amount of produced intermediate inputs i can be expressed as
yi(t) =
ν
ν − 1Mi(t)Li(t). (1.8)
The total amount of intermediate inputs i used to produce machines ωi is
ci(t) =
ν − 1
ν
Mi(t)Li(t). (1.9)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
So far the number of available machine varieties, Mi(t), has been treated as exogenous.
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As a next step we specify how a new machine variety can be introduced.
Production Possibilities Frontier
By spending 1η units of output of industry i as R&D investments, a new machine variety
χ(ωi, t) can be invented. Hence, we have
M˙i(t) = ηzi(t), (1.10)
where zi(t) denotes intermediate inputs of type i used for R&D investments (in industry
i). There is free entry into research and a successful innovator obtains a perpetual patent
on a machine variety ωi. Mi(0), ∀i is exogenously given and we assume Mi(0) = 1, ∀i.7
Considering a situation with positive R&D investments in all industries i, we obtain the
following Lemma.
Lemma 1.2. With positive R&D investments, the value of a machine producing firm is
given by
v(ωi, t) = vi(t) =
w(t)(ν − 1)
ηMi(t)
, ∀ωi. (1.11)
Moreover, we must have
r(t)− w˙(t)
w(t)
+
M˙i(t)
Mi(t)
=
ηLi(t)
ν
, ∀i. (1.12)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
In order to close the model we need to specify the demand side of the economy. As
motivated in Section 1.2 this demand side has to allow for non-homothetic preferences.
1.3.3 Demand Side
Suppose we have a unit interval of identical households endowed with L units of inelasti-
cally supplied labor and A(0) units of (initial) wealth. Each household has the following
preferences
U(0) =
∫ ∞
0
exp (−ρt)
[
1
ϵ
E(t)ϵ − β
γ
PN(t)
γ − 1
ϵ
+
β
γ
]
dt, (1.13)
where ρ > 0 is the rate of time preferences and the term in squared brackets is the
indirect instantaneous utility function. This instantaneous utility function is defined over
the nominal expenditure level, E(t), and the prices of durables and non-durables. But
7This assumption is not crucial, but simplifies the analysis. Basically, as we will see below, it normalizes
all relative prices between any two intermediate inputs to one at t = 0.
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as we have chosen the price of durables as our numeraire, only the (relative) price of
non-durables, PN(t), shows up in (1.13). We have 0 < ϵ < 1, γ ≤ ϵ and β > 0. The
intratemporal preferences are identical to Boppart (2011) and are a subclass of “price
independent generally linearity” (PIGL) preferences specified in Muellbauer (1975) and
Muellbauer (1976).8 The virtue of these preferences is that, although they are non-
homothetic (and moreover do not fall into the Gorman class), the analysis of intertemporal
optimization is very tractable.
The intratemporal preferences are only well defined if the expenditure level exceeds a
certain threshold. In order to ensure this, we assume henceforth
E(t)ϵ ≥ βPN(t)γ. (1.14)
This condition will be fulfilled as long as the factor endowments L andA(0) are “suﬃciently
large”. A condition in terms of exogenous model parameters which guarantees (1.14) is
stated later on. Total consumption expenditures, E(t), are spent on durables, XD(t) and
non-durables, XN(t). Applying Roy’s identity yields the following demand system:
Lemma 1.3. Intratemporal optimization implies
XD(t) = E(t)− βE(t)1−ϵPN(t)γ , (1.15)
XN(t) = βE(t)
1−ϵPN(t)γ−1, (1.16)
at each date in time.
Proof. Deriving the optimal consumption structure is just an application of Roy’s identity.
We see that the demands are non-linear functions of the expenditure level E(t). Hence,
we have non-homothetic preferences.9 Condition (1.14) ensures the consumed quantities
to be non-negative. The expenditure share devoted to non-durables, SN (t) ≡ PN (t)XN (t)E(t) ,
can be written as
SN(t) = βE(t)
−ϵPN(t)γ . (1.17)
8For more detail on these preferences, the reader is referred to Boppart (2011), where it is shown
that these preferences remain very tractable even if we allow for household heterogeneity and population
growth. However, note that the parameter space is slightly diﬀerent compared to Boppart (2011) in order
to allow for cases where the elasticity of substitution exceeds unity.
9The class of preferences (1.13) does enclose a homothetic case with ϵ→ 0. But in this paper we focus
on the more interesting non-homothetic cases with ϵ > 0.
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Clearly, SN(t) is declining in E(t) and Engel’s law applies.10 The expenditure elasticity of
demand and the elasticity of substitution are the two elasticities that control the eﬀects
of changes in expenditure levels and relative prices on the demand structure. The expen-
diture elasticity of demand for non-durables is equal to 1 − ϵ, which is strictly smaller
than unity. Moreover, the elasticity of substitution is given by 1 − γ + (ϵ − γ) SN (t)1−SN (t) .
So the elasticity of substitution is in general time varying and can be either larger or
smaller than unity, depending on the parameter γ.11 Overall, this means that both the
income and substitution channel of structural change are present in the model and their
importance is controlled by the parameters ϵ and γ.
Next, we turn to the household’s intertemporal optimization problem. The household
takes the interest rate, r(t), and wage rate, w(t), as given and maximizes (1.13) subject
to the flow budget constraint and the transversality condition, which read
A˙(t) = r(t)A(t) + w(t)L−E(t) and lim
t→∞E(t)
ϵ−1A(t) exp [−ρt] = 0. (1.18)
This yields the following Lemma:
Lemma 1.4. Intertemporal optimization implies the following Euler equation
(1− ϵ) E˙(t)
E(t)
= r(t)− ρ. (1.19)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
This is the familiar form of the Euler equation which is consistent with a constant
growth path along which the saving and interest rate are constant. Note that we obtain
this simple Euler equation although intratemporal preferences are non-homothetic.
1.3.4 Market Clearing and Resource Constraints
Market clearing at the final output sector level implies
Yj(t) = Xj(t), j = {D,N} . (1.20)
10Interestingly, it is even consistent with the functional form Ernst Engel had in mind while studying
the expenditure structure of Belgian workers. See Engel (1857), p. 30: “Das Gesetz, mit welchem man
es hier zu thun hat, ist kein einfaches. Die Höhe der Ausgaben für Nahrung wachsen bei Abnahme des
Wohlstandes in einer geometrischen Progression.”
11As it will be shown later on, we have limt→∞ SN (t) = 0, so 1−γ can be interpreted as the asymptotic
elasticity of substitution.
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On the industry level, market clearing requires
yi(t) = x˜i(t) + ci(t) + zi(t), ∀i ∈ [0, 1] , (1.21)
where yi(t) is total production of intermediate inputs. x˜i(t) is the total amount of inter-
mediate inputs used in final goods production. ci(t) are total intermediate inputs used
to produce machines and zi(t) are total intermediate inputs used as R&D investments.
Labor market clearing can be written as
L =
∫ 1
0
Li(t)di. (1.22)
Finally, asset market clearing implies
A(t) =
∫ 1
0
Mi(t)vi(t)di. (1.23)
1.3.5 Dynamic Equilibrium
In this economy, a dynamic equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1.1. A dynamic equilibrium is a time path of expenditure, wealth and con-
sumption quantities {E(t), A(t), XN(t), XD(t)}∞t=0, prices, wage rate and interest rate
{PN(t), w(t), r(t)}∞t=0, available machine varieties, output, labor demand, R&D invest-
ment and price in each industry {Mi(t), yi(t), Li(t), zi(t), pi(t)}∞t=0, i ∈ [0, 1], and quantity
and price of all machines varieties in all industries {χ(ωi, t), p(ωi, t)}∞t=0, ∀ωi, i ∈ [0, 1]
which are jointly consistent with household and firm optimization, the resource constraint
and market clearing, given the specified market structure (i.e. perfect competition in all
markets with the exception of the machine producers who have a monopoly position).
Before solving the model, we briefly relate the specified framework to some refer-
ence cases. First, with β = 0, the representative household only consumes good D (i.e.
durables). In this case, the perfectly symmetric unit interval of intermediate inputs be-
comes obsolete and the economy coincides with the standard one-sector lab-equipment
model where households have CRRA preferences (see e.g. Acemoglu, 2009, chapter 13).
Second, with ϵ → 0, σ2 = 0 and ∆ ̸= 0, we have homothetic preferences and identical
technologies across sectors – with the exception of a Hicks-neutral exogenous but sector-
specific TFP growth rate. In this case, the model is very similar to Ngai and Pissarides
(2007). The equilibrium dynamics feature structural change due to relative price eﬀects
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and we can solve the model explicitly since the Kaldor facts will be fulfilled.12 However,
such an analysis clearly abstracts from biased technical change and there would be no
income eﬀects on the demand structure. Third, with ϵ ̸= 0, σ2 = 0 and ∆ ̸= 0, the
model becomes similar to Boppart (2011) where structural change is driven by the non-
homotheticity of preferences. But since σ2 = 0 structural change at the sector level does
not trickle down to intermediary inputs and hence does not induce directed technical
change on the industry level. Finally, if we consider homothetic preferences (i.e. ϵ→ 0),
introduce two diﬀerent types of labor (skilled and unskilled), and assume that diﬀerent
intermediate industries use these two labor types with diﬀerent intensities, we move to-
wards a standard model of directed technical change a la Acemoglu (1998).
It is important to emphasize that none of the aforementioned models contain all the char-
acteristics motivated in Section 1.2. In the next subsection we solve our model and show
that it features industry directed technical change while the long-run structural change is
driven by both an income and a substitution eﬀect.
1.3.6 Solving for the Dynamic Equilibrium Path
Aggregate Dynamics
We solve the model in two parts: first, we show that the dynamic equilibrium path
features standard balanced properties on the aggregate (i.e. the Kaldor facts are fulfilled).
Second, we characterize the sectoral dynamics. This is more complicated since we have
to deal with relatively rich dynamics at the disaggregate level. But irrespectively of these
sectoral dynamics, the next proposition shows that on the aggregate the model has a
unique dynamic path with a closed form solution.
Proposition 1.1. Suppose we have ηLν > ρ >
ϵηL
ν . Then, the model features no tran-
sitional dynamics and the real (durable good denominated) interest rate and the growth
rates of wealth, wages and expenditures are constant, i.e.
r =
ηL
ν
(1.24)
A˙(t)
A(t)
=
w˙(t)
w(t)
=
∫ 1
0
M˙i(t)
Mi(t)
di =
E˙(t)
E(t)
=
1
1− ϵ
[
ηL
ν
− ρ
]
≡ g > 0. (1.25)
Moreover, we have
w(t) =
1
ν − 1 exp [gt] , (1.26)
12The reason why the model would not be identical to Ngai and Pissarides (2007) is due to the fact
that they use a CES utility function, whereas in our model the elasticity of substitution between durables
and non-durables is not constant over time.
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and
E(0) =
[
L
ν − 1 +
1
(1− ϵ)η
[
ρ− ϵηL
ν
]]
≡ E0 > 0. (1.27)
This is an equilibrium path as long as (1.14) is fulfilled for all t.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1.1 shows that the aggregate variables behave in the dynamic equilibrium
as in the steady state of a neoclassical growth model and Kaldor’s stylized facts (see
Kaldor, 1961) are fulfilled. It is noteworthy that we can solve for the aggregate dynamics
without knowing the exact equilibrium path of the disaggregate variables. This separation
keeps the problem tractable and allows us to find a closed form characterization of the
disaggregate dynamics, as we will show in the next step.
Disaggregate Dynamics
The disaggregate equilibrium dynamics of this model are much richer than the aggregate,
because the expenditure structure, SN(t), and the intermediate input prices, {pi(t)}1i=0,
interact with each other in two ways. On the one hand, the dynamics of intermediate
input prices aﬀect the (relative) price of non-durable goods, PN(t), and consequently via
a standard substitution eﬀect the demand structure SN(t). On the other hand, as in
any theory of directed technical change, the demand structure determines the (industry-
specific) R&D investment incentive and via this channel the dynamics of intermediate
industry prices. Interestingly, the causality of the two eﬀects go in diﬀerent directions.
The two eﬀects are highlighted in the next lemma.
Lemma 1.5. The disaggregate dynamics can be summarized by the following equations:
SN(t) = βE−ϵ0 exp
[
−ϵgt− γ∆t + γ
∫ 1
0
[α(i)− 1] log [pi(t)] di
]
, (1.28)
and
pi(t) = exp
[
−ην − 1
ν
E0
∫ t
0
SN(τ) [α(i)− 1] dτ
]
, ∀i, (1.29)
where expenditures at date zero, E0, and the growth rate, g, are defined in Proposition 1.1.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
(1.28) visualizes the substitution eﬀect of intermediate industry prices on the demand
structure, whereas (1.29) formalizes the directed technical change eﬀect from the expen-
diture structure on the industry price dynamic.
The expenditure share of the non-durable sector, SN (t), changes over time for two rea-
sons: first, households have non-homothetic preferences and (per-capita) expenditures
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grow along the dynamic equilibrium path with rate g. Since non-durables are necessities
and durables luxuries, SN(t) tends to decline over time. The magnitude of this eﬀect
is governed by the degree of non-homotheticity of preferences, ϵ, and the growth rate of
(per-capita) expenditures, g. With homothetic preferences (i.e. ϵ = 0) we would have
no income eﬀect on the demand structure and the corresponding term in (1.28) would
vanish. The second reason why SN (t) changes over time is that the relative price PN(t)
varies. Clearly, the relative price changes due to the exogenous diﬀerence in TFP growth
rates, ∆. But in addition, PN(t) varies since there are diﬀerences in the intensities with
which the sectoral outputs depend on the diﬀerent intermediate industries (represented by
the α(i)’s) and since industry-specific prices, pi(t), change according to directed technical
progress. The sign and magnitude of this relative price eﬀect on the demand structure is
determined by the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors, which itself is con-
trolled by the parameter γ. If the (asymptotic) elasticity of substitution between goods
and services is unity (i.e. γ = 0) the demand structure is independent of the relative price
PN(t). If durables and non-durables are (asymptotically) gross substitutes (i.e. γ < 0)
the sector which experiences a relative price increase loses in terms of expenditure shares.
With gross complements the opposite is true.
Equation (1.29) characterizes how endogenous technical change aﬀects the price of inter-
mediate industry i. In a given point in time τ , the growth rate of the price of industry i
is given by the inverse of R&D activity in this industry (relative to the average over all
industries). More formally13,
p˙i(τ)
pi(τ)
= g − M˙i(τ)
Mi(τ)
.
Consequently, the price of industry i at date t is given by the history of R&D activities up
to date t. What determines the R&D activity in industry i at a given date τ? As equation
(1.12) shows, this R&D activity is positively related to the number of people employed in
the industry. This is a standard market size eﬀect indicating that the incentive to innovate
a new machine increases proportionally to the number of workers that use it. The number
of workers in industry i is above average if the intensity, α(i), with which non-durable
good production depends on it exceeds unity (see (A.10)). Moreover, given that industry
i is, as an input, more intensively used by the non-durable sector (i.e. α(i) > 1), the
number of workers employed in this industry is increasing in the expenditure share of
non-durables.
Equations (1.28) and (1.29) define a system of equations in SN(t) and {pi(t)}1i=0. By
setting t equal to zero, we obtain the initial conditions
13This follows immediately from (1.6) and (1.26). The average of the R&D activity over all industries
shows up because of the choice of numeraire.
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pi(0) = 1, ∀i, (1.30)
and
SN(0) = β
[
L
ν − 1 +
1
(1− ϵ)η
[
ρ− ϵηL
ν
]]−ϵ
= βE−ϵ0 . (1.31)
Solving the system of equations we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1.2. Along the dynamic equilibrium path, the sectoral dynamics are char-
acterized by
SN(t) =
SN(0)
exp [(γ∆ + ϵg)t] + [exp [(γ∆ + ϵg)t]− 1] SN (0)γη ν−1ν σ2E0γ∆+ϵg
, (1.32)
where SN(0) is given by (1.31). Moreover, we have
PN(t) = exp
[
ϵg
γ
t
](
SN(t)
SN(0)
) 1
γ
, (1.33)
Li(t) = L+ (ν − 1)E0 [α(i)− 1]SN(t), (1.34)
and
pi(t) =
[
SN (t)
SN(0)
exp [(γ∆+ ϵg)t]
]α(i)−1
γσ2
. (1.35)
This is an equilibrium path under the parameter restrictions stated in Proposition 1.1 and
as long as (1.14) is fulfilled for all t.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1.2 shows that we indeed obtain closed form solutions for all variables.
Finally, note that we assumed that (1.14) is fulfilled along the entire path. We are now
prepared to state conditions on the exogenous parameters such that this condition is
indeed met. This is done in the next proposition. Recall that condition (1.14) ensures
that the expenditure share devoted to non-durables does not exceed unity. As we can see
from (1.32), the dynamics of SN(t) depend on several parameter values. In the following
we focus on a case in which the durable good sector is asymptotically dominant, for which
we get:
Proposition 1.3. Suppose
γ∆ +
ϵ
1− ϵ
[
ηL
ν
− ρ
]
≥ 0, (1.36)
γ∆+
ϵ
1− ϵ
[
ηL
ν
− ρ
]
> −γην − 1
ν
σ2β
[
L
ν − 1 +
1
(1− ϵ)η
[
ρ− ϵηL
ν
]]1−ϵ
, (1.37)
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and
β <
[
L
ν − 1 +
1
(1− ϵ)η
[
ρ− ϵηL
ν
]]ϵ
. (1.38)
Then, condition (1.14) is fulfilled along the entire path and the dynamics in Propositions
1.1 and 1.2 characterize a dynamic equilibrium path.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
We are now ready to discuss the equilibrium dynamics on the disaggregate level. The
assumptions in Proposition 1.3 make sure that SN(t) is declining over time. An easy way
to see the dynamics of SN(t) is in equation (A.13). The non-homotheticity channel leads
to a declining SN(t), since non-durables are necessities by assumption and expenditures
grow over time. So the conditions in Proposition 1.3 ensure that this declining trend in
SN(t) due to income eﬀects is not overturned by a relative price eﬀects. Whether the
relative price eﬀects increases or decreases SN (t) depends on the elasticity of substitution
as well as on how PN(t) changes over time. If the (asymptotic) elasticity of substitution
is larger than unity (i.e. if γ < 0), an increase in the relative price, PN(t), decreases the
expenditure share devoted to non-durables. With γ > 0 the opposite is true. For the
growth rate of the (relative) price of the non-durable sector, we obtain (see (1.33) and
(A.13))
P˙N(t)
PN(t)
= −∆− ην − 1
ν
σ2E0SN(t). (1.39)
The relative price changes because of the exogenous TFP growth rate diﬀerence, ∆, as
well as because of industry-specific technical progress (captured by the second term in
(1.39)).
With S˙N (t)SN (t) being always negative the expenditure share of non-durable goods asymptot-
ically converges to zero and the durable sector is therefore asymptotically dominant.14
As time goes to infinity, S˙N (t)SN (t) converges to − (γ∆+ ϵg), which is still negative (see as-
sumption (1.36)). In this sense, structural change does not come to a halt and does exist
even asymptotically. In contrast, since asymptotically the direction of industry-specific
technical change is fully determined by the durable good sector, we have
lim
t→∞
P˙N(t)
PN(t)
= −∆. (1.40)
Hence, asymptotically, the growth rate of the relative price does not change anymore (but
it can diﬀer from zero).
The theory oﬀers relatively rich dynamics. It is worthwhile to emphasize that these
14Note that just the expenditure share of non-durables goes to zero. In levels non-durable good expen-
ditures go to infinity.
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dynamics occur along the equilibrium path of a dynamic general equilibrium model. Con-
sequently there are no exogenous shifts in demand or supply. Since the (asymptotic)
elasticity of substitution can be either larger or smaller then unity (i.e. γ " 0) our theory
does not take a stand whether the expenditure share, SN (t), increases or decreases in the
relative price (see (1.17)). In addition, because there are both relative price and income
eﬀects on the expenditure structure, the elasticity of substitution between durables and
non-durables is not so easy to infer. For instance, the fact that the expenditure share of
non-durable goods declined whereas the relative price of non-durable goods increased over
the last 80 years does not automatically imply that the elasticity of substitution has to
be larger than unity. It could well be that it is strictly smaller than unity but the relative
price eﬀect on the expenditure structure is overturned by an income eﬀect.
From (1.39) it is clear that our theory does not make a prediction about the average level
of relative price growth (i.e. whether PN(t) is increasing or declining). Depending on the
sign of ∆ this can either be negative or positive. However, the theory does make a clear
prediction how P˙N (t)PN (t) changes over time: the growth rate of the (relative) price of a sector
which experiences a decline in terms of its expenditure share increases over time. This
is consistent with Figures 1.1 and 1.2. The reason for this dynamic is directed technical
change. As the expenditure share of the non-durable sector shrinks, (1.34) shows that a
declining amount of labor is allocated to industries which are relative intensively used by
the non-durable sector (i.e. with α(i) > 1). A declining market size in these sectors imply
a declining R&D activity (see (A.11)) and an increasing industry-specific price growth
p˙i(t)
pi(t)
. This eﬀect constitutes the so called market size eﬀect. Formally, this can be seen
from combining (1.35) and (A.13) and writing the industry-specific price growth as
p˙i(t)
pi(t)
= − [α(i)− 1] ην − 1
ν
E0SN(t). (1.41)
As the price growth rate of industries that are more intensively used in the non-durable
sector increases, the growth rate of the relative price of non-durables, PN(t), increases
too.15
It is the aim of the next section to test this prediction of industry directed technical
change using disaggregate US data. By doing so we explicitly make use of the input-
output structure of the US economy. This allows us to identify the variation in the
industrial market shares which is exogenous from the perspective of an individual firm
that makes the decision of how much to invest in R&D.
15For this see (1.2), which implies that we have P˙N (t)PN (t) = −∆+
∫ 1
0 (α(i)− 1) p˙i(t)pi(t)di.
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1.4 Empirical Application
1.4.1 Testing for the Market Size Eﬀect
In the following, we test for our theory’s prediction how structural change in terms of
final consumption translates into changes in the market sizes of diﬀerent industries at the
value-added level and how this in turns aﬀects industry-specific TFP and output price
growth rates. We use US data from EU KLEMS covering 30 diﬀerent industries and 30
years.16 For our analysis we build five-year spells, which leads to 180 observations. Our
model’s main prediction suggest a negative (positive) correlation between an industry’s
market size and its price (TFP) growth rate. This motivates the following regression
di(t) = δ log si(t− l) + κi + φ(t) + ui(t), (1.42)
where di(t) is one of the dependent variables (i.e. either the TFP or the price growth
rate). si(t− l) is the market size of industry i, κi and φ(t) represent a full set of industry
and time fixed eﬀects and ui(t) is an error term. The TFP and price growth rates, di(t),
are calculated as log-diﬀerences over the five-year interval between t and t−5. The market
size measures the average fraction of industry value-added, vai, relative to total GDP over
a five-year interval, or formally17
si(t− l) = 1
5
5∑
k=1
vai(t− l − k)
GDP (t− l − k) . (1.43)
An important question is the timing. In our theory, where all agents are perfectly for-
ward looking and R&D investments immediately result in a TFP enhancing innovation,
expenditure shares and TFP growth rates co-move instantaneously. Arguably, this is not
true in reality and for this reason we explore diﬀerent time lags of length of zero, one and
two periods (i.e. l = 0, 5, 10). The industry and time fixed eﬀects are included to control
for industry-specific diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of R&D investments and time trends
in the average productivity growth rate.18 Our theory of directed technical change makes
a prediction about the sign of δ and this is the parameter of main interest.
Table 1.1 presents results of our baseline specification using the industry-specific price
growth rate as a dependent variable. The contemporaneous logarithmized value-added
16A precise list of data sources can be found in Appendix A.3.
17Note that this allows us to interpret it directly as an industry’s market share. Both terms market
size and market share will be used interchangeably in the following.
18Note again that our theory’s main prediction is about changes in industry-specific TFP and price
growth rates and not their levels.
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share shows no significant correlation with the current rate of price growth, which is
displayed in column (1). However, if we take lagged market shares we see a negative
correlation with the price growth rate (see columns (2) and (3) in Table 1.1). This finding
might have two diﬀerent interpretations. On the one hand, the evolution of market shares
might not perfectly be foreseen and R&D investments might take some time to material-
ize. This suggests that the correlation between an industry’s market size and price growth
rate is zero contemporaneously, becomes negative after some years and finally attenuates
again. In Appendix A.2, we show for a subset of years and industries for which we have
a measure of the R&D stock, that the growth rate of the R&D stock reacts immediately
(and that there is no anticipating eﬀect). This is in line with the found lags of the eﬀects
on prices (and TFP later on).
On the other hand, the low and insignificant coeﬃcient in column (1) could also be the
result of reversed causality. Suppose the industry-specific price fluctuates for exogenous
reasons. Then, if the short run elasticity of substitution is smaller than one, periods with
high prices are correlated with high value-added shares. This mechanical eﬀect runs in
the opposite direction of the market size eﬀect of induced innovation and attenuates the
estimate for δ. One way to relax this problem is to use the lagged value-added share. In
column (4) we include both the contemporaneous and the lagged market share and show
that the coeﬃcient of the lagged market share remains significant. This mitigates the
concern that the coeﬃcient in column (2) is driven by the mechanical contemporaneous
eﬀect as well as a serial correlation in the independent variable.
The magnitude of the estimated eﬀect of column (2) suggests that a one percent increase
in an industry’s market share relative to GDP decreases the price growth rate by 0.52
percentage points over the next five years. Given the standard deviation of this variable
of 21 percentage points, this is an economically significant eﬀect.
Since there exists a strong negative correlation between the industry-specific TFP growth
rates and the relative price changes, it is not surprising to find the analog positive eﬀect
of a larger market size on the TFP growth rate. Table 1.2 presents our estimates using
the five-year TFP growth rates as the dependent variable. Qualitatively the same picture
as in Table 1.1 remains, even though the eﬀects are slightly smaller in magnitude and less
precisely estimated.
The identification strategy of the OLS regressions relies on the assumption that firms –
that make the R&D investment decision – do take the industry market size as exogenously
given. However, this might not be the case. Especially, some large firms might take into
account that their innovation activity can aﬀect the industry price index and consequently
their market size. Depending on the elasticity of substitution this would bias our estimate
up- or downwards. To address this concern we oﬀer an IV strategy where we instrument
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Dependent variable: Price growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log market share 0.026 0.847**
(0.088) (0.374)
L.Log market share -0.522*** -1.081***
(0.202) (0.335)
L2.Log market share -0.419**
(0.168)
N 180 150 120 150
R2 0.312 0.441 0.484 0.570
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
Table 1.1: OLS regression on price growth
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (4-6 intervals) and industry fixed eﬀects (30 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1977-2007, but observations are grouped into five-year intervals. The independent variable is
averaged over five years, the dependent variable is calculated as the five-year log-diﬀerence. “L.” and “L2.” denotes a one and two
period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10 in equation (1.43)).
Dependent variable: TFP growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log market share -0.104 -0.533**
(0.071) (0.260)
L.Log market share 0.241** 0.593**
(0.119) (0.247)
L2.Log market share 0.145*
(0.081)
N 180 150 120 150
R2 0.489 0.549 0.587 0.624
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
Table 1.2: OLS regression of TFP growth
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (4-6 intervals) and industry fixed eﬀects (30 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1977-2007, but observations are grouped into five-year intervals. The independent variables are
averaged over five years, the dependent variable is calculated as the five-year log-diﬀerence. “L.” and “L2.” denotes a one and two
period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10 in equation (1.43)).
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the industry market size by its component stemming from the structural change at the
final consumption level. This is in line with our theory, where structural change at the
final good level trickles down – via the input-output structure of the economy – to the
industry value-added level, where it determines the incentive to innovate.
Hence, in order to construct our instrument we require the US input-output tables. We
first have to close the gap between purchaser’s prices and producer’s prices.19 This is
done by the “Personal Consumption Expenditure Bridge Table”. Then the input-output
tables of the year 2002 are used to calculate how much nominal value-added in industry
i is needed in order to produce one US dollar sale of final consumption good j. As in the
theoretical section we denote this requirement coeﬃcient as αj(i). Given the gross nom-
inal consumption, pjyj, of 76 final consumption sectors j = 1, ..., Q and these intensities
αj(i), we can then construct for each industry and year the “potential” market size
v˜ai(τ) =
Q∑
j=1
αj(i)pj(τ)yj(τ). (1.44)
This potential market size is the value-added that would have been generated in industry
i if the intensities would have been the same as in the year 2002. With this potential
market size we can calculate our instrument, the potential market share, as
s˜i(t− l) = 1
5
5∑
k=1
v˜ai(t− l − k)
E(t− l − k) , (1.45)
where the denominator is simply total consumer expenditures E(t− l− k) = ∑Qj=1 pj(t−
l−k)yj(t− l−k).20 The identifying assumption of this instrument is that individual firms
consider the final sales in the 76 consumption categories as exogenously given. More
specifically, firms do not consider that their own R&D investments can aﬀect the price
indices of the diﬀerent final consumption categories and consequently their market size.
For example, the assumption is that a single tire producer takes the market size of newly
sold cars as exogenously given and does not consider it to be influenceable by his own
R&D investments.
Table 1.3 and 1.4 and summarize the results when we instrument the market share,
19The producer’s price of a good is the value the producer obtains when the good leaves the factory,
while the purchaser’s price is the price the consumer pays in a store when buying the good. Thus, the
main diﬀerence is that the later contains distribution costs (like sales tax or transportation costs) while
the former does not.
A detailed application of input-output tables is found in Appendix A.3.
20Note that this measure of total consumer expenditures diﬀers slightly from the one reported in the
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) since our measure of potential market size corrects for
expenditures on imported (intermediate) goods.
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Dependent variable: Price growth
(1) (2) (3)
Log market share -0.210**
(0.096)
L.Log market share -0.602***
(0.232)
L2.Log market share -0.437**
(0.199)
N 180 150 120
R2 0.279 0.438 0.483
Method IV IV IV
Table 1.3: IV regression on price growth
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (4-6 intervals) and industry fixed eﬀects (30 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1977-2007, but observations are grouped into five-year intervals. The independent variables are
averaged over five years, the dependent variable is calculated as the five-year log-diﬀerence. The Log market share is instrumented
by the structural change at the final consumption good level as described in Section 1.4. First stage regression results are found in
Appendix A.2. “L.” and “L2.” denotes a one and two period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10 in equation (1.43)).
Dependent variable: TFP growth
(1) (2) (3)
Log market share 0.090
(0.102)
L.Log market share 0.296**
(0.144)
L2.Log market share 0.209**
(0.098)
N 180 150 120
R2 0.459 0.547 0.584
Method IV IV IV
Table 1.4: IV regression on TFP growth
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (4-6 intervals) and industry fixed eﬀects (30 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1977-2007, but observations are grouped into five-year intervals. The independent variables are
averaged over five years, the dependent variable is calculated as the five-year log-diﬀerence. The Log market share is instrumented
by the structural change at the final consumption good level as described in Section 1.4. First stage regression results are found in
Appendix A.2. “L.” and “L2.” denotes a one and two period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10 in equation (1.43)).
Chapter 1 33
si(t− l), by our measure of potential market share.21 The eﬀects on both the price growth
rate and the industry-specific TFP growth are slightly higher, but qualitatively they show
the same, consistent pattern: the coeﬃcients of the one period lagged variables is large
and statistically significant at least at the five percent level. With a two period lag, the
coeﬃcients get smaller and the contemporaneous eﬀects are small (and at least in the
case of the TFP growth insignificant). The coeﬃcient in column (2) of Table 1.4 suggests
that a one percent increase in its market share increases the industry-specific TFP growth
rate by 0.3 percentage points over the next five years. Given the average five-year TFP
growth rate of 4.3 percent, this is an economically significant eﬀect.
21The corresponding first stage regressions can be found in Appendix A.2.
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1.5 Conclusion
This paper presented a parsimonious model of industry directed technical change where
households have non-homothetic preferences. Within our theoretical framework we show
how structural change at the final output level translates into structural change at the
industry value-added level. In line with the directed technical change literature, the
industry-specific market share is the key determinant of R&D investments. A change in
households’ expenditure profile leads to a systematic shift in industry-specific TFP growth
rates and consequently relative prices. However, the changing relative prices themselves
create a feedback eﬀect on households’ expenditure structure. Hence, our model also in-
corporates the relative price channel of structural change. Although replicating this rich
disaggregate structure, the model features constant growth on the aggregate and has a
closed form solution.
Building on our theoretical model, we evaluated the market size eﬀect empirically. Work-
ing with input-output tables, we constructed a measure of market size that is driven by an
arguably exogenous component of structural change at the final output level. Our identi-
fication strategy then allowed us to evaluate the importance of the market size hypothesis
across the complete set of US industries. Robust to diﬀerent specifications, we find that
a one percent increase in an industry’s market share increases its TFP growth rate by
about 0.3 percentage points or equivalently reduces its price growth by −0.6 percentage
points (over a five year period). Consistent with our expectation, we also document that
while R&D investments react simultaneously to an increase in market size, it takes about
five years for these investments to result in larger TFP growth rates and falling prices.
Our results can be read as a qualification to the “Baumol’s cost disease”, which states that
with an elasticity of substitution smaller than unity, sectors with a lower TFP growth rate
account for an increasing fraction of total GDP and consequently, the economy’s aggregate
growth rate declines as sectors with lower technical progress constitute a larger fraction
of the economy. Our qualification is twofold: first, we emphasize the non-homotheticity
of preferences as a driver of structural change. If the production process of luxuries (with
an expenditure elasticity of demand larger than one) exhibited faster technical change,
there might be no cost disease – even if the elasticity of substitution were less than unity.
The second challenge is due to the endogenous direction of technical change. If – as our
results suggest – bigger markets attract more R&D investments, the TFP growth rate of
faster expanding sectors will endogenously increase. Consequently, the ranking of the sec-
tors along the rate of technical progress is not stable over time. The sectors that feature
today a low rate of technical change and account for an increasing fraction of GDP might
transform into tomorrow’s engine of technical progress.
A version of this paper was submitted to the Economic Journal in February 2014.
2 Employment Polarization and the Role of
the Apprenticeship System
Joint with Michelle Rendall
2.1 Introduction
One of the most significant changes in the labor market has been the increasing adoption
of computer technology since the 1970s (Autor et al., 1998). Recent research has high-
lighted one specific impact of this ICT innovation: the displacement of middle income
employment by capital adoption. This labor-capital displacement has caused employ-
ment polarization, which has become a major focus of research in developed economies.
For example, Autor et al. (2003) first documented the eﬀect of computers, not only
complementing the high-skilled, but also replacing middle-skilled jobs in the US. The au-
thors decompose occupation requirements into three task types: manual (hand and finger
dexterity), routine (repetitive) and abstract (analytical). Generally, the low, middle and
high portions of the income distribution are linked to manual, routine and abstract tasks,
respectively. Thus, computers most easily replace middle-skill tasks. Goos et al. (2011)
document similar employment polarization across Europe. Figure 2.1a shows the change
in employment shares for the US and Germany along the 1979 wage distribution for each
country.1 As polarization is present in both countries, it seems natural to conjecture that
both countries have seen a rise in polarization driven by technical change in ICT (infor-
mation and communications technology). However, graphing computer adoption rates
against the share of routine-intensive employment across German labor market regions
(see Figure 2.1b) presents a puzzle in terms of the polarization hypothesis.2 In Germany
regions with the most computer adoption since the 1980s are those regions with the low-
est routine employment share in 1979. In contrast, regions in the United States with
the highest routine employment share have experienced the largest per capita computer
adoption rate (Autor and Dorn, 2013, see Table 3).
1Information about the data sources is found in Section 2.3 and in Appendix B.2.
2For details on regions in Germany and the construction of routine employment see Section 2.3.
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Figure 2.1: Employment Polarization and Computers
In this paper we argue that diﬀerences in educational systems can resolve this puzzle.
More precisely, we formalize the link between worker replacement, technology adoption
and an education system that incentivizes skill-specific vocational education versus gen-
eral education. To support this mechanism, we use empirical evidence on the (dual-)
apprenticeship system in Germany and regional variation in apprenticeship intensity. In
Germany, routine-intensive local labor markets have a large, apprentice-trained labor
force. We show that these local markets see less computer adoption, but also less employ-
ment polarization over time. Figure 2.2b sorts regions along the percentile distribution in
terms of new apprenticeship contracts in 1978/79 and graphs the share of personal com-
puters used within each region.3 The graph shows that regions with above average rates
of new apprenticeship contracts in the 1978-1979 period (labeled “Apprentice Regions”),
are also regions with lower computer shares in 1999. In fact, the linear fit suggests a
negative correlation of −0.445.
Figure 2.2a repeats Figure 2.1a for Germany by regions with above and below average
new apprenticeship contracts from 1978 and 1979. Regions with above average ratios in
apprenticeship contracts (or apprentice-intensive regions) have experienced significantly
less employment polarization. That is, regions with little employment polarization are
also regions with less computer adoption.
At the same time, Autor and Dorn (2013) find that the rise in the service sector has
come with large wage polarization in the US. That is, jobs in the middle of the wage dis-
tribution are replaced by growth in low wage service sector jobs leading to greater wage
inequality. In comparison, structural transformation (or the rise of the service sector),
has been considerably slower in Germany. In 1980 roughly 50 percent of Germany’s em-
3New apprenticeship contracts are measured as the ratio of new contracts over the employed population
within local German labor markets.
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Figure 2.2: Employment Polarization and Computers across Regions
ployment was manufacturing related (including agriculture), with this number dropping
to roughly 38 percent in 2000. In contrast, the US employment share in manufacturing
fell from 34 to 25 percent during the same period. In terms of employment polarization
both Germany and the US have seen an increase at the top of the distribution. However,
only the US has a marked U-shape with low wage occupations growing over time.
We are not the first to make a link between education systems and cross-country
growth diﬀerences. Goldin and Katz (2008) hint that slower output growth in Europe
could be a function of the vocational education emphasis, rather than general education
as in the US. Krueger and Kumar (2004) formalize this argument and suggest that since
the 1980s Europe has lagged behind in terms of manufacturing productivity, investment
in ICT, and/or in total output growth due to vocational education systems. However, to
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to linking the education system and technology
adoption to the recent literature on task based production and employment polarization
(see Acemoglu and Autor, 2011, for a detailed survey).
The (dual) apprenticeship system incentivizes firms to invest in the industry- or firm-
specific human capital skills of its workforce. Winkelmann (1997) documents that very few
workers enter the labor market in Germany without having received specific vocational
training. He further suggests that the institutional structure that allows the apprentice-
ship system to function in Germany is likely not present in the US. That is, the greater
labor mobility, flexibility in wages and reduced layoﬀ costs in the US make it riskier for
firms to train workers in case of “poaching”. Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) show that
the US is characterized by a high-turnover, low-training equilibrium. Thus, high school
graduates (e.g., associate degree holders or college dropouts) in the US are individuals
that acquire general human capital at school, but receive very little specific training. In
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contrast, German apprentices acquire specific skills and tend to be more productive than
those without industry-specific training when operating machinery and attending to pro-
duction processes. Skills are specifically learned during the training period and not later,
as apprentices have higher wages then unskilled workers in Germany, but have almost
no return to experience and tenure within the firm (for empirical evidence see Adda et
al., 2006; Hanushek et al., 2011). In summary, German non-college graduates are com-
posed primarily of skilled apprentices who have acquired specific skills at the expense of
firms/governments.
These apprenticeship costs, estimated to be about e15,000 per year per apprentice
by the Bundesinstitut fuer Berufsbildung (BiBB), are, similarly to technology adoption,
mostly born by firms (Harhoﬀ and Kane, 1993; Soskice, 1994). From the firm’s perspec-
tive then, acquiring new machinery in areas where apprentices are employed is more costly
because the prior training (specific skill) becomes obsolete and the comparative advantage
acquired through specific training during the apprenticeship is lost. Moreover, if ICT cap-
ital replaces non-college workers (as suggested by Autor et al., 2003), firms in Germany,
when compared to the US, have less incentives to adopt new technology and machines
and as a consequence, less middle-skilled jobs are destroyed in Germany. Finally, Michaels
et al. (2010) document the positive correlation between high-skill demand/ high-skilled
wages and ICT adoption across countries, and van Ark et al. (2003) show that the EU is
“lagging” behind the US in terms of ICT capital adoption. Although non-ICT adoption
is very high in Europe, ICT has diﬀused slowly with no “catch up" eﬀect observed - in
reality the gap between the EU and US has even widened.
In this paper, we develop a simple “task-replacing” model a la Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) to demonstrate how non-college, routine task labor is prone to substitution by
capital/machines. In addition to the substitutability of ICT and non-college labor the
model also incorporates the concept of complementarities between college labor and ICT.
Building on the empirical fact that apprentice-skills are immobile, we extend the model
to a spatial equilibrium setting where local labor markets have diﬀerential degrees of skill-
specific workers (apprentices) similar to Autor and Dorn (2013). The regional analysis
provides results across local labor markets that follow the German commuter zones. It
predicts that regions using apprentices (i.e., non-college labor with task-specific human
capital, instead of general workers): (1) adopted fewer computers; (2) face slower em-
ployment polarization or displacement of routine tasks; and (3) realize a slower rate of
structural transformation, or a smaller rise in low-skilled services, since apprentices pri-
marily work in the manufacturing sector (i.e. slower employment polarization). We then
evaluate these hypotheses using German social security data.
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Although Germany has an extensive apprenticeship system there exists substantial
variation in regional apprenticeship intensity. Before the ratification of the Berufsbil-
dungsgesetz at the beginning of the 1970s and the introduction of the Ausbildungsplatz-
foerderungsgesetz in 1976 the German apprenticeship system was regionally fragmented.
Only after the two oil shocks and the following deterioration of employment opportunities
for young adults, the federal government made an eﬀort in promoting the apprentice-
system within Germany and with it provided a systematic federal structure (or incen-
tives) to educate the workforce.4 Thus, in our empirical analysis, we use initial regional
variation in apprentice shares and routine employment shares to determine the interac-
tion between education, ICT adoption and labor market polarization. Exploiting regional
variation within a country, rather than using cross-country variation, avoids accounting
for a myriad of other potential important cultural and institutional diﬀerences.
The empirical results for Germany confirm the model’s hypotheses, that is, regions
with high apprenticeship rates have less computer adoption, less employment polarization
and a smaller rise in service employment. The results for other (non-apprentice) routine-
labor are similar in magnitude, in terms of labor displacement, to the US results for the
decades from 1980 to 2000. That is, a region with 10 percentage points more routine-labor
has a 2.19 percentage points larger displacement of routine-labor per decade. The results
on computer adoption and service employment are in the same direction as in the US but
smaller in magnitudes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the theoret-
ical model and derives the testable implications. Section 2.3 provides the German data
description with aggregate and regional facts. Section 2.4 presents the empirical results
and compares them both across regions within Germany and in an international context.
Lastly, Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
To model the interaction between apprenticeships and technological change, we develop a
partial equilibrium model. Assume skill supplies are given, and the population is divided
into non-college (apprentice or general education) and college graduates.5 For simplicity,
4See Casey, 1991; and see BiBB, 1977; Soskice, 1994 and references therein for a detailed discussion
of the history of the apprenticeship system in Germany.
5For simplicity we assume skill supplies to be fixed. Incorporating an endogenous education decision
does not change the results of employment polarization qualitatively.
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we refer to non-college workers as low-skilled and college graduates as high-skilled.6 Firms
choose how many machines to purchase for production and which type of worker to use for
what task. Machines are produced by monopolists each period and technological progress
is exogenous.
Final Good Production
The model is loosely based on Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(2001), but with the addition of apprentices. The unique final good is made up of a
continuum of intermediate goods, [0, 1],
Yt = exp
[∫ 1
0
ln yt(i)di
]
.
We normalize the price of the final good to one each period. Each good can be produced
using machines and both types of labor,
yt(i) = max{αℓ(i),1(ℓ=a|i≥x)αˆℓ(i)}ℓt(i) + (αh(i)ht(i))β
[∫ Nt
0
(αk(i))
β(kt(i, v))
1−β dv
]
,
where αj(i) > 0 captures the skill-specific and task-specific comparative advantage in
producing good i. The specific productivity skills of apprentices, 1(ℓ=a|i≥x), in contrast
to “regular” low-skilled workers, ℓt, are captured by αˆℓ(i). Hence, if the low-skilled are
apprentices, they have productivity, αˆℓ(i) > αℓ(i).7 However, apprentices are more pro-
ductive only for a subset of tasks, i ≥ x.8 The high-skilled productivity in contrast is
constant across all goods, αh(i) = αh ∀ i ∈ [0, 1], but requires capital, k(i, v), to be
productive.9 Finally, capital’s productivity varies over the interval, αk(i).10
6These labels do not imply that the low-skilled acquire no skills, rather they acquire diﬀerent skills, as
the skill set is lower in terms of formal schooling only. Since this paper’s focus is not on wage polarization,
we abstract from a third skill type.
7This Assumption is a reduced form of modeling the firms’ decision to invest in teaching apprentices
a task-specific skill. Due to labor market imperfections, such as high firing cost, the German firm has
a monopsony power over its apprentices, giving the incentives to invest in apprentices’ costly training
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998).
8Very low-skill jobs, e.g. cleaning occupations, do not require a special apprenticeship training to
be done. Moreover, the relative wage diﬀerential between apprentices and non-apprentices suggests an
apprentice’s comparative advantage to be largest in middle-skill occupations.
9The results depend only on the relative productivities of the low-skilled and machines in the RT
sector.
10The power of the β component serves as a convenient normalization.
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Definition of Tasks
Each intermediate good has manual-, routine- and abstract-task components and interme-
diate goods can be sorted according to these components. We sort goods on the interval
i ∈ [0, 1] from mostly manual to abstract, with routine in the middle. That is, the
manual-intensive component is decreasing over the unit interval. The routine-intensive
component is an inverted U-shape on the interval of intermediate goods. Thus, only goods
in the middle have a large routine component that is easily replaceable by machines. The
abstract component is increasing over the unit interval and goods at the upper range are
mostly abstract.
Denote production processes at the low-end, i ∈ [0, x), as low-skilled service occu-
pation, LST . Denote the interval with a large routine component as, RT = [x, x]. For
these production processes apprenticeships provide extra training yielding additional pro-
ductivity. The routine component of these tasks can be done by labor or machines. At
the upper range, i ≥ x, tasks are abstract and complex and the high-skilled are most
productive. However, high-skilled labor requires machines to preform these tasks. The
following Assumption formalizes this idea in terms of comparative advantages.
Assumption 2.1.
αℓ(i)
αh
is continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly decreasing in i. In addition, assume that
machine productivity is highest in routine tasks, i.e. ∂αk(i)∂i < 0 ∀i [0, 1].
Furthermore, it is assumed that the more abstract a production process is, the more
diﬃcult it is for low-skilled labor to be productive. Assumption 2.2 summarizes this
concept.
Assumption 2.2.
Assume that ∂
2αℓ(i)
∂i2 < 0 ∀i [0, 1].
Given Assumption 2.1, there will be perfect sorting between between low- and high-
skilled labor. Denote the threshold of sorting by Jt. Since we are interested in studying the
eﬀect of technology replacing routine-labor, Assumption 2.3 guarantees that the economy’s
starting point is within the potential replacement/displacement region.
Assumption 2.3.
The threshold on labor is within the RT regions for all time-periods, Jt ∈ [x, x] ∀t.
Lastly, for simplicity of derivations below, we assume that αk(i) takes two distinct
values, such that Assumption 2.1 is still satisfied,
Assumption 2.4.
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The productivity of capital is larger on the RT interval than for tasks above this interval.
That is, αk(i) = αk1 ≡ 1 ∀i [x, x] and αk(i) = αk2 < 1 ∀i (x, 1].
Machine Production
Assume the level of technology, Nt, is exogenously given (e.g. adopted from the world
technological frontier). The market for machines is perfectly competitive, such that the
price must equal the marginal cost of each machine. For all machines, it requires (1− β)
units of intermediate good yt(i) to produce one machine. Each machine is task-specific.
The firm producing machines solves,
max
kt(i,v)
pkt (i, v)kt(i, v)− (1− β)pt(i)kt(i, v).
The price, pkt (i, v) = pkt (i) = (1− β)pt(i), follows immediately from the zero-profit condi-
tion.
2.2.1 The Static Equilibrium
In this Section we analyze the static equilibrium without apprentices, instead concentrat-
ing on the productivity schedule αℓ(i) for the general-education low-skilled.
Given comparative advantages from above and Assumption 2.1, the economy has per-
fect sorting, with low-skilled labor working in the interval [0, Jt), and the high-skilled
and machines, kt, working in the interval [Jt, 1]. Lemma 2.1 summarizes this production
structure.
Lemma 2.1. In any equilibrium, there is a threshold, Jt, s.t. x < Jt < x and for any
i < Jt, ht(i), kt(i, v) = 0, for any i ≥ Jt, ℓt(i) = 0.
Production
Producers of the final good are price takers and maximize profits, taking the price of their
product (pt(i)), wages (wℓt, wht) and the price of machines (pkt (i, v)) as given. Maximizing
profits gives the demand for intermediate machines for each vintage type, v, and for each
intermediate good, i,
kt(i, v) = αhαk(i)ht(i).
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The demand for machines at each production process i is,
kt(i) =
∫ Nt
0
kt(i, v)dv = αhαk(i)h(i)Nt.
Given the demand for machines and Lemma 2.1, the production of tasks yt(i) is,
yt(i) = αℓ(i)ℓt(i) if 0 ≤ i < Jt
yt(i) = αhαk(i)ht(i)Nt if Jt ≤ i ≤ 1.
In any equilibrium, the marginal product of each skill group has to be equalized across
all tasks performed by a given group. This means price diﬀerences must exactly oﬀset
productivity diﬀerences,
pt(i)αℓ(i) = pt(i
′)αℓ(i′) := Pℓt, (2.1)
and
pt(i)αhαk(i) = pt(i
′)αhαk(i′) := Pht. (2.2)
No Arbitrage Condition across Skills
Due to the Cobb-Douglas production structure, expenditures, pt(i)xt(i), are equalized
across all tasks, which implies that the low- and high-skilled are equally distributed across
tasks, ℓt(i) = LtJt and ht(i) =
Ht
1−Jt . Hence, the following cost condition must hold in
equilibrium,
PhtHtNt
1− Jt =
PℓtLt
Jt
.
Substituting prices from equations (2.1) and (2.2) yields the “no arbitrage” condition,
which pins down the equilibrium threshold,
αhαk(Jt)HtNt
1− Jt =
αℓ(Jt)Lt
Jt
. (2.3)
Note that the model bears also implications for wages. However, as the study of wages
in Germany is beyond the scope of this paper due to the country specific issues outlined
in Section 2.4.4, the wage implications are omitted here.
2.2.2 Technical Progress
To analyze the dynamics of employment and structural change in the event that new tech-
nologies are invented, assume the world technological frontier advances at the exogenous
rate (1 + γ) > 1 or Nt = (1 + γ)tN0 with N0 = 1. That is, the technical knowledge up to
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the frontier is assumed to be perfectly available to each producer, whereupon he decides
on how much to invest in machines of this technology.
Employment Division
Let productivity diﬀerences between the low-skilled and the high-skilled (that use ma-
chines) be ω(i) ≡ ln(αℓ(i)) − ln(αhαk(i)). Consider a one-time change in N and totally
diﬀerentiate the no arbitrage condition in equation (2.3) with respect to Nt,
dJt
d ln(Nt)
=
(
∂ω(Jt)
∂Jt
− 1
1− Jt −
1
Jt
)−1
< 0, (2.4)
where by Assumption 2.1, ω′ < 0. Driven by skill-biased technical change, the range of
tasks performed by high-skilled workers increases at the expense of low-skilled workers.
From the threshold cross-derivative - under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 - the negative growth
in the threshold accelerates the lower the threshold becomes,
d2Jt
d ln(Nt)dJt
= −
(
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)2(∂2ω(Jt)
∂J2t
+
1− 2J
(Jt(1− Jt))2
)
> 0 for all Jt > J⋆, (2.5)
if the threshold is above a certain critical value, J⋆, where J⋆ ∈ (0, 12).11 Initially it is very
costly to spread high-skilled labor over more tasks and acquire the necessary machines for
labor to be productive. However, the marginal cost of spreading high-skilled labor over
evermore tasks decreases with the threshold. Every additional task, is more marginal.
I.e., spreading high-skilled labor from one to two tasks, is more costly, than spreading it
from two to three tasks.
Machine Investment
To derive the eﬀect of technological innovation on total machine investment, let us define
the demand for machines as Xt. Then Xt is given by,
Xt =
∫ 1
Jt
∫ Nt
0
kt(i, v)dvdi = αhNt
Ht
1− Jt
∫ 1
Jt
αk(i) di. (2.6)
Given Assumption 2.4, this simplifies to
Xt = αhNt
H
1− Jt [(x− Jt) + (1− x)αk2] . (2.7)
11See Appendix B.1 for the derivation of J⋆.
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New technologies, a rise in Nt, increase machines’ relative productivity and firms adopt
more machines,
d ln(Xt)
d ln(Nt)
=
∂ ln(Xt)
∂ ln(Nt)
+
∂ ln(Xt)
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
> 0. (2.8)
The first term is the direct productivity eﬀect, each tasks uses more machines. The second
term is the indirect eﬀect, more tasks are done by machines. Since the direct eﬀect is
always positive and irrespective of the threshold, the following analysis only focuses on
the second term. The eﬀect of a change in the threshold on machine adoption is,
∂ ln(Xt)
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
= − dJt
d ln(Nt)
(
1
x− Jt −
1
1− Jt
)
> 0. (2.9)
There are two eﬀects, (1) the interval in which machines are used increases and routine-
labor is replaced (i.e. Jt decreases); but (2) each machine is used by less high-skilled labor
(the last term in equation (2.9)). Given Assumption 2.4, machines are more productive in
the RT -interval, the first eﬀect always outweighs the second, within the routine-intensive
interval.
Routine-labor Displacement
Define the labor share performing routine occupations as LRT,t := LtJt (Jt − x). The inter-
val, (Jt − x) is a subset of the total interval of RT , (min {Jt, x}− x). Strictly speaking,
the model suggests that the high-skilled and machines perform all tasks in the interval
i ∈ [Jh,t, 1], even though machines become increasingly productive at more routine tasks.
Therefore, routine-labor would also include high-skilled labor by Assumption 2.3. How-
ever, recall that each task i, has three components: manual, routine and abstract. If there
is only labor in the interval, we could imagine that labor does all three components at the
same time. That is, a secretary does manual, as well as routine and abstract tasks for the
production of intermediate good i = j. However, if there is both labor and machines, the
routine component of production from i ∈ [Jt, x] might always be performed by machines
and the non-routine component by high-skilled labor. E.g., the addition and subtrac-
tion of numbers are performed by machines and the more analytical tasks are performed
by high-skilled labor using machines. Therefore, we abstract from high-skilled labor in
the RT interval.12 With technical progress and Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3, the change in
12Alternatively, we could write a model combining the pure substitution eﬀect of machines and middle-
skilled tasks as in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and the complementarity between machines and high-skilled
tasks, as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001). Since this is a stylized model, we choose to keep a simpler
approach of only modeling one part explicitly.
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routine-labor is,
∂ lnLRT,t
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
=
(
x
(Jt − x)Jt
)
dJt
d ln(Nt)
< 0. (2.10)
Technological progress leads to a fall in routine employment. As some labor shifts to the
production of low-skilled goods, i < x, the relative fall in the number of routine tasks is
always larger than the increase in the number of workers per task.
Low-skilled Service Sector Employment
Finally, as in Autor and Dorn (2013), the displacement of labor to production processes
below x implies that employment in low-skilled services increases upon ICT capital adop-
tion by,
∂ ln(LLST,t)
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
= − 1
Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
> 0, (2.11)
where labor in low-skilled services, LLST,t := LtJt x, is all labor in the interval of LST =
[0, x].
The Eﬀects of Technical Progress
Proposition 2.1 summarizes the eﬀects of technological progress on machine adoption and
the allocation of labor.
Proposition 2.1. Upon arrival of new (ICT) technologies, a rise in Nt causes:
1. the adoption of more machines;
2. the displacement of labor in routine tasks; and
3. an increase of low-skilled service labor.
2.2.3 Spatial Equilibrium
To discuss diﬀerences across apprentice-intensive and general-education regions, we intro-
duce an integrated spatial equilibrium model without labor mobility.13 Following Autor
and Dorn (2013), we assume that goods from each region are perfect substitutes, which
ensures that goods’ prices are equated in equilibrium. Moreover, since there is only one
13Dustmann and Pereira (2008) show that job mobility (wage growth and returns to experience) is
substantially lower in Germany compared to the UK. Adda et al. (2006) further document that especially
apprentices are less mobile and again overall job mobility is substantially lower in Germany compared
to the US. Since job mobility is a prerequisite for regional mobility, these facts also hint to low overall
mobility in Germany.
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tradable commodity, there are no gains from trade and no trade will take place in equi-
librium.
Consider two types of regions. Regions have either only apprentices or only low-skilled
workers. Since apprenticeship training is local (firm-specific) and apprentices exhibit little
mobility we assume the low-skilled, Lt, have additional productivity, captured in αˆℓ(i),
in the apprentice only regions.14 The only diﬀerence between an apprentice region and
others is the relative productivity of the low-skill group and αˆℓ(i) > αℓ(i). Denote the
“specific apprentice productivity” as λ, where αˆℓ = f (αℓ,λ) and ∂αˆℓ∂λ > 0. Ceteris paribus
a region with apprentices has a higher threshold Jt,
dJt
dλ
= − 1
αˆℓ(Jt)
∂αˆℓ(Jt)
∂λ
dJt
d ln(Nt)
> 0. (2.12)
For the purpose of this study, αˆℓ(i) can take any functional form as long as (1) Assump-
tions 2.1 and 2.2 are satisfied; and (2) regions with apprentices have a slower fall in the
threshold upon technology adoption,
d dJtd ln(Nt)
dλ
> 0, (2.13)
or (
d2ω(Jt)
dJ2t
+
1− 2J
(Jt(1− Jt))2
)
1
αˆℓ(Jt)
dαˆℓ(Jt)
dλ
dJt
d ln(Nt)
>
d2ω(Jt)
dJtdλ
. (2.14)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The left hand side is strictly positive as long as Jt > J⋆ (see equation (2.5)) and hence
the condition holds whenever d
2ω(Jt)
dJtdλ
< 0. One simple productivity schedule that fulfills
this condition is αˆℓ(i) = αℓ(i) ·λ(i) with ∂λ(i)∂i < 0. The qualitative results are independent
of the exact αˆℓ(i)-schedule, as long as equation (2.14) holds. For the remainder of the
paper it is assumed that equation (2.14) is satisfied.
Given this productivity schedule, the diﬀerential behavior of apprentice- versus other
regions with respect to (1) machine adoption, (2) routine-labor displacement, and (3)
low-skilled service growth can be studied. The cross derivatives of equations (2.9), (2.10)
and (2.11) with respect to the apprentice productivity, λ, summarize the relevant eﬀects.
14Alternatively, instead of diﬀerent regions, the thought experiment also works across occupations
which are diﬀerentially prone to apprentice employment.
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Machine Adoption across Regions
From equation (2.9), technology innovation leads to a rise in machine adoption. The
diﬀerential eﬀect of machine adoption across regions is,
d
(
∂ ln(Xt)
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
dλ
=
∂
(
∂ ln(Xt)
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
∂Jt
dJt
dλ
+
∂
(
∂ ln(Xt)
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
∂λ
< 0. (2.15)
Using the results from equations (2.4), (2.5), (2.12), condition (2.14) and Assumptions 2.1
- 2.4 apprentice-regions have less machine adoption given a threshold in the RT -region,
Jt > J⋆.15 The diﬀerential speed of machine adoption across regions is only driven by
diﬀerences in the substitution channel (of the low-skilled). The complementarity eﬀect,
conditional on regions having the same high-skilled labor share, is identical in apprentice-
and other regions.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Routine-labor Displacement across Regions
Analogously to above, diﬀerentiating equation (2.10) with respect to the apprentice pro-
ductivity, λ,
d
(
∂ lnLRT,t
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
dλ
=
∂
(
∂ lnLRT,t
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
∂Jt
dJt
dλ
+
∂
(
∂ lnLRT,t
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
∂λ
> 0, (2.16)
shows the impact of apprentices. That is, with the results from equations (2.4), (2.5),
(2.12), condition (2.14), and Assumptions 2.1 - 2.4, as long as Jt > J⋆, technical progress in
apprentice-regions leads to less displacement of routine employment. Intuitively, appren-
tices are more productive than other low-skilled workers and, therefore, the opportunity
cost of replacing them is larger.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Low-skilled Service Employment Across Regions
The derivation of diﬀerential growth in low-skilled services is analogous to routine-displacement
above. That is, low-skilled service employment, LLST,t increases faster for non-apprentice
15Technically, this still holds for thresholds below J⋆, as long as the absolute value of the first term is
larger than the second term.
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regions,
d
(
∂ lnLLST,t
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
dλ
=
∂
(
∂ lnLLST,t
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
∂Jt
dJt
dλ
+
∂
(
∂ lnLLST,t
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
∂λ
> 0, (2.17)
given equations (2.4), (2.5), (2.12), condition (2.14) and Assumptions 2.1 - 2.4, as long
as Jt > J⋆. As less routine-labor is replaced by machines in apprentice-intensive regions,
there is also displacement to low-skilled services.16
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
2.2.4 Testable Implications and Empirical Specification
Using the results from equations (2.15)-(2.17), we derive three testable implications across
German commuting zones. The testable implications relate to: (1) the adoption of ma-
chines; (2) the rate of displacement of routine-labor; and (3) the increase in low-skilled
service labor.
Empirical Specification
The data does not provide a direct measure of technological change, Nt. In the model,
the change in the threshold parameter, Jt only changes because of technological progress,
therefore,
dJt
d ln(Nt)
≡ dJt
dt
.
Then the eﬀects of technology on the dependent variable, Yt ∈ {Xt;LRT,t;LLST,t}, from
equations (2.9)-(2.11), are
∂ ln(Yt)
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
≈ ∆ ln(Yt)
∆Jt
∆Jt
∆t
.
Ignoring apprentices, the change in Jt over time only depends on the region’s initial J0.
That is, conditional on J0, regions have the same change in the threshold value and hence
in the dependent variable,
∆ ln(Yt)
∆Jt
∆Jt
∆t
≡ ∆(ln(Yt)− ln(Y0))
∣∣∣
J0
.
Thresholds, Jt, are an abstract concept and not observed in data. However, a region’s
routine-labor share is observable, LRT,0. The routine-labor share is determined by the
16The eﬀect on low-skilled service employment is equal in magnitude (in levels) to the (negative) eﬀect
on routine-labor.
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threshold, that is the higher the threshold, the higher the routine-labor share. Hence, the
threshold can be replaced by the routine-labor share, LRT,0, yielding
∆(ln(Yt)− ln(Y0))
∣∣∣
J0
≈ ∆(ln(Yt)− ln(Y0))
∣∣∣
LRT,0
.
Ignoring any productivity diﬀerences between apprentices and other low-skilled labor,
since all regions face the same global technology, the initial routine-labor share, LRT,0,
captures all the variation in the threshold, J0 (given the two types of labor, low- and high-
skilled must equal one). Therefore, the baseline regressions corresponding to equations
(2.9)-(2.11) are,
∆ ln(Yt,j) = β0 + β1LRT,0,j + ϵj . (2.18)
When diﬀerentiating between apprentices and other low-skilled labor, the routine labor
share, LRT,0 does not uniquely define the threshold, J0. That is a region’s threshold is
determined by (1) the share of high-skilled labor and (2) the composition of low-skilled
labor (apprentices or others). Only conditional on the high-skilled labor share, does a
region with more apprentices have a higher threshold given globally available technology.
Thus, equations (2.15)-(2.17), can be rewritten as,
d
(
∂∆ ln(Yt)
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
dλ
=
d∆(ln(Yt)− ln(Y0))
dλ
∣∣∣
LRT,0,H0
.
While the regressions showing the diﬀerential eﬀect of apprentice and other low-skilled
labor across regions, are
∆ ln(Yt,j) = β0 + β1L
A
RT,0,j + γ1L
O
RT,0,j +H0,j + ϵj , (2.19)
where “A” denotes apprentice- and “O” other low-skilled labor in routine tasks and H0,j
denotes the region’s initial high-skilled share.17
Testable Implications
Hypothesis 1. Conditional on the high-skilled labor share, regions with an apprentice-
intensive industry structure adopted fewer computers over time (see equation 2.15).
Hypothesis 2. Apprentice-intensive regions, conditional on the high-skilled labor share,
have less displacement of routine-labor as new ICT technology is invented (equation 2.16).
17Unlike the theory, regions do not perfectly sort into apprentice- versus non-apprentice regions. Re-
gions have diﬀerent mix of the two types of education systems, therefore, making it necessary to diﬀer-
entiate between apprentice and other low-skilled labor.
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Hypothesis 3. Apprentice-rich regions should experience a smaller rise in low-skilled
services over time, conditional on the high-skilled labor share (equation 2.17).
To summarize, Figure 2.3 visualizes the eﬀect of hypotheses 1 and 2 or regression
equation (2.19). Hypothesis 3 is just the inverse of hypothesis 2.
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Figure 2.3: Hypotheses 1 and 2
The Figure displays the change in the occupational structure across regions upon an increase in ICT
capital eﬃciency. The LHS displays the eﬀect for a non-apprentice region and the RHS panel depicts it
for an apprentice-intensive region.
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2.3 German Regional Data
This Section summarizes our construction of key variables and data sources. Further
detail is provided in Appendix B.2.
2.3.1 Data Sources
Two main data sources are used in this paper: (1) the Sample of Integrated Labour Market
Biographies - Regional File 1975-2008 (SIAB-R 7508) (SIAB in the following); and (2) the
BIBB/IAB Qualification and Career Survey 1979 and 1999 (QCS in the following). The
SIAB sample provides detailed individual-level characteristics, such as education, region
of work, nationality, and labor market experience (e.g., occupational status and wages)
(see Dorner et al., 2011, for details). The sample used consists of all workers subject to
social security payments, aged 17 to 62.18 If an individual has more than one employer,
only the primary occupation is considered. Following Dustmann et al. (2009) all workers
are weighted by part-time or full-time work given limited information on hours worked in
the regional sample.
The QCS is primarily used to construct occupation specific computer usage. In addi-
tion, we use task measures computed by Autor and Dorn (2013) for the US to compute
task-intensity across the German working population in the SIAB sample. We do so in
order to make the research comparable to US studies, even though the QCS also provides
information on tasks performed by each individual. Although there are questions in the
German data that identify routine, manual, and abstract tasks, these questions are not
identical to the US survey and, therefore, will not necessarily capture the same informa-
tion. Nonetheless, the German task measure provides very similar results. A comparison
between the German and US task measures, when applied to the SIAB sample, is provided
below.
To compute regional variation, we rely on a similar concept, as in Autor and Dorn
(2013), of local labor markets (or commuting zones). To define the German local la-
bor markets, we use the oﬃcial classification of the “Bundesinstitut fuer Bau-, Stadt-
und Raumforschung”, which are quasi identical to the classification of the “Gemeinschaft-
saufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur ” (Koller and Schwengler, 2000).
Since these zones are based on economic geography by taking into account commuter flows
and commuting time, they are a good representation of local labor markets (see Eckey,
1988; Eckey and Klemmer, 1991). Due to limited information in the SIAB dataset, some
18This means that civil servants, the self-employed, active-military and students are not included.
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regions are aggregated to a broader level. Analysis is restricted to West Germany and
contains 182 commuting zones.
2.3.2 Apprentices
Apprenticeship rates in Germany are high and largely stable over time. The vocational
education report (Berufsbildungsbericht) from 1977 and 2011 (BiBB, 1977; BiBB, 2011),
document 496,000 new apprenticeship contracts in 1976, or about 67% of all secondary
graduates choose an apprenticeship, and 468,410 new contracts in West Germany in 2010,
or about 65% in 2009. According to the reports, roughly 60 percent of apprenticeships are
in industry and 25 percent are in artisanry.19 Of all apprenticeships in 2010, 93 percent
were financed by firms and the rest by public funds.20
However, while initial apprenticeship numbers are large, a considerable fraction even-
tually switch industries and occupations, making most of the specific knowledge obsolete.
BiBB (1977) states that about 40 percent of male employees that had done an apprentice-
ship between 1955-1970 switched their broad sector of work. About half of them document
that their specific skills became obsolete. Using the QCS sample, we find about 50 percent
of apprentices switching industry and about 31 percent switching the broad sector, i.e.,
services to non-services or vice versa. In the empirical analysis, we only label workers as
apprentices if they, at some point, completed an apprenticeship in the same broad sector
they are currently employed in. E.g. a worker who finished an apprenticeship in manufac-
turing, but now works as a service worker, is not labeled an apprentice. This is consistent
with the model’s assumption that apprentices only have additional productivity in the
RT sector.
2.3.3 Measuring Tasks
To make the study comparable to equivalent US studies, we use the task measures com-
puted by Autor et al. (2003) across occupations merged to the SIAB sample. We make
use of both of the individual tasks as well as the routine measure computed as,
Rj =
routinej
routinej +manualj + abstractj
,
for occupation j. Routine tasks are an average of routine-cognitive and routine-manual
tasks. Abstract tasks are the average of non-routine personal and non-routine analytical.
19Apprenticeships in the reports are classified by occupation.
20The portion financed by firms is slightly higher, 95 percent, when restricting the sample to West
Germany.
Chapter 2 55
Manual tasks is simple the non-routine manual tasks (for details see Autor et al., 2003).
As in Autor and Dorn (2013), an occupation is labeled routine-task-intensive, RTIj, if
the occupation falls within the top one-third of the employment distribution in terms of
the Rj measure,
RTIj = 1
[
Rj ≥ RP66
]
.
These occupations are called RTI-occupations. For the analysis of machine adoption we
also compute the 66th percentile index for the separate task measures (manual, routine
and abstract).
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Figure 2.4: Share of RTI Occupations (DOT vs BiBB) in 1979
While using US task measures on German occupations might have limitations, we are
able to compare the measure to similar German measures. The QCS in Germany, as the
dictionary of occupational title (DOT) in the US, provides information on types of tasks
done by workers. While the questions asked are not identical between the two surveys,
the two measures provide very similar aggregate results. Figure 2.4 shows the share of
employment within RTI-occupations for both the DOT and the BiBB measures across
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the 1980’s wage distribution. Given these similarities the results are provided using the
US data, since this allows for a direct comparison between this study and US studies.
Similar to Figure 4 in Autor and Dorn (2013), most of the employment in RTI-
occupations is in the middle of the wage distribution which falls toward the lower and
upper tails. However, unlike the US, the polarization as seen in Figure 2.1 takes place at
a higher percentile of the wage distribution. In Germany, most polarization has happened
around the 40th and 60th percentile. In the US, most polarization has been around the
20th to 50th percentile. Routine jobs in the US are also consistently at a lower wage
percentile rank than in Germany.
It is important to establish that both apprentices and non-apprentices could potentially
be replaced by ICT technology. If apprentices were to perform very diﬀerent tasks (i.e.,
tasks that are not routine in nature), it might not be surprising that apprentices are not
displaced by ICT. As a consequence, Figure 2.2 would simply be a product of apprentices
being irreplaceable and not that acquired skills increase their relative productivity. Figure
2.5 graphs the share of routine employment from Figure 2.4 separately, by apprentices
versus other workers. More precisely, the left panel (Figure 2.5a) graphs the aggregate
RTI measure in employment shares and the right panel (Figure 2.5b) graphs the 66th
percentile employment share of occupation that are routine (individual task measure).
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Figure 2.5: Share of Routine Occupations (Apprentices vs Others) in 1979
Although apprentices perform less RTI tasks along the lower part of the wage dis-
tribution, the overall employment in RTI tasks is similar. Comparing only the routine
component of RTI suggests that apprentices and other workers engage in virtually the
same amount of routine employment, especially in the middle of the wage distribution
were the majority of employment polarization has taken place in Germany. The diﬀerence
in the aggregate RTI measures is driven by some apprentice occupations performing more
manual tasks than other workers.
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Comparing the distributions from Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4, 2.5, we propose that - as
in the US - German employment polarization is due to the displacement of routine oc-
cupations by ICT technology. However, given the evidence of Figure 2.2 and outlined in
the theory in Section 2.2, this polarization is slower in apprentice-intensive regions. This
occurs even though apprentices work in just as many routine occupations, the “disappear-
ing” occupations, as other low-skilled workers. The next Section formally tests this theory
by empirically evaluating the hypotheses as stated in Section 2.2.4.
2.4 Empirical Results
In this Section we separately test our three hypotheses (1) on computer adoption, (2)
routine-labor displacement, (3) and service sector growth. As suggested by Figure 2.2 in
the introduction, the main prediction is that local labor markets with more apprentices
should see less computer adoption, less routine-labor displacement, and lower service
sector growth.
To do this formally, cross-section OLS regressions are estimated. The cross-sectional
variation comes from the regional diﬀerences at the commuting zone level within Germany.
As such, all variables are constructed on a regional labor market level. For example, the
regional measure of routine-task-intensity, RTI, is defined as the share of employment
within region j that works in RTI-occupations k,
RTIjt =
(
K∑
k=1
Ljkt ·RTIk
)(
K∑
k=1
Ljkt
)−1
.
As suggested in the introduction, regional apprenticeship variation is likely due to the
absence of oﬃcial federal apprenticeship support prior to the mid-1970s. Instead, local
governments made all decisions concerning what schooling to provide and how.
2.4.1 Computer Adoption and Skills
To determine the validity of hypothesis 1, we test whether the adoption of personal
computers can be explained by the share of RTI-occupations and/or the share of abstract-
occupations in a region.21 The former would suggest ICT is substitutable with the low-
skilled (or routine tasks) and the later would suggest ICT is complimentary with high-
skilled (or abstract tasks). In general, one would suspect both eﬀects to be present.
21Note that the share of manual-, routine-, and abstract employment within a region does not neces-
sarily add up to one.
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Furthermore, the model suggests that regions with more apprentices should see less of
substitutability of routine tasks (see equation 2.15).
The computer measure is tabulated from the 1999 QCS. We adopt the standard proce-
dure of assuming that the share of computers in 1999 also captures the growth in computer
utilization since 1979. I.e., computers were virtually absent in 1979.22 The QCS allows
us to compute computer adoption by occupations, and the SIAB provides the regional
variation in occupational structure. That is, it is assumed that a given occupation adopts
computers in a similar way, regardless of location. E.g., it does not matter whether the
adoption is located in the South or the North of Germany.23 For additional detail on the
construction of the computer measure see Appendix B.2.2.1.
First, without diﬀerentiating between apprentices and others, we regress the computer
(PC) measure in 1999, PCj,99, on the regional measure of routine-task-intensity, RTIj,79,
PCj,99 = β0 + β1RTIj,79 + ψf + ϵj .
This regression is directly derived from equation (2.9) in Section 2.2 and the expected
sign points to a positive coeﬃcient on RTIj,79, β1 > 0. Each regression has controls for
federal state fixed eﬀects, ψf . Standard errors are clustered on the federal state level and
all regressions are weighted by each periods’ initial employment shares.
Alternatively, we also show the correlation decomposed by separate tasks,
PCj,99 = β0 + β1Routinej,79 + β2Abstractj,79 + β3Manualj,79 + ψf + ϵj .
In this specification, the coeﬃcient on routine-labor should still be positive, β1 > 0.
In addition, the coeﬃcient on abstract-labor should also be positive, β2 > 0 and if the
complementarity eﬀect is stronger than the substitution eﬀect, the latter coeﬃcient should
be greater, β2 > β1. Since manual-labor is not easily replaced by computers, and also has
little complementarity with computers, we expect the coeﬃcient to be zero, β3 = 0.
Table 2.1 shows the correlation between PC Adoption in 1999 and initial employment
shares in routine-intensive jobs in 1979 across regions j. Column (1) uses the compounded
RTI measure, column (2) uses the individual routine measure, and column (3) uses the
three separate measures to distinguish between substitution and complementarity eﬀects.
Column (1) and (2) suggest, counter to the theory, that more RTI- or routine employ-
ment is associated with less computer adoption. However, the results of column (3),
22Although the 1979 QCS does provide computer utilization information, we do not rely on this data
since the survey design changed substantially since 1979. Defining computer adoption in 1999 as the
change between computer utilization in 1999-1979 would however provide similar results.
23Unfortunately, regional variation in the QCS is sparse, and does not allow for a robust measure on
the regional level.
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Table 2.1: PC Adoption and Tasks
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES PC_99 PC_99 PC_99
RTI -0.660***
(0.103)
Routine -0.663*** 0.143**
(0.0682) (0.0430)
Abstract 1.133***
(0.0377)
Manual 0.0176
(0.0619)
N 182 182 182
R2 0.530 0.632 0.818
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the federal state level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include federal state fixed eﬀects (11 federal states). All models are weighted by each
periods’ initial employment shares. PC adoption is measured in 1999, the independent variables in 1979.
when including all task measures, suggest that both the substitution-of-routine-skills and
complementary-to-abstract-skills are present in Germany. The substitution eﬀect is con-
siderably smaller. A region with 10 percentage points more routine employment in 1979
has 1.4 percentage points more computer adoption, whereas 10 percentage points more
abstract employment in 1979 results in 11.3 percentage points more computers in 1999.
Finally, there is no eﬀect of the manual component.
Having established the same overall eﬀects in Germany as in the US, Table 2.2 explores
the diﬀerential eﬀect between apprentices and other workers. In doing so, we diﬀerentiate
the share of workers in RTI-occupations, for example, into apprentice-intensive, ARTI
and other occupations, ORTI,
ARTIj,t =
(
K∑
k=1
Lj,ktRTIk × 1
[
APPk > APP
P66
])( K∑
k=1
Lj,kt
)−1
,
ORTIj,t =
(
K∑
k=1
LjktRTIk × 1
[
APPk # APP P66
])( K∑
k=1
Lj,kt
)−1
,
⇒ ARTIj,t +ORTIj,t = RTIj,t,
where APPk indicates if the job is apprentice-intensive and thus has an apprentice-share
above the 66th percentile. The apprentice-routine, -manual or -abstract and other-routine,
-manual or -abstract measures are formed analogously.
Within Germany we see a much larger complementarity eﬀect, and the RTI-measure
is unable to pick up the eﬀect in the aggregate. Thus, the next results only focus on
the decomposed task measures. Moreover, this allows for a direct comparison of the
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importance in substitution and complementarity eﬀects. Now the computer (PC) measure
in 1999, PCj,99, is regressed on the Routinej,79, the Abstractj,79, and the Manualj,79
employment shares, and a control for the high-skilled labor share, Hj,t:
PCj,99 = β0 + β1ARoutinej,79 + β2AAbstractj,79 +
γ1ORoutinej,79 + γ2OAbstractj,79 + δManualj,79 + ψf + ϵj .
Even though equation (2.15) is only conditional on the high-skilled share the control is
omitted here, as the correlation between “Abstract” and the high-skilled share is 0.926.
Equation (2.15) suggests the coeﬃcient on routine-labor should be smaller in the appren-
tice region, 0 < β1 < γ1. Given equation (2.9) it is unclear what the relationship of
coeﬃcients on abstract labor, β2 and γ2 should be. The model however suggests that
these eﬀects would be similar across regions since high-skilled labor is equally productive
everywhere.24
The results in Table 2.2 are provided both by diﬀerentiating all task measures by
apprentices and other worker (columns (1)), and only focusing on the routine diﬀer-
ence (column (2)). Column (1) sheds light on the purpose of computer adoption across
Table 2.2: PC Adoption, Apprentices and Tasks
(1) (2)
VARIABLES PC_99 PC_99
ARoutine 0.0044 0.016
(0.234) (0.236)
ORoutine 0.153** 0.154**
(0.064) (0.0537)
AAbstract 0.858***
(0.160)
OAbstract 1.585***
(0.268)
Abstract 1.150***
(0.056)
Manual 0.023 0.046
(0.067) (0.098)
N 182 182
R2 0.835 0.819
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the federal state level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include federal state fixed eﬀects (11 federal states). All models are weighted by each
periods’ initial employment shares. PC adoption is measured in 1999, the independent variables in 1979.
24The regression does not diﬀerentiate between apprentice and other manual employment, since the
employment share has no significant eﬀect on computer adoption. However, results are robust to diﬀer-
entiating between manual types.
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apprentice-intensity. The coeﬃcient on abstract employment is smaller for apprentices
than other workers, but the two measures are qualitatively comparable. Moreover, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are statistically equal at the 5 percent confi-
dence level (F (1, 8) = 3.49). The coeﬃcient on manual employment is insignificant (they
are still insignificant if estimated separately). Finally, as more routine jobs are done by
other workers, the more computer adoption is observed. Instead, when apprentices work
in routine tasks, there is no correlation with computer adoption. Since apprentices work
mostly in the middle of the wage distribution, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that there is a diﬀerence in abstract employment, column (2) diﬀerentiates only the rou-
tine tasks by apprentices. The eﬀect remains qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged.
In magnitudes, regions with a 10 percentage points larger routine labor share adopt 1.5
percentage points more PCs. That is, all the substitution eﬀect from Table 2.1 is driven
by other workers, not apprentices. This is precisely the prediction from the model, i.e.,
that workers without specific skills are more prone to replacement. However, until now
we have only showed a correlation between routine-labor and computers and have not es-
tablished if these workers are replaced or simply use computers at work. The next Section
shows that these workers are actually displaced.
2.4.2 Routine Shares and their Displacement
The model suggests that with the invention of ICT technologies, the low-skilled working
in routine tasks should be displaced. However, apprentice-intensive regions should have
less displacement of routine-labor, since the rate of adoption of new technologies is slower.
Visually, Figure 2.6 shows the correlation of apprentice intensity and routine displacement
in a similar manner as Figure 2.2b for computers. The negative raw correlation between
the share of new apprentice contracts in 1978-1979 and the displacement of RTI-labor
shares for the 1979-2008 time period is −.26.
First, we establish the general results irrespective of regional apprenticeship rates.
The regression of the change in routine task intensity (the employment share in routine-
intensive occupations) on the period’s initial routine task intensity, is
∆(t+10)−tRTIj = β0 + β1RTIj,t + ψf + θt + ϵj , (2.20)
which follows from equation (2.10). Given the theoretical framework and the evidence
from the US, we expect the coeﬃcient on RTI-labor to be negative, β1 < 0. The more
routine-labor a region has, prior to technology innovation, the more routine-labor can
potentially be displaced by machines.
Again, all regressions have controls for federal state fixed eﬀects and time fixed eﬀects,
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Figure 2.6: Displacement by Region and 1979 Apprentice Intensity
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θt, standard errors are clustered on the federal state level and results are weighted by
the period’s initial employment shares. For brevity we report results for the compounded
measure only, although results for the separate routine measure are comparable.25 Ta-
ble 2.3 column (1) is a stacked multi-period model, where the dependent variable is the
decade change in the routine share. Again, counter to the theory, the results suggest
that the greater the routine-intensive employment share, the less routine-labor displace-
ment. Column (2) repeats column (1), but diﬀerentiating by apprentice and other em-
ployment. That is, the change in employment is regressed on initial apprentice or other
RTI-employment and the initial high-skilled labor share, Ht,j ,
∆(t+10)−tRTIj = β0 + β1ARTIj,t + γ1ORTIj,t + δHt,j + ψf + θt + ϵj. (2.21)
The control for the high-skilled labor share follows directly from equation (2.16), since ap-
prentice regions show less displacement only conditioning on the high-skilled labor share.
Moreover, given the sign from the cross-derivative of equation (2.16), the coeﬃcient on
routine-labor should be negative, but in absolute value larger for other employment, i.e.,
γ1 < β1 < 0. Column (2) corroborates the theory, finding displacement for other work-
Table 2.3: Routine Displacement, Apprentices and Tasks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ∆(t+10)−t RTI ∆(t+10)−t RTI ∆89−79 RTI ∆99−89 RTI ∆08−99 RTI
RTI -0.0710
(0.0400)
ARTI 0.010 -0.003 0.064 0.025
(0.130) (0.237) (0.100) (0.228)
ORTI -0.219*** -0.079 -0.406*** -0.207**
(0.052) (0.049) (0.120) (0.089)
N 546 546 182 182 182
R2 0.309 0.371 0.152 0.490 0.163
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the federal state level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include federal state fixed eﬀects (11 federal states). Columns (1)-(2) include time
fixed eﬀects (3 decades). Columns (2)-(5) control for the region’s initial high-skilled share. All models are weighted by each periods’ initial
employment shares.
ers, but not apprentices. That is, a region with a 10 percentage points higher routine-
labor share faces a 2.19 percentage points faster decrease in its routine labor share (per
decade).26 This is about the same eﬀect that Autor and Dorn (2013) find for the US
(see Table 3 in their paper). The authors find a 2.95 percentage points displacement per
decade in the US. In contrast, a region with a 10 percentage points larger apprentice
25The results are available from the authors upon request.
26Using the separate routine measure, gives a slightly smaller, but still comparable, impact of 1.7
percentage points in a decade.
64 Employment Polarization and the Role of the Apprenticeship System
routine-labor share has no eﬀect. These results are robust to a number of additional
controls, e.g. the employment share in services, the female employment share, the share
of immigrants, the share of youth (age 25 and below), and the share of part-time work-
ers. With these additional controls the coeﬃcient on apprentice routine-labor is always
insignificant. The coeﬃcient on other routine-labor varies between −0.331 and −0.221
and is always significant at the 1 percent confidence level.
Column (3) - (5) show results separately for each decade.27 Splitting the eﬀect by
decade shows that most of the replacement took place for other workers between 1989
and 1999. However, the apprentice routine-labor coeﬃcient is insignificant and close to
zero during all decades. In fact, the 1990s was the period where ICT adoption exploded.
Nordhaus (2007) shows that computer power increased and prices decreased the most
between the 1980s and late 1990s. According to the author, improvement in computer
technology was most pronounced between 1985-1995.
Alternatively, Table 2.4 shows the eﬀect over a longer time horizon, from 1979 to
1999 and from 1979 to 2008. This long-term perspective is done by regressing the overall
change in routine employment shares between t = 0 and t = T on the initial routine
intensity in 1979. Column (2) and (4) include controls for the high-skilled labor share.
Table 2.4: Routine Displacement, Apprentices and Tasks in the Long-run
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆99−79 RTI ∆99−79 RTI ∆08−79 RTI ∆08−79 RTI
RTI -0.182* -0.124*
(0.0921) (0.0652)
ARTI 0.036 0.023
(0.209) (0.204)
ORTI -0.472** -0.448***
(0.142) (0.046)
N 182 182 182 182
R2 0.318 0.484 0.342 0.535
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the federal state level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include federal state fixed eﬀects (11 federal states). Columns (2)-(4) control for the
region’s initial high-skilled share in 1979. All models are weighted by each periods’ initial employment shares.
In the long-run, aggregate eﬀects are negative and significant at the 10 percent level. In
terms of magnitude, the coeﬃcient for the first twenty years suggests that a region with a
10 percentage points higher routine labor share has a 0.9 percentage points lower routine-
labor share within 10 years, and an 1.8 percentage point decrease after 20 years. Over
the entire 29 years, the result is slightly smaller but still similar. The results for column
27To make results comparable across decades, column (5) is adjusted for the missing years. I.e., all
results in Table 2.3 can be interpreted as 10-year changes.
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(2) and (4) are identical to above, there is no eﬀect for apprentice routine-labor and an
eﬀect similar to the US for other routine-labor. Comparing the results from Table 2.4 and
Figure 2.6 suggest that the displacement results are robust to diﬀerent specifications.
2.4.3 Routine Shares and Service Employment
Having determined the displacement of routine-labor, we need to establish whether this
displacement comes with a rise in services. More precisely, low-skilled service jobs could
possibly replace routine-labor as in the US.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 regress the change in the low-skilled service sector share and the
service sector share on the same set of variables as above. The results are presented in
decades, similar to regressions (2.20) and (2.21). Given the cross derivative, equation
(2.17), the only diﬀerence is that we expect the coeﬃcients to have the opposite sign.
The low-skill service sector is defined as the share of regional employment that works
in certain service occupations. Following the definition of Blossfeld (1985), low-skilled
service occupations range from “hairdresser” and “street and indoor cleaners” to “attending
on guests” and “nursing assistants”.
Table 2.5: Low-Skilled Services, Apprentices and Tasks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ∆(t+10)−t LS ∆(t+10)−t LS ∆(t+10)−t LS ∆99−79 LS ∆08−79 LS
RTI 0.023**
(0.009)
ARTI -0.014 -0.008 -0.074 -0.178
(0.0213) (0.069) (0.093) (0.159)
ORTI 0.024 0.028** 0.072*** 0.111***
(0.021) (0.012) (0.020) (0.032)
N 546 546 546 182 182
R2 0.499 0.499 0.499 0.209 0.214
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the federal state level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5
percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include federal state fixed eﬀects (11 federal states). Columns (1)-(3) include time fixed
eﬀects (3 decades). Column (2) controls for the region’s initial high-skilled share. All models are weighted by each periods’ initial employment
shares. The regional low-skill service share (dependent variable) is defined as the employment share working in low-service occupations defined
after Blossfeld (1985).
The results in column (1) suggest that more routine-labor and larger growth in low-
skilled services are related. In magnitude this is about one-third of the eﬀect in the
US. Given the lack of polarization at the lower end of the wage distribution in Germany
(see Figure 2.1) it is not surprising that the results for the share of low-skilled services
are smaller in magnitude (see Table 2.5). Column (2) controls for the high-skilled labor
share and splits the results by apprentices versus other routine-labor. Both results are
insignificant when controlling for the high-skilled labor share. However, consistent with
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the theory, the eﬀect on other routine-labor is larger and positive (and almost significant).
As it turns out, not controlling for the high-skilled share, column (3), preserves the same
results, but now the coeﬃcient on other routine-labor is significant at the 5 percent level.
This result is consistent with, for example, the theory postulated by Manning (2004) and
Mazzolari and Ragusa (2013), who suggest that high-skilled labor demands low-skilled
services. Thus, the more high-skilled labor the higher the demand for low-skilled services.
The last two columns, (4) and (5), show the long-run trends. The results are similar in
magnitude for the entire time period. Having a 10 percentage points larger (other) routine
labor share in 1979 leads to a growth in low-skilled services of 1.1 percentage points over
the entire period, compared to a 1.1 percentage point increase over one decade in low-
skilled services for the US (see Autor and Dorn, 2013, Table 5). The results are in line
with the previous results (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4) as the aggregate eﬀect is solely driven
by other workers, not apprentices.
However, the rise in low-skilled service employment in Germany is relatively small.
Although the theory is such that labor is always pushed to the lower-end of tasks, it
could be that some low-skilled labor who acquired specific-skills are more likely to move
to abstract tasks. Table 2.6 repeats the analysis from Table 2.5 for the entire service
sector.28 Column (2) through (4) use the high-skilled labor share as a control. Column(1)
Table 2.6: Services, Apprentices and Tasks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆(t+10)−t S ∆(t+10)−t S ∆99−79 S ∆08−79 S
RTI 0.008
(0.037)
ARTI -0.269 -0.691 -0.795
(0.232) (0.566) (0.540)
ORTI 0.161*** 0.461*** 0.452***
(0.036) (0.092) (0.047)
N 546 546 182 182
R2 0.473 0.503 0.376 0.420
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the federal state level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include federal state fixed eﬀects (11 federal states). Columns (1)-(2) include time
fixed eﬀects (3 decades). Columns (2)-(4) controls for the region’s initial high-skilled share. All models are weighted by each periods’ initial
employment shares. The regional service share (dependent variable) is defined as the employment share working in the service sector.
shows that there is no aggregate eﬀect on the service sector size. But again, when splitting
routine-labor by apprentices and other workers, the results suggest that regions high
in routine-labor not performed by apprentices in 1980 saw service sector growth. The
28Non-services are defined as agriculture, construction, mining and manufacturing. Services are then
wholesale & retail trade, personal & business services, transport, education, health, public administration
and cleaning services.
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coeﬃcient on apprentice labor is insignificant, but the coeﬃcient on other routine-labor
is significant and large, similar to US estimates for the low-skilled service sector. Since
apprentices mostly work in industry and are not displaced similarly to other workers,
regions with many apprentices should see a slower rise in the service sector. Furthermore,
much of the change happens in the 1990s, aligning with the displacement eﬀects.
2.4.4 Wage Polarization
Unlike the US (see Figure 1 panel B in Autor and Dorn, 2013), Germany has seen little
wage polarization in terms of wage growth along the skill distribution (see Figure 2.7).
Consistent with the complementarity of ICT technologies and high-skilled labor, the top
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Figure 2.7: Wage Growth and 1979 Wage Distribution
of the skill distribution has had the highest wage growth. Dustmann et al. (2009) find
a rise in the wage diﬀerential of middle-skilled (apprenticeship holders) relative to the
low-skilled starting in the 1980s. However, they find no clear trend between the high- and
middle-skilled.
In addition, the literature has found little wage polarization in Germany, but rather
wage dispersion (consistent with employment polarization). The conclusion is that wage
68 Employment Polarization and the Role of the Apprenticeship System
adjustments have been avoided due to institutional policies, e.g. centralized wage bar-
gaining and generous unemployment benefits (see Dustmann et al., 2009; Kohn, 2006;
Antonczyk et al., 2010; Senftleben and Wielandt, 2012). Given the limited evidence in
our data sample, and that an analysis of wage polarization would have to take into ac-
count diﬀerent regional institutional factors, it is outside the scope of this study to further
investigate these trends.
2.5 Conclusion
ICT technology adoption has led to substantial employment polarization across the world.
The standard theory suggests that routine tasks performed by the middle-skilled are most
prone to displacement by computers. However, when quantifying the investment in com-
puter adoption over the last couple of decades across German regions, the data suggests
that regions with the least routine employment have the most computer adoption. This
apparent puzzle - which stands in sharp contrast to the US - is resolved by studying more
closely the composition of non-college labor in Germany. That is, in this paper, we develop
a stylized one-sector model that demonstrates the importance of the educational-system,
general versus specific training, in incentivizing firms to adopt skill-replacing technologies.
Since firms that train apprentices, invest resources in doing so, the adoption of ICT tech-
nologies that replace non-college labor is more costly. As, due to their specific training,
apprentices are more productive than other middle-skilled labor. Consequently, regions
with a large number of apprentices, see less ICT adoption (here in terms of computers,
given data availability), but also less displacement of routine-labor and less employment
polarization.
For the empirical analysis we make use of regional variation in apprentice intensity
across German local labor markets prior to the 1980s. The empirical results show virtually
no displacement of apprentice routine-labor, while for other (non-apprentice) routine-
labor the eﬀects are similar in magnitude, in terms of labor displacement, to the US
results. That is, a region with a 10 percentage points higher routine-labor share has a
2.19 percentage points faster displacement of routine-labor per decade. The results on
computer adoption and service employment are in the same direction as in the US, but
magnitudes are smaller.
3 Directed Technical Change, The Environ-
ment and The Role of Emerging Markets
3.1 Motivation
Although industrialized countries started to impose environmental regulations, CO2 emis-
sions are rising on a global scale. This fact is triggered by the emerging countries that
lack environmental regulations and - through their rapid economic growth - account for
an increasing fraction of global CO2 emissions. Figure 3.1 displays the aggregate CO2
emissions within China and the US. The linear fit (dashed line) suggests that Chinese
emissions rose by about 5.6% p.a., overtaking the US as the largest CO2 emitter in 2005.
And even if per capita emissions are still lower in emerging markets, they are projected to
increase continuously.1 The source of these alarming figures is found in missing environ-
mental regulations and a government that is only concerned about maximizing economic
growth. Fang et al. (2009) document the “develop first, clean up later” strategy of China
that served the industrialized countries, but is no longer sustainable in a world of ris-
ing total emissions. In fact, emerging markets face an environmental challenge that is
three-fold: first, emissions rise as population and production increases. According to the
International Energy Agency (IEA), Non-OECD countries will account for 90% of world
population growth and 70% of global economic growth. Second and closely related, energy
demand increases. The IEA forecasts that 90% of total energy demand growth between
2010 - 2035 will be attributed to emerging markets. Finally, relying on coal as their main
energy source, emerging markets face an increasing carbon intensity of energy production.
Their carbon intensity of energy use between 1971 - 2009 increased on average by 1.1%
p.a. (China) and 2.1% p.a. (India) while industrialized countries (e.g. US, EU) managed
to decrease theirs by about 0.5% p.a.2 And at the same time as Non-OECD countries
account for a major share of global emissions and economic growth, they start moving
from an “imitation strategy”, to building up own innovation facilities.
These facts raise three questions: first, are unilateral policies suﬃcient to prevent a global
environmental disaster? Second, will emerging markets become innovators instead of
1Figure C.1 in Appendix C.2 compares the evolution of per capita emissions across countries.
2Figures taken from the Worldbank database. See the bibliography for further detail.
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imitators? Third, what are the economic consequences for countries subject to bind-
ing regulations in terms of long-run growth, international competitiveness and economic
welfare?
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Figure 3.1: Aggregate CO2 emissions (kt)
Notes: The figure displays the evolution of log-linearised aggregate CO2 emissions (in kt) for China and the US. The dashed line
represents a linear fit for Chinese and US data. The slope coeﬃcients for China and the US are given by 0.056 (st. error 0.002) and
0.012 (st. error 0.001). Source: worldbank.org (database).
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This paper tries to answer these questions in a directed technical change model, where
entrepreneurs invest either in “dirty” or “clean” production techniques. By extending the
model into a global perspective and introducing a negative pollution externality, I analyze
the interaction between unilateral environmental regulations and the direction of R&D
investments that are shaped endogenously.3 As the technologically leading North imposes
environmental regulations, the paper studies the optimal behavior of entrepreneurs within
the unregulated South. The key decision for entrepreneurs is either to invest in polluting
or in “clean” technologies. Depending on the initial distance to the technological frontier
of the South and the relation between countries’ growth rates, I find three possible long-
run outcomes: first, if clean technologies are growing fast within the regulated country,
the unregulated South also finds it optimal to invest in clean technologies. However, at
the same time there exists the risk of a “dirty production trap” where the South special-
izes in the “dirty” sector and either continues imitating Northern technologies or starts
innovation.
In doing so, this paper relates to the growing literature on the interaction between
growth and the environment. While early strands of the literature, among others e.g.
Gradus and Smulders (1993) and Stokey (1998), emphasize the trade-oﬀ between higher
growth and a “healthier” environment, this paper, in contrast, explicitly takes into ac-
count the response of technological progress itself. This eﬀect substantially reduces the
barriers to switch away from polluting technologies to a sustainable growth path. Em-
pirical evidence for the induced innovation channel comes from Newell et al. (1999) and
Popp (2002), who exploit the evolution of energy prices and the direction of research. Al-
lowing for the development of non-polluting “backstop” technologies releases the tension
between higher growth and less pollution. This idea is explored further by Acemoglu,
Aghion, Burstzyn and Hemous (2012) (AABH henceforth), who show that in the absence
of regulations, all research investments are channelled towards the dirty sector. In a one-
country setup representing the developed world, they characterize the optimal policy that
prevents such a disaster as a combination of a carbon tax and research subsidies to the
clean sector.
Extending the analysis into a global framework, most literature has recognized the “pollu-
tion haven eﬀect” as polluting industrial activities tend to shift from regulated to unreg-
ulated countries. DiMaria and Smulders (2004) analyze the interaction between diﬀerent
environmental regulations, trade and pollution. Through the channel of technology dif-
fusion the less regulated South adopts (partially) clean technologies from the regulated
North such that whenever this eﬀect dominates the “pollution haven eﬀect” of free trade,
3Compare Acemoglu (1998) and Acemoglu (2002) for the idea of directed technical change.
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unilateral policies are enough to prevent a global environmental disaster. On the other
hand, Hemous (2012) considers the case where both countries are innovators of new tech-
nologies.4 Extending the framework of AABH (2012) to a second country, his paper
focuses on the role of international trade between countries with diﬀerent environmental
regulations. In contrast to this work, my model abstracts from international trade but
allows countries to either imitate or innovate. Initially the South is the technological
follower. However, as the North abandons innovation in the “dirty” sector, the South gets
the chance to catch up with the frontier and to overtake the leadership. As in Acemoglu
et al. (2006) countries that are close enough to the frontier find it optimal to invest in
own innovation activities rather than keeping the imitation strategy forever. Now in con-
trast to Hemous (2012), countries are still linked through the cross-country technology
spillovers, which bears interesting implications. Moreover, as growth rates diﬀer between
countries (and sectors), the technological frontier can be defined by either the North or
the South. Thus, the model allows me to study the path of relative technology stocks,
the direction of technical change and its implications on economic welfare in a very rich
setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 documents the increasing in-
novation activity of emerging markets, in particular China. Section 3.3 introduces the
Benchmark Model, that builds upon AABH (2012).5 Section 3.4 analyzes the optimal
behavior of the South under unilateral environmental regulations enforced in the North.
Section 3.5 discusses the diﬀerent possible long-run outcomes and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Innovation Activity
Figure 3.2 plots the increasing innovation capacity of China by measuring the number of
patents granted to domestic residents within China. Although the majority of patents is
classified as “utility model patents”, the number of invention patents is increasing sharply,
which indicates that China is moving from an imitation to an innovation strategy. While
patents measure innovation output, R&D inputs are increasing accordingly. Over the
last 15 years the number of scientists and in particular (governmental) spending into
R&D has increased enormously. According to the Worldbank, Chinese R&D expenditures
amounted to 1.7% of GDP in 2009, which is more than upper middle income countries
spent on average.6 Although in absolute terms still less than the US or Japan (around 3%
4Apart from a brief section, where he considers global knowledge or the case of possible diﬀusion of
technologies.
5For further details the reader is referred to their paper.
6An “upper middle income” country, according to the Worldbank classification, is defined as a country
with a GNI per capita of US $ 4,036 - US $ 12,475 in 2011 calculated using the World Bank Atlas method.
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), the R&D expenditures (relative to GDP) in China tripled between 1996 - 2009, rising
on average by 8.8% per year. In contrast, within developed countries such as the US or
Japan, expenditures grew at a much slower rate of 1.0 - 1.5%. Taking into account the fact
that during this interval (1996 - 2009) China’s GDP grew at a much higher rate (about
9.8 % p.a.), the increase in R&D expenditure for emerging markets is even more drastic
in absolute terms. Finally, Figure 3.3 plots the ratio of patents granted per million US
$ of R&D expenditure. Interpreting this ratio as a measure of eﬀectiveness of innovation
activities, three facts are remarkable: (i) Chinese eﬃciency in R&D rose by 5.8% p.a.
between 2001 - 2010; (ii) Chinese are more eﬀective in innovating than the US and (iii)
by 2009 the Chinese and Japanese innovation activities had converged, such that China
has come to compete with one of the most innovative countries of the world.
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Figure 3.2: Domestic Patents by Chinese Residents
Notes: The figure plots the logarithm of the number of patents obtained by domestic residents within China broken down in invention
and utility patents, where the dashed line indicates the utility models.
Source: www.wipo.int - Tables: “Patent grants by patent oﬃce, broken down by resident and non-resident (1883-2011)” & “Utility
Models granted by patent oﬃce, broken down by resident and non-resident (1977-2011)”.
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Figure 3.3: Resident Filings per mio. US $ R&D Expenditure
Notes: The figure plots the number of resident patent filings per mio. US $ R&D expenditure (using 2005 PPP weights).
Source: www.wipo.int - Table: “Resident patent filings per $ million research & development (R&D) expenditure (2001-2010)”.
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3.3 The Benchmark Model
The key ingredients are two diﬀerent types of technologies, that diﬀer with respect to
their pollution intensity. “Dirty” technologies that establish the traditionally used tech-
nologies can be thought of as production processes that create vast emissions, sewage
water and the like. In particular private firms do not internalize this negative external-
ity that is caused as a by-product of production. The alternative production method is
called “clean” and resembles modern production technologies like machines using electric-
ity rather than petrol.
In a two-country setup, each country produces a homogenous final consumption good
that is made of two intermediates, where one intermediate is produced by dirty produc-
tion technologies and the other by clean. Thus, the intermediate sectors are labeled as
either being clean or dirty. The technological frontier is initially determined by the North,
while the South advances through imitation. The paper’s focus lies on the question of
how unilateral environmental regulations imposed in the North aﬀect profit incentives,
and hence the direction and form of technological progress in the South.
3.3.1 The Model Setup
Production and Technology
Within each country i ∈ {N, S} final output Y it is produced using two intermediate inputs,
Y idt and Y ict, where the former represents the aggregate output of the dirty sector and the
later is aggregate output of the clean sector
Y it =
[
Y
i ϵ−1ϵ
dt + Y
i ϵ−1ϵ
ct
] ϵ
ϵ−1
.
Dirty and clean intermediates are imperfect substitutes, where ϵ ∈ (0,∞) governs the
elasticity of substitution between them. Whenever ϵ > 1 the goods are gross substitutes
and gross complements whenever ϵ < 1. Motivated by the literature and increasing
substitution possibilities for dirty inputs, I set ϵ > 1. Countrywide pollution intensity is
determined by the relative usage of clean intermediates Yct/Ydt which itself is governed
by the technology ratio.7
7The fact that some goods are more energy intensive and hence more pollution intensive in its pro-
duction ex-ante, could be captured by varying values for ϵ. However, this is beyond the scope of the
paper.
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The production function at the sectoral level j ∈ {d, c} is given by
Y ijt =
(
Lijt
)1−α 1∫
0
(
Aijmt
)1−α (
xijmt
)α
dm. (3.1)
Both sectors j ∈ {d, c} use labor, Lijt and a unit-interval of sector-specific machines, xijmt,
as inputs. Aijmt denotes the quality of machine of typem in sector j at time t. Normalizing
the total labor force to 1 within each country, labor market clearing requires
Lict + L
i
dt # 1.
As standard in the endogenous growth literature, machines are supplied by monopolis-
tically competitive producers. Independent of time, sector or quality, the production of
one unit of any machine costs ψ units of the final good. Without loss of generality, I nor-
malize ψ = α2. Technological progress is as follows: at the beginning of each period, each
scientist decides whether to direct research towards the dirty or the clean sector. Upon
this decision she is then randomly allocated to one machine on the unit interval. Upon
successful innovation she obtains a one-period patent and becomes the entrepreneur for
production of machine m in this period. Note that not one specific machine but rather
the sector is targeted, which leads to entrepreneurs comparing relative profits between
sectors (not between specific machines). Denote by sijt the number of scientists working
in sector j at time t and normalize the total to 1. Then market clearing for the scientists
implies
sict + s
i
dt # 1.
Before specifying the exact form of technological progress within the economy, let me
define the sectoral technology level in sector j as the average over all machines m in
sector j8
Aijt =
1∫
0
Aijmtdm. (3.2)
Using this, technical progress on the sectoral level is
Aijt =
(
1 + sijtγ
i
j
) (
Aij,t−1
)1−φ−δ (
A¯j,t−1
)δ (
Aimax,t−1
)φ
, (3.3)
8For simplification, initial productivity is equal for all machines within one sector: Aijm,t=0 =
Aijm′,t=0 = A
i
j,t=0.
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where for j ∈ {c, d} and i ∈ {N, S},
δ > 0 if
{∀ j : Aij,t−1 ̸= A¯j,t−1} (3.4)
δ = 0 if
{∃ j : Aij,t−1 = A¯j,t−1} .
A¯j,t−1 denotes the sector-specific technological frontier and Aimax,t−1 denotes the country-
specific technological frontier. In general, the state of technology in sector j depends
on four components: (i) technological progress features state dependency as the size of
further innovations increases in the stock of existing technologies within this sector; (ii)
it depends on the absolute mass of entrepreneurs investing in technology j (denoted by
sijt); (iii) φ controls the spillover between sectors within the same country and (iv) δ
controls the possible spillover from the sector-specific world technological frontier, A¯j,t−1.
However, if the country is the technological leader within at least one sector, this specific
spillover is mute. Interpreting this spillover as foreign FDI investments means that there
are no incentives to boost the technology level of a country that is already operating at
the world technological frontier.9
Pollution and Abatement
Production of the dirty intermediate creates a negative externality on individuals by
degrading environmental quality. The flow of pollution is directly proportionate (captured
by ξ) to the amount of dirty output, Ydt, but decreasing in the amount of abatement
techniques ABT it
P it =
ηY idt
ABT it
, (3.5)
where pollution is bounded from below by some lower bound, such that P it ∈ [P,∞).10 As
Brock and Taylor (2010) note, the existence of abatement techniques captures the fact that
even without any regulations cost-minimizing firms have an incentive to minimize energy
inputs and recapture waste products. Abatement activities are not explicity modeled
but rather improve at some endogenous rate (1 + θt). This rate is determined by the
rate of technical progress within the clean sector weighted by the relative stock of clean
9This assumption is made to simplify the transitional dynamics. Abstaining from it leaves the main
results unchanged.
10An alternative specification would be to define preferences over the stock of pollution, as PStockt =
P it +P
Stock
t−1 −ωPStockt−1 , where P it = ηY
i
dt
ABT it
denotes the flow of pollution and ω $ 0 is the (possible positive)
rate of environmental regeneration.
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technologies and thus, can be time-varying11
ABT it = (1 + θ
i
t)ABT
i
t−1,
(1 + θit) =
(
Act
Adt
)i
·
(
Act
Ac,t−1
)i
, (3.6)
ABT it=0 = A
i
c,0.
Finally, the flow of global pollution, Pt, is defined as the aggregate of both countries’ flow
of pollution
Pt = P
N
t + P
S
t . (3.7)
Observe that the growth rate of global pollution converges to the growth rate of the
maximum of local pollution, limt→∞ PtPt−1 → max
{
PNt
PNt−1
; P
S
t
PSt−1
}
.
Preferences
There is a unit-mass of infinitely-lived households within the economy. A household exists
of one entrepreneur and one manufacturing worker. Population is constant over time and
labor is supplied inelastically.
The utility function of the representative household of country i is given by
∞∑
t=1
βtU(C it , Pt), (3.8)
U it = log(C
i
t)−B
(Pt)χ
χ
,
where i ∈ {N, S}, χ $ 0 and β is the discount factor. The specification follows Brock and
Taylor (2003) and is consistent with the existence of a balanced growth path. Observe
that preferences are defined over consumption and the global flow of pollution Pt, which
enters negatively in the utility function. Additionally, a minimum level of environmental
quality is needed to ensure positive welfare and second, whenever pollution reaches its
lower bound, there is no marginal gain from less pollution
lim
P→∞
U(C, P ) = −∞,
∂U(C, P )
∂(−P ) = 0.
11In addition this attribute of indirect growth in abatement techniques is technically needed to generate
a balanced growth path where both sectors will be active within the economy.
Chapter 3 79
These features of the utility function let me define an environmental disaster as the
following:
Definition 3.1. An environmental disaster occurs whenever Pt →∞.
Finally, to close the model, the economy’s resource constraint is given by
C it +X
i
t # Y it , (3.9)
where X it denotes aggregate spending on machines.
3.3.2 Laissez-Faire Equilibrium
A dynamic equilibrium is given by a sequence of prices for inputs (pijt), wages (wijt), prices
for machines (pijmt), demand for machines (xijmt), demand for intermediates (Y ijt), demand
for manufacturing labor (Lijt), research allocations of scientists (sict, sidt), the flow of local
and global pollution (P it , Pt) and the stock of abatement techniques (ABT it ) such that in
each period t: (i) (pijmt; xijmt) maximizes profits of the entrepreneur of machine m in sector
j in country i, (ii) (Lijt) maximizes profits of producers of intermediate j in country i,
(iii) Y ijt maximizes profits of the final good producer in country i, (iv)(sict, sidt) maximizes
expected profits of an entrepreneur in country i at time t, (v) wit and pijt clear labor and
input markets, (vi) and finally, the evolution of local and global pollution is given by (3.5)
and (3.7) and (vii) abatement evolves according to (3.6).
Assumption 3.1.
Within both countries i ∈ {N, S} dirty technologies are initially more developed than
clean technologies, such that A
N
c,t=0
ANd,t=0
< min
(
(1 + γNd )
1
σ−1
(
1
1+γNc
)
, (1 + γNd )
(
1
1+γNc
) 1
σ−1
)
,
and A
S
c,t=0
ASd,t=0
:=
aSd,t=0
aSc,t=0
ANc,t=0
ANd,t=0
< min
(
(1 + γSd )
1
σ−1
(
1
1+γSc
)
, (1 + γSd )
(
1
1+γSc
) 1
σ−1
)
.
Assumption 3.2.
In both sectors, the technological frontier is defined by the North: ASc,t=0 < ANc,t=0, and
ASd,t=0 < A
N
d,t=0.
First we consider the equilibrium at time t for given technology stocks: Aidt, Aict. The
final good Y it is produced competitively such that the relative price of the two intermediate
inputs can be written as12
pict
pidt
=
(
Y idt
Y ict
) 1
ϵ
, (3.10)
12Appendix C.1 provides the detailed equilibrium analysis.
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where at each point in time I normalize the price of the final good to one, i.e.
1 =
[(
pidt
)1−ϵ
+
(
pict
)1−ϵ] 11−ϵ
. (3.11)
Using this, profits for an entrepreneur in sector j in country i at time t are given by
Πijt = (1− α)α(pijt)
1
1−αLijt
(
1 + γij
) (
Aij,t−1
)1−φ−δ (
A¯j,t−1
)δ (
Aimax,t−1
)φ
. (3.12)
To determine the direction of technical change, the relative profits between sectors are
decisive
Πict
Πidt
=
(
pict
pidt
) 1
1−α Lict
Lidt
Aict
Aidt
. (3.13)
The larger the ratio, the greater the profitability of R&D investments into the clean
sector. (3.13) shows that relative profits are a function of the relative stock of existing
knowledge, relative prices and the relative market size of sectors. The market size eﬀect
pushes innovation towards the more advanced sector, the price eﬀect pulls innovation
towards the less-developed sector. While these are standard in the growth literature,
there exists an additional direct productivity eﬀect. Through the path dependency of
technical progress, further innovations are pulled towards the more developed sector.
Empirical evidence for the presence of the “standing on the shoulders of giants” eﬀect is
most recently documented in Aghion et al. (2011) by studying the direction of research
in the car industry.
In equilibrium, the relative profits can be expressed as a function of the mass of scientists
sict working in the clean sector and the relative stock of technologies
Πict
Πidt
=
(
1 + sictγ
i
c
1 + (1− sict)γid
)σ−2
1 + γic
1 + γid
(
Aic,t−1
Aid,t−1
)σ−1
, (3.14)
where σ = (1 − α)ϵ + α denotes the (derived) elasticity of substitution between factor
inputs.13 Under Assumption 3.2 and the form of technical progress, as stated in equations
(3.3) and (3.4), the relative country-specific stock of technologies is given by
Aic,t−1
Aid,t−1
=
(
Aic,t−1
Aid,t−1
)1−δ−φ(
A¯c,t−1
A¯d,t−1
)δ (Aimax,t−1
Aimax,t−1
)φ
. (3.15)
These equations show that relative profits depend on the existing relative stock of tech-
13Note that ϵ > 1 implies that σ > 1.
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nologies, the relative distance to the frontier technology, the size of the spillover eﬀects
and the mass of scientists working within each sector. While for the technological lead-
ing country, the North, relative profits unambiguously increase in the relative stock of
technologies, there exists a trade-oﬀ for the technology follower. The “standing on the
shoulders of giants” force pushes research to the more developed sector, while the “distance
to frontier eﬀect” pulls innovation to the less-developed sector. The larger the distance
to the frontier, the larger the obtainable profits within this sector. Finally, note that
for σ > 2 relative profits increase in the mass of scientists working in the clean sector
(increasing returns), while for σ < 2 the opposite applies. If σ = 2, profits are constant
in sict. Lemma 3.1 characterizes the direction of research investments:
Lemma 3.1. An equilibrium exists, where all research is directed to the clean sector at
time t whenever Π
i
ct
Πidt
=
(
1+γic
1
)σ−2
1+γic
1+γid
(
Aic,t−1
Aid,t−1
)σ−1
> 1. On the other hand whenever
Πict
Πidt
=
(
1
1+γid
)σ−2
1+γic
1+γid
(
Aic,t−1
Aid,t−1
)σ−1
< 1, in equilibrium all research is directed to the dirty
sector. Whenever Π
i
ct
Πidt
= 1 it will be channelled in both sectors (with sict ∈ (0, 1)).
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
From this Lemma it follows that the case of multiple equilibria becomes possible
whenever σ > 2. To rule out indeterminacy of the steady state equilibrium, Assumption
3.3 ensures that all entrepreneurs target the clean sector, whenever multiple equilibria are
ex-ante possible.
Assumption 3.3.
If σ > 2 and Π
i
ct
Πidt
(sict = 0) < 1 <
Πict
Πidt
(sict = 1) there exists a unique equilibrium with
sict = 1.
Laissez-Faire Steady State
Before characterizing the laissez-faire steady state equilibrium, I restrict the parameter
space in the following way:
σ > 2 (3.16)
δ < φ < 0.25 if δ = 0, (3.17)
0 < δ = φ < 0.25 if δ > 0, (3.18)
0 < γSj = ξγ
N
j → ξ < 1. (3.19)
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(3.16) makes clear that I focus on the case where there is some substitutability between
sectoral intermediates, which is the more relevant case as suggested by the literature.14
(3.17) and (3.18) limit the overall strength of the cumulated spillover and equalize the
strength of spillovers across sectors and countries. Finally, (3.19) shows that the Southern
growth rate (step-size of innovation) is strictly positive and proportionally smaller com-
pared to the Northern. However, let me emphasize that the Southern rate of technical
progress within one sector j may well be greater than the rate of progress in the Northern
sector k. Using this, I summarize the steady state dynamics by the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that (1 + γic) < (1 + γid)
σ−1+φ
φ(σ−1) and Assumptions 3.1-3.2 hold,
then there exists an unique equilibrium, where all Northern scientists innovate in the
dirty sector,
(
sNc
)SS
= 0, and the South imitates in dirty technologies,
(
sSc
)SS
= 0. The
North defines the technological frontier within both sectors and within both countries clean
technologies are relatively less-developed. The equilibrium distances to frontier and the
relative stock of technologies are
aSSd :=
ASd
ANd
=
(
1 + γSd
1 + γNd
) 1
δ
,
aSSc :=
ASc
ANc
=
(
1 + γSd
1 + γNd
) φ
(φ+δ)δ
,(
ANc
ANd
)SS
=
(
1
1 + γNd
) 1
φ
, (3.20)
(
ASc
ASd
)SS
=
[
1
1 + γSd
(
ANc
ANd
)δ] 1φ+δ
=
[
1
1 + γSd
(
1
1 + γNd
) δ
φ
] 1
φ+δ
,
ANd > A
S
d > A
N
c > A
S
c .
Consumption, technology, wages and output within both countries grow at the constant
positive rate of Northern dirty technologies, γNd . Pollution is increasing at a strictly
positive rate such that a global environmental disaster arises.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
This proposition resembles the main result by AABH (2012) in the sense that research
activities are targeted towards the more profitable dirty sector whenever no environmen-
tal regulations apply. This result carries over to the global framework, where countries
are linked through technological spillovers. The next Section analyzes the behavior of
Southern entrepreneurs upon the introduction of Northern environmental regulations.
14Compare the papers by Hemous (2012) and AABH (2012) to this point.
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3.4 Unilateral Environmental Regulation
Assumption 3.4.
At time t the North enforces environmental regulations, such that all Northern scientists
are forced to direct research to the clean sector only,
(
sNcτ
)
= 1 ∀ τ ∈ [t,∞).
The behavior of the North is straight forward, as Assumption 3.4 makes
(
sNc
)SS
= 1
the unique long-run outcome. What remains to be determined, is the form of technical
progress and the behavior of the South. Through the spillover eﬀect, δ, relative profits
of the clean sector increase for the South. At the same time however, the South gets the
chance to become the technological leader in the dirty sector, which raises the risk of a
dirty production trap. Thus, not only lead diﬀerent parameter combinations to diﬀerent
long-run outcomes, but initial conditions will be decisive, too. In the following, I first
characterize three possible long-run outcomes before turning to a detailed analysis of the
transitional path.
3.4.1 Steady State Characterization
1. Imitation of dirty technologies
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that (1+γSc ) < (1+γSd )
σ−1+φ
φ(σ−1)
(
(1 + γSd )(1 + γ
N
c )
)− 12φ , γNc > γSd
and Assumption 3.4 holds, then there exists an unique equilibrium, in which all Northern
scientists innovate in the clean sector, while the South imitates only the dirty technolo-
gies. The North defines the technological frontier within both sectors and the clean sector
dominates within both countries. Distances to frontier and technology ratios are given by
aSSd =
(
1 + γSd
1 + γNc
) 1
δ
,
aSSc = ad
(
1
1 + γSd
1
1 + γNc
) 1
φ+δ
,(
ANc
ANd
)SS
= (1 + γNc )
1
φ , (3.21)(
ASc
ASd
)SS
=
[(
1 + γNc
) δ
φ
1
1 + γSd
] 1
φ+δ
,
ANc > A
N
d > A
S
c > A
S
d .
Consumption, technology, wages and output within both countries grow at the constant
positive rate of Northern clean technologies, γNc . Local pollution within both countries as
well as global pollution converges to its lower bound P .
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Proof. See Appendix C.1.
2. Innovation of dirty technologies
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that (1 + γSc ) < (1 + γSd )
σ−1+φ
φ(σ−1) , γNc < γSd and Assumption 3.4
holds, then there exists an unique equilibrium, in which all Southern scientists innovate
in the dirty technologies, while the North is forced to imitation in the clean sector. The
technological frontier within both sectors is defined by the South and within both countries
the dirty sector constitutes the most developed sector. The long-run distances to frontier
and technology ratios are given by
aSSd =
(
1 + γSd
) 1
δ ,
aSSc =
[(
1 + γSd
1
)φ
δ 1
1 + γNc
] 1
φ+δ
,
(
ANc
ANd
)SS
=
[
(1 + γNc )
(
1
1 + γSd
) δ
φ
] 1
δ+φ
, (3.22)
(
ASc
ASd
)SS
=
(
1
1 + γSd
) 1
φ
,
ASd > A
N
d = A
S
c > A
N
c .
Consumption, technology, wages and output within both countries are growing at the con-
stant positive rate of Southern dirty technologies, γSd . Pollution is increasing at a strictly
positive rate such that a global environmental disaster arises.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
3. Imitating the clean technologies
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that (1+γNd ) < (1+γSc )
(σ−1)(2φ+1)
2φ (1+γNc )
(σ−1)
2φ and Assumption
3.3 holds, then there exists an unique equilibrium, in which all Northern scientists innovate
in the clean sector, while the South imitates the clean technologies. The North defines the
technological frontier within both sectors and within both countries the clean sector has
become the most developed sector. Distances to frontier and technology ratios are given
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by:
aSSd =
(
1 + γSc
1 + γNc
) φ
δ(φ+δ)
aSSc =
(
1 + γSc
1 + γNc
) 1
δ
(
ANc
ANd
)SS
=
(
1 + γNc
) 1
φ (3.23)
(
ASc
ASd
)SS
=
[
(1 + γSc )
(
ANc
ANd
)δ] 1φ+δ
=
[
(1 + γSc )
(
1 + γNc
1
) δ
φ
] 1
φ+δ
ANc > A
S
c > A
N
d > A
S
d
Consumption, technology, wages and output within both countries are growing at the con-
stant positive rate of clean Northern technologies, γNc . Local pollution within both countries
as well as global pollution converges to its lower bound P .
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
3.4.2 The Transitional Path
This section analyzes the transitional path for both countries and pins down the long-
run equilibrium that the economies converge to. Since it is decisive whether Southern
R&D is inferior in absolute or in relative terms, the analysis is split in two distinct cases
(that depend on exogenous parameters only). Since relative obtainable profits are the key
determinant of the direction of research and hence the form of transition, I first define
relative profits at time t as a function of scientists allocated to the clean sector
f(sict) =
(
1 + sictγ
i
c
1 + (1− sict)γid
)σ−2
1 + γic
1 + γid
(
Aic,t−1
Aid,t−1
)σ−1
, (3.24)
which (for σ > 2) is increasing in sict. Within the static equilibrium (given the stock of
technologies: A
i
c,t−1
Aid,t−1
) the allocation of scientists across sectors is such that
sict =
⎧⎨⎩1 if f(sict = 1) > 10 if f(sict = 1) < 1. (3.25)
As Assumption 3.4 ensures that sNct = 1 ∀t for the North, the analysis’ focus lies on the
allocation of Southern scientists across sectors. Defining ASt−1 :=
ASc,t−1
ASd,t−1
, there exists a
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threshold value k¯ for ASt−1, that determines the equilibrium allocation of scientists across
sectors, given by
k¯ =
(
1 + γSd
) 1
σ−1 1
1 + γSc
. (3.26)
Using this, the equilibrium allocation of scientists across sectors for the South is charac-
terized in the following Lemma:
Lemma 3.2. Define k¯ :=
(
1 + γSd
) 1
σ−1 1
1+γSc
and ASt−1 :=
ASc,t−1
ASd,t−1
, then the equilibrium
allocation of scientists in the South is given by
sSct =
⎧⎨⎩1 if ASt−1 > k¯0 if ASt−1 < k¯.
Proof. This follows directly from Assumption 3.3 and equations (3.24) and (3.25).
Case 1: γSd < γNc
As the Southern innovation capacity is inferior to the Northern in absolute terms, it is
evident that in the long-run it is forced to imitation. Hence, in the long-run the economies
will converge either to the “dirty imitation equilibrium” (as defined in Proposition 3.2) or
the “clean imitation equilibrium” (see Proposition 3.4). Assuming both economies to start
within a dirty regime, the transitional path then depends on exogenous parameters only.
In the North, the ratio of clean technologies, A
N
ct
ANdt
starts rising unambiguously.15 If γic > γid,
the stock of clean technologies increases also for the South. As the North is very eﬃcient
in the new sector, the South profits from that through technology adoption, which raises
the profitability of the clean sector globally. Finally, Southern entrepreneurs switch their
investment strategy and target the clean sector. The “good” equilibrium described in
Proposition 3.4 occurs. Along the transition, the Southern distance to the frontier in the
clean sector increases while the eﬀect on the distance to the dirty frontier is ambiguous.
Whenever γic < γid, the possibility of a dirty production trap arises. Starting from
ASt=0 < k¯, the relative profitability of the clean sector increases for both countries.16
However, if the long-run relative technology ratio is smaller than the threshold, k¯, the
South converges to the “dirty imitation equilibrium”. From the dynamics of ASt, the
15See Appendix C.1 for a detailed analysis of the equilibrium dynamic equations of technologies.
16If AStrap < ASt=0 < k¯, the ratio of clean technologies of the South falls initially. As the adjustment
is instantaneously, it falls below the steady state value and then rises again in conjunction with the
Northern ratio.
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long-run value (conditional on sSct = 0 ∀t) is given by
AStrap =
[(
1 + γNc
) δ
φ
1
1 + γSd
] 1
φ+δ
. (3.27)
Moreover, the South is converging to the technological frontier in the dirty sector, such
that ad rises along the transition. The dynamics of ac is ambiguous in this case.
AStrap k¯
ASt−1
ASt
ASLF ASclean
sSc = 0
sSc = 1
Figure 3.4: Equilibrium Dynamics of ASt
The figure displays the equilibrium dynamics of ASt for the case of σ > 2.
Figure 3.4 visualizes the equilibrium dynamics of the stock of clean technologies ASt.
It assumes the economy to start in the dirty laissez-faire equilibrium and shows the dirty
technology trap that arises whenever AStrap < k¯ (as for the case depicted). Whenever
AStrap > k¯, at the point where ASt equals the threshold, the economy switches out of
the dirty sector and moves to the clean equilibrium. Upon this, the catching up process
in clean technologies is spurred while it is slowed down in the dirty sector. Note that if
ad > 1 - as the South may temporarily constitute the technological leader - the distance
to the dirty frontier widens again for the South.
When does this become more likely? Note from equations (3.26) and (3.27) that AStrap is
decreasing in φ, δ and γSd and strictly increasing in γNc . On the other hand the threshold
values are decreasing in γSc and increasing in γSd . Hence the dirty technology trap is likely
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to arise within economies with an eﬃcient dirty sector and few possibilities from copying
clean technologies. The spillover rate acts as an enforcing parameter such that the relative
advantage of the leading sector is strengthened. Moreover k¯ is decreasing in the elasticity
of substitution σ, such that the switch to the clean sector becomes more likely for a high
elasticity of substitution. Intuitively the better the goods are substitutable, the more
likely the switch to the clean sector. The next proposition summarizes the equilibrium
dynamics:
Proposition 3.5. Suppose it holds that γSd < γNc , and AStrap, k¯ are defined by (3.26), (3.27)
and the economy starts within the dirty regime, sSc,t=0 = 0, the unique dynamic equilibrium
is as follows:
1. If AStrap < k¯, the economy starts within the regime of full dirty imitation, and
converges towards the dirty imitation steady state defined by Proposition 3.2.
2. If k¯ # AStrap, the economy starts within the regime of full dirty imitation, but
switches to the clean sector when ASt = k¯. In the long-run the South converges to
the clean imitation steady state described under Proposition 3.4.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Case 2: γSd > γNc
First, as the South is more eﬃcient in innovation, whenever the Southern scientists are
employed in the dirty sector, they must innovate in the long-run. The possibility of the
South overtaking the North in the dirty sector, (as well as in the clean sector), leads to the
fact that the dynamics of technology ratios change as soon as the South becomes superior.
In contrast to the previous case - where parameter conditions determined the long-run
outcome - multiple steady states are possible. The long-run equilibrium thus depends
on the initial distance to frontier, which emphasizes the importance of the timing of
environmental policies.
Along the transitional path the relative stock of clean technologies is increasing within
both countries which raises its profitability also within the South. The counteracting
eﬀect however occurs, as the South approaches the dirty technological frontier. If the
South is initially close to the technological frontier (in dirty technologies), it soon starts
innovating in this sector. If this occurs before the investment in the clean sector becomes
profitable (i.e. ASt reaches the critical threshold k¯), an environmental disaster becomes
inevitable. Upon the South switching from imitation to innovation in the dirty sector, the
dynamical system changes. Then the relative stock of clean technologies decreases again
(for the South) and the distance to the clean frontier widens (as the spillover channel is
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shut down). However, since the spillover within countries is still active, in the long-run
the South must overtake the clean frontier as well. Upon this, the North is increasingly
influenced by Southern technologies, which on the one hand leads to a decline of the
relative stock of clean technologies even in the North, but on the other hand reduces its
distance to the dirty technology frontier. Naturally, as the North is ineﬃcient in innovating
clean technologies, the South prefers own innovation over adopting the clean ones from
the North. The combination of the market size for dirty technologies and the incentive to
become the technological leader within one sector drives the result of the dirty technology
trap. But even if in this case the environmental disaster is inevitable, bear in mind that this
result is specific for the South being already very close to the dirty technological frontier
when the North imposes environmental regulations. On the other hand, if the South starts
very far from the technological frontier, the clean technologies continue to catch up and the
transition depends again on the relation between AStrap ≶ k¯. If AStrap < k¯, the dynamics
and the long-run equilibrium is the same as above. If AStrap > k¯, Southern entrepreneurs
switch sectors as soon as investment in clean technologies is (more) profitable. Upon the
regime switch, the clean distance to the frontier decreases, while the distance to the dirty
frontier increases again. The ratio of clean technologies keeps rising throughout until the
new steady state (see Proposition 3.4) is reached.
Figure 3.5 plots the equilibrium dynamics of the stock of clean technologies, ASt,
visualizing two possible transitional dynamics depending on the South’s initial backward-
ness.17 Starting from the laissez-faire technology ratio, denoted by ASLF , the lower solid
line displays the transitional path for a country being close to the technological frontier.
The growth in the relative stock of clean technologies is minor and convergence to the new
steady state value, denoted by ASIN , is fast. Since ASIN < k¯, the economy is locked-in
the dirty technology trap. In contrast, the upper solid line displays the transitional path for
an economy starting far from the technological frontier. For this economy the transitional
period is much longer, which gives Northern clean technologies the chance to spill over
to the South and hence increase the profitability of clean R&D. As k¯ < AStrap, (which
is the case depicted) Southern entrepreneurs follow the North and change the direction
of their R&D investments. The South then converges to the “good” equilibrium, where
ASclean denotes the new steady state technology stock. Finally, whenever k¯ > AStrap, the
South will stick to specializing in dirty production technologies, independent of the initial
distance to frontier. Thus, the combination between parameter specifications and initial
conditions determine the long-run equilibrium. The following proposition summarizes the
equilibrium dynamics:
17Again, the figure assumes the starting point to be the dirty laissez-faire equilibrium.
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AStrapASIN AScleanASLF k¯
ASt−1
ASt
sSc = 0
sSc = 1
Figure 3.5: Equilibrium Dynamics of ASt
The figure displays the equilibrium dynamics of ASt for the case of σ > 2.
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Proposition 3.6. Suppose it holds that γSd > γNc , and AStrap, k¯ are defined by (3.26), (3.27)
and the economy starts within the dirty regime, sSc,t=0 = 0, the dynamic equilibrium is as
follows:
1. Whenever AStrap < k¯, the economy starts within the regime of full dirty imitation,
and converges towards the dirty innovation steady state defined by Proposition 3.3,
independent of the initial conditions.
2. Whenever AStrap $ k¯, multiple steady states are possible depending on the initial
distance to frontier in dirty technologies: let T 1 denote the number of periods it
takes the South to reach the technological frontier, adt = 1, and let T 2 denote the
number of periods it takes the ratio of technologies to reach the critical threshold,
that is ASt = k¯. Whenever T 1 < T 2 the South converges to the dirty innovation
steady state as described under Proposition 3.3.
Whenever T 1 $ T 2, the economy starts within the regime of dirty imitation, but
switches to the clean sector when AS = k¯ and in the long-run converges to the clean
imitation steady state described under Proposition 3.4.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
3.5 Discussion and Numerical Illustration
3.5.1 Discussion
The Dirty Imitation Equilibrium
Proposition 3.2 shows that although Southern scientists keep targeting the dirty sector,
clean technologies have overtaken the country-intern technological frontier. This is trig-
gered by the South being extremly ineﬃcient in R&D activities (low γSj ), such that the
indirect eﬀect of cross-country spillovers dominates the direct eﬀect of active imitation in
the dirty sector.
There is no scope for the South to leapfrog the technological leading North, not even in
the dirty sector. However, as the growth rate of clean technologies is small, the incen-
tive to copy clean technologies from the leading country is not strong enough. For this
equilibrium to exist, it must be that γic < γid, such that the clean sector is less attrac-
tive as such. Moreover, from equations (3.26), (3.27) note that the South must only be
marginally less eﬀective, γSd ≈ γNc − ϵ, and intermediates are not very good substitutes,
σ ≈ 2. Interpreting these findings, the equilibrium is likely to arise within developing
economies, that do not impose environmental regulation and entrepreneurs that do not
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internalize the negative externality of pollution. However, as countries are not capable of
own innovation, they rely on adopting technologies from the North. Thus, through the
link of technology adoption, clean technologies diﬀuse to the South such that unilateral
environmental regulations in the frontier country are enough to prevent the environmental
disaster. This is the result discussed in Di Maria and Smulders (2004) and mainly applies
to developing countries that are far from the technological frontier. From the environmen-
tal point of view both economies profit from unilateral environmental regulations as they
are shifted to a sustainable growth path. Local as well as global pollution is decreasing at
a positive rate and converges towards its lower bound P . From an economic point of view
regulations do not lead to a negative growth drag in output, however, since γNc < γNd and
the South relies on imitation, the long-run growth rate of both economies is reduced.18
The Dirty Innovation Equilibrium
Being the focus of this paper, this equilibrium arises, whenever innovation activities in
the dirty sector are suﬃciently advanced and the country is close to the technological
frontier. In Section 3.2, I documented that this is the relevant case for emerging markets
like China. In the North environmental regulations prevent further R&D investments
in the dirty sector, which gives the technological follower the chance to approach the
technological frontier and take the leading position. Moreover, since clean technologies
are inferior, there is no incentive for the Southern entrepreneur to adopt them when she
can invent a more productive (dirty) one. Through path dependency of technological
progress the more advanced dirty sector then attracts all R&D investments. By reaching
the dirty technological frontier, the incentives to push these technologies further and to
become the technological leader within this sector strengthens the relative profitability
even more. As part of the acquired new knowledge is fundamental to research in general,
the Southern clean sector also profits in the long-run, finally overtaking the clean frontier
as well. From this point onwards, the North is forced to imitate the few clean technologies
developed in the South. Thus, the closer the unregulated country to the technological
frontier, the larger the probability of an environmental disaster, where the role of the
technological leader becomes reversed. This has severe consequences in economic and
environmental terms. Economically, the North suﬀers twice: (i) first, the long-run growth
rate is reduced and (ii) second, only by imposing environmental regulations, the South
is able to overtake the North in terms of output, technology and consumption. However,
note that the long-run growth rate within both countries is strictly larger than in the
equilibrium of dirty imitation (see above). Finally, as the dirty technologies are the most
developed ones, pollution is rising towards infinity such that unilateral environmental
18The direct eﬀect on welfare however is not straight forward as agents benefit from less pollution.
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regulations fail to prevent a global disaster. Both economies are on an unsustainable
growth path.19 Note that even though the North innovates in the clean sector, their
research is too ineﬃcient to change the technology composition used within the country.
The Clean Imitation Equilibrium
This equilibrium marks the “good” long-run steady state, in which unilateral environmen-
tal regulations are suﬃcient to prevent an environmental disaster. Since the North is
eﬃcient in developing clean technologies, the attractiveness of investments in the clean
sector increases even within the unregulated South. Through the cross-country spillover,
the Southern clean sector benefits from a high growth rate in the North such that the rela-
tive dominance of dirty technologies is reduced. As the relative stock of clean technologies
rises, profitability of the clean sector is increased, such that finally Southern entrepreneurs
switch their direction of research to the clean sector as well. Clearly, from the environmen-
tal perspective this is the desired outcome as all research is directed towards non-polluting
technologies. Economically, the consequences are ambiguous: depending on the relation
between clean and dirty growth rates, the long-run growth rate of both economies can be
greater or smaller than in laissez-faire. While this equilibrium is the preferred outcome
in the North, it is unclear whether the South favors this regime. Compared to the dirty
innovation equilibrium, the South is not able to become the technological leader, and the
long-run growth rate is smaller than in the previous case (conditional on γSd > γNc ).
3.5.2 Numerical Illustration
In this section I illustrate the transitional dynamics for the two distinct cases, γSd ≶
γNc . Before I define the necessary parameters required, let me emphasize that this is an
illustrative exercise and exact values of parameters should not be taken (too) seriously. I
follow AABH (2012) and set α = 13 , such that the share of machines in the production
function equals the usually assumed capital share. Moreover, I set γNd = 0.02 such that
the long-run growth rate (in the past) is about 2% p.a., which is again in line with the
literature. Motivated by the currently slower growth of clean technologies, I choose γNc =
0.01 such that the regime under environmental regulation enjoys a slower equilibrium
growth rate of 1% p.a. Further, I fix the spillover parameters with φ = δ = 0.1. As the
absolute value of initial technology levels, Aij,t=0 does not matter for the long-run outcome,
19Interpreting these findings as evidence for environmental quality being a luxury good, may lead to the
dangerous conclusion that all countries eventually switch to a sustainable growth path. However, to avoid
the environmental disaster, it would require an unreasonable small rate of environmental degradation and
a tiny growth rate of emissions. Empirical evidence tells exactly the opposite, stressing the importance
of the immediate enforcement of environmental policies.
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I only need to fix the ratios of technologies within each country. For this I assume that
the relative stock of technologies within each country equals the laissez-faire steady state
value and define ANt :=
(
ANc,t=0
ANd,t=0
)
=
(
1
1+γNd
) 1
φ and ASt :=
(
ASc,t=0
ASd,t=0
)
=
[
1
1+γSd
(
1
1+γNd
) δ
φ
] 1
φ+δ
.
Finally, ξ, ad,t=0 and ϵ, will vary depending on the case I consider.20
1. ξ = 0.49 ⇒ γSd < γNc : as analyzed in Section 3.4.2, the long-run equilibrium
will be determined by parameters independent of initial conditions. As the South
is less eﬃcient in research, it will never overtake the North as the technological
leader, but always stay behind. Thus, all Southern entrepreneurs either perform
dirty imitation or clean imitation in the long-run.21 I fix the distance to the dirty
technological frontier to ad,t=0 = 0.3 such that the South starts oﬀ with having
acquired 30% of the technologies available in the North. Then I let ϵ vary to generate
two possible transitional paths. Figure 3.6 visualizes the equilibrium dynamics
for the two relative technology stocks, ASt, ANt and the two distance to frontier
measures, act, adt. The upper panel shows the dynamics for the case of ϵ = 2.5, while
the lower one shows the dynamics for the case of ϵ = 10. While the first case leads
to the long-run steady state of continued imitation in the dirty sector, the second
case generates the “good” equilibrium, in which all Southern entrepreneurs find it
optimal to follow the North in the clean sector. Thus, the degree of substitutability
between intermediate inputs is decisive, which was already stressed in AABH (2012).
For intermediates being good substitutes, the Southern entrepreneur is more willing
to switch to the new technology, upon which the relative stock of clean technologies
rises, the distance to the clean frontier decreases and the distance to the dirty
frontier becomes slightly larger again. Note that the path of ANt is the same in
both scenarios as the North remains the innovator and hence independent of the
path of Southern technologies.
20Note that ac,t=0 then is indirectly fixed through the relative technology stocks within countries, i.e.
act = adt
(
ASc,t=0
ASd,t=0
)(
ANc,t=0
ANd,t=0
)−1
.
21However, note that along the transition there may exist a limited period, in which the South consti-
tutes the technological frontier in dirty technologies.
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Figure 3.6: Equilibrium Dynamics
The figure displays the equilibrium dynamics of ANt, ASt, act and adt for the case of γSd < γNc .
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2. ξ = 0.52 ⇒ γSd > γNc : in contrast to the previous case, now initial conditions are
the key determinant of the long-run equilibrium (possibly together with parameter
conditions). I fix ϵ = 10, such that AStrap > k¯ and only the initial distance to
frontier will decide which long-run equilibrium the economy converges to.22 Thus, I
let ad,t=0 vary to visualize both possible cases. The upper panel in Figure 3.7 shows
the case for emerging markets that are close to the technological frontier, starting
with ad,t=0 = 0.6. The South very quickly becomes the technological leader (in
dirty technologies) and from then on innovates at the frontier more eﬃciently than
the North does in clean technologies. Naturally then, clean technologies never can
compete with the stock of (already) available dirty technologies. In this scenario
there is a long intermediate period, in which the North innovates at the clean and
the South innovates at the dirty frontier. However, since the Southern growth rate
is larger in absolute terms, it finally overtakes the clean technological frontier as
well. Upon this the North falls behind and is forced to imitation. In contrast, the
lower panel in Figure 3.7 displays the case for countries that start far away from
the technological frontier with ad,t=0 = 0.1. Through the technological spillover
profits in the dirty sector get depressed and after a relatively short interval profits
in the clean sector have risen suﬃciently, such that the South follows the North
in clean R&D even though it foregoes the chance to become the leader in world
technologies. Note that this scenario is very similar to the one depicted in the lower
panel of Figure 3.6.
22I focus on ϵ = 10 since for ϵ = 2.5 there exists only one feasible long-run equilibrium.
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Figure 3.7: Equilibrium Dynamics
The figure displays the equilibrium dynamics of ANt, ASt, act and adt for the case of γSd > γNc .
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3.6 Conclusion
Assuming unilateral environmental regulations within the industrialized world, this paper
characterized the optimal behavior of profit-maximizing entrepreneurs in non-regulated
emerging market economies. Analyzing the direction and form of technological progress,
the model allows for a sector-specific cross-country spillover as well as for an intra-country
cross-sector spillover. Letting growth rates be diﬀerent across countries and sectors and
interacting them with the spillover parameters, embeds the analysis in a very general set-
up. Abstracting from interior equilibria, three diﬀerent long-run outcomes are possible,
depending on the relation between growth rates, the substitutability between factors of
production, the strength of the spillovers and the initial distance to the (dirty) techno-
logical frontier. Emerging markets close to the technological frontier that are capable of
innovation raise the risk of a global environmental disaster. Since the polluting sector is
their most developed one, and technological progress features path dependency, innova-
tion is directed towards the “dirty” sector only. By targeting the more profitable dirty
sector, they are able to overtake the global technological frontier and the environmental
disaster is unavoidable. In contrast, less developed countries where technological progress
occurs through adoption of frontier technologies, are more prone to follow the regulated
industrialized world and switch to installing non-polluting technologies. Since clean tech-
nologies are growing faster, profit maximization is enough to push all research towards
the clean sector. Finally, countries that are close to the frontier but are incapable of inno-
vation, face a mixed outcome. Although they still direct research investments in the dirty
sector, diﬀusion of clean technologies from the industrialized countries is strong enough
to prevent a global environmental disaster. This shows that unilateral regulations are
suﬃcient to prevent a disaster only if (i) the technological leading country is the one that
enforces regulations and (ii) the rate of cross-country technology diﬀusion is suﬃciently
high. Judging from China’s R&D accounts however suggests that emerging markets are
already close to the stage from where innovation becomes the driving force of techno-
logical progress. From an economic point of view desirable, for the global environment
it will be devastating, if emerging markets that lack the enforcement of environmental
policies become the global technological leader. Hence, this study supports the call for
an immediate enforcement of environmental regulations on a global scale.
4 Demand Forces of Technical Change
Evidence from the Chinese Manufacturing
Industry
Joint with Andreas Beerli, Fabrizio Zilibotti and Josef Zweimüller
4.1 Introduction
To which extent does the emerging middle class fuel growth and technical change in
the Chinese manufacturing industries? The unprecedented growth in average incomes in
China since the outset of its economic reforms in 1978 lifted over half a billion people out
of poverty. The process was associated with the emergence of a new class of consumers
with discretionary income to spend on consumer goods that satisfy less basic needs. This
paper asks whether and to which extent the expected expansion of the local market for
consumer durables might have stimulated productivity-enhancing investments by Chinese
firms, thus partly contributing to an explanation of the surge of technical progress in
Chinese manufacturing.
Our empirical investigation is motivated by recent theories of growth with directed
technical change (e.g., Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Acemoglu, 2002, henceforth DTC)
and with non-homothetic preferences (Foellmi and Zweimüller, 2006; Boppart, 2011,
henceforth NHP). The theory of DTC predicates that firms’ investments in new tech-
nologies hinge on a market size eﬀect: as the demand for a good produced by a particular
industry increases, firms in such an industry invest more in the creation or adoption of
new technologies relative to industries in which demand is sluggish. The theory of NHP
predicts, in turn, that economic growth aﬀects the sectoral composition of domestic de-
mand. It is well-known, for instance, that economic development and the formation of a
middle class reduces the food share of consumption and stimulates the demand of durable
consumption goods. If, in addition, there is a hierarchy in the consumers’ purchase of
durable good (e.g., as they grow richer, households purchase first a motorbike, and then a
car) the process of economic growth is characterized by waves of expansion of the domes-
tic market for diﬀerent durable goods. Merging the insight of the two theories yields the
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prediction that economic growth brings about demand-driven waves of technical progress:
the expectation of a future market size expansion for the product of a particular industry
causes a boom in innovative activities in that industry.1
To establish an empirical link between expected market size and technical progress,
we combine data from two diﬀerent sources: the Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS) which provides information on consumption behavior of households; and the
Annual Survey of Industrial Production (ASIP) from which firm-specific productivity
measures (and their changes over time) can be calculated. We concentrate on 16 in-
dustries covering a substantial share of expenditures for consumer durables: cellphones,
cars, computers, telephones, refrigerators, home video appliances, washing machines, air
conditioning, cameras, satellite dishes, motorcycles, kitchen appliances, radios, sewing
machines, electric fans and cycles.
A potential problem with our empirical analysis is the endogeneity of market size.
Technical progress can be the trigger rather than the eﬀect of the expansion in the do-
mestic market of a specific product, e.g., by causing a fall in its sale price. To tackle
the endogeneity problem we exploit the large variation in the households’ distribution
across income classes associated with the Chinese economic growth during the last two
decades: in 1990 less than one percent of Chinese households fell into the category of
high-middle income and high-income households, while both low-income and low-middle
income households made up close to 50 percent each.2 By the year 2009, the fraction
of low-income and low-middle income households has fallen below 10 percent and to 40
percent, respectively, while the fraction of high-middle and high-income households has
increased to more than 30 percent and 20 percent, respectively. These changes lead to
predictable, diﬀerential changes in demand across various consumer goods industries. For
instance, to return to the previous example, the market for motorcycles booms earlier
than the market for cars. However, at some point, the former becomes saturated, and the
potential for future market expansion dies oﬀ. At that point, it is the car industry that
starts attracting investments and innovative activities. It is this source of variation that
forms the basis of our strategy to identify the impact of expected demand on technical
change in Chinese manufacturing industries.
More precisely, we construct product-specific Engel-curves for the 16 consumer durables,
and estimate changes in expected market size for each durable good. We first fix income-
1A formal argument of the link between DTC and NHP is provided in the recent theory of structural
change of Boppart and Weiss (2013)
2Following World Bank convention, we group households into four classes: low-income, low-middle
income, high-middle income, and high-income. The corresponding income brackets – measured in real
incomes per year in constant 2009 Yuan - are: 0-2’149 Yuan; 2’150-8’514 Yuan; 8’515-16’499 Yuan; and
16’500 Yuan or more. (Measured in 2009 US $ this corresponds to US $ 0-2’149; US $ 2’150-4’167; US $
4’168-8’075; and US $ 8076 or more.)
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group specific ownership rates of a particular durable good to a particular base-year and
then use the changing population shares across income classes to calculate a measure of
potential ownership and potential market size in other years. This yields an industry-
specific markets size measure, whose evolution over time is entirely driven by changes in
the income distribution. Changes in ownership patterns of a given income group, which
might be induced by changes in prices or the quality of goods, do not aﬀect this potential
market size measure. To the extent that these diﬀerential changes in expected markets
size are uncorrelated with unobserved factors that drive innovation incentives, our market
size measure identifies the impact of expected demand on technical change in Chinese
manufacturing.
We find quantitatively important demand eﬀects on technical change: a one percent
increase in expected market size increases firm-specific TFP by 0.27% and firm-specific
labor productivity by 0.42%. Hence our findings suggest that firms in industries with
a large expected local market are significantly more productive today, and show higher
levels of other measures of innovative activity. Moreover, the eﬀect of expected market
size becomes larger when the expected market size measure is constructed from a longer
time window over which firms may form expectations about local market size.
The estimated eﬀect of expected market size is robust to a number of checks. First,
we include a rich set of firm-level determinants of R&D and market concentrations, in
particular foreign and government ownership, as some scholars pointed out that this
may aﬀect productivity to a considerable degree (Van Reenen and Yueh, 2012). Second,
we show that our results are robust to supply-side drivers of R&D aﬀecting innovation
opportunities of Chinese firms by including a measure of worldwide technology potential
reported by Swiss firms. Third, our findings our robust when we control for a firms’ export
status. This is particularly important in the context of China, as the Chinese economy
is strongly export-driven, so demand conditions on export markets may be more relevant
for productivity and technical progress than domestic demand. We test for the robustness
of our results controlling for firms’ export behavior. Interestingly, in our dataset there
is a stark dichotomy between exporting and non-exporting firms. About 50% of the
firms in our sample do not export at all, whereas for 24% of them exports account for
more than 75% of their total sales.3 Interestingly, we find that the domestic market size
eﬀect is totally insignificant for exporting firms. Instead, our results are driven entirely
by non-exporting firms serving exclusively the Chinese market. This is coherent with
our hypothesis that innovative activity is driven by the expectations of future market
size. For exporting firms what matters is the global market, thus the expansion of the
3To be precise, it may be that one firm exports in one year but not in the next year. Shares are taken
with respect to the panel of datapoints.
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domestic market size is less important. It is instead the technology adoption behavior
of non-exporting firms that hinges the most on the expectation of about future domestic
demand. For instance, the incentive for a Chinese car producer serving the local market
to invest in technology hinges on the expansion of the Chinese middle class. In contrast,
this does not matter for an assembling firm producing cameras that are exported to the
West.
Empirical studies thoroughly examining the eﬀect of market size on innovation remain
relatively scarce with most papers focusing on the pharmaceutical industry. Acemoglu
and Linn (2004) document a causal link between market size and innovation building
on diﬀerential patterns of drug use between young and old individuals. Exploiting the
demographic changes in the US population as exogenous source of variation in market
size, they find a positive eﬀect of expected demand on innovation across diﬀerent drug
categories. Their findings are quantitatively important and very robust. A one percent
increase in potential market size leads to approximately a 4% increase in the entry of
new non-generic drugs. Finkelstein (2004) demonstrates that health policies designed to
increase utilization of vaccines created strong incentives to develop new vaccines. Accord-
ing to her estimates, a 1 dollar increase in expected annual revenue for vaccines generates
additional 6 cents of investment in that vaccine. Moreover, these policies were associated
with a 2.5-fold increase in clinical trials for new vaccines. Contrasting evidence comes
from Acemoglu et al. (2006) who investigate the eﬀect of Medicare on the development
of new pharmaceuticals for the elderly. They find no evidence that the introduction of
Medicare is associated with an increase in drug consumption among the elderly. Con-
sistent with this, they also find no evidence of an increase in the approval of new drugs
more likely to treat diseases that aﬀect the elderly, after Medicare’s introduction. Blume-
Kohout and Sood (2012) consider the market size increase for prescription drugs through
Medicare Part D which increased pharmaceutical firms’ expected sales. They find a sig-
nificant increase in pharmaceutical R&D for therapeutic classes with a higher Medicare
market share. De Mouzon et al. (2011) use detailed data on spending patterns of patients
(and their insurers) to show that expected market size has a highly significant and quan-
titatively important eﬀect on innovations (as measured by the number of new chemical
entities of the market of a particular disease class).
The above findings all indicate a large impact of expected market size on innovative
activities but they are specific to the pharmaceutical industry. It is not clear whether
empirical evidence from the pharmaceutical industry applies to other industries as well.
The recent study by Boppart and Weiss (2013) focuses on demand eﬀects on R&D in
the whole US industry. Using the input-output structure of diﬀerent industries as an
instrument for actual market size, it turns out that a sector’s market share has a significant
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positive eﬀect on sector-specific R&D investments.
Our paper is also related to the literature studying the determinants of the recent
sharp increase in R&D and patent activity in China. The share of R&D expenditure on
GDP roughly tripled in China from 0.6% in 1996 to over 1.8% in 2011 (The World Bank
2014). While an increase in R&D intensity is a common pattern over the development
process, this has started when China has still a very large technology gap from the fron-
tier. Taiwan, for comparison, reached the same R&D-to-GDP ratio in 1995 as did China
in 2009, when its GDP per capita was twice as large as China in 2009. Some recent stud-
ies argue that this exceptional pattern is partly due to the opportunities provided by the
presence of a large domestic market. Gao and Jeﬀerson (2007) argue that large and fast
growing consumer markets create a premium for research-intensive industries to establish
production centers in close proximity to burgeoning-consumer markets. Hu and Jeﬀer-
son (2008) go further and suggest that an important driving force could be the changing
composition of domestic consumption shifting away from products with low-technology
content (such as bicycles) to goods and services that are more technology intensive (such
as automobiles).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes our data sources
and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4.3 explains the econometric model and
lays out our empirical strategy. Section 4.4 presents the baseline results and Section 4.5
discusses a variety of robustness checks. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use two micro-level data sources. The first contains household-level data about the
ownership of durable goods to construct a count measure of actual market size.4 The
second contains firm-level manufacturing data about value-added, investments and em-
ployment that we used to estimate total factor productivity, our main outcome measure
of innovative investments.
4Working with durable goods ownership rather than household expenditure data has some important
advantages but also bears some diﬃculties. The main advantage is that CHNS’ coverage of a relatively
broad set of diﬀerent durable goods allows to construct a market size measure with substantial industry
and time variation which can be linked relatively straightforward to diﬀerent industries in the manufac-
turing data. Second, the lumpy nature of durable goods creates an interesting variation in ownership
profiles across the income distribution which can be exploited to create an exogenous measure of market
size. As a major disadvantage relative to expenditure data, we have no information about the value
of diﬀerent durable goods. Therefore, we can only use the population count of each durable good in
the population and need to abstract from value weighted market size measure. See Appendix D.1.1 for
greater detail.
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4.2.1 Market Size
The household-level ownership data are from the China Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS). The CHNS was collected in eight waves between 1989 to 2009, and covers a
representative sample of Chinese urban and rural households across nine provinces with
substantial variation in geography, economic development and public resources. These
data are publicly available and are widely used in the literature.5 The CHNS contains
information, for a number of durable goods, on how many items of a particular durable
good are owned by each household, of which we also know the income and household
size. We combine this information with the size of the Chinese population to estimate
total number of items of a particular durable good j held by Chinese consumers in year
t, denoted by Stockactualj,t .6
Figure 4.1 shows the diﬀusion patterns of five selected durable goods between 1989
to 2009: cycles, electric fan, refrigerator, air condition, and car. The years not covered
by the CHNS are fitted by linear interpolation.7 The time interval between 1998 and
2007, which we can match to the firm-level data described below, is marked with the
dotted vertical lines. Electrical fans were already widespread in the early years, and
feature some saturation in more recent years. Saturation is even stronger for bicycles
whose stock is decreasing since 2000, likely to be due to their progressive substitution
with higher-ranked transportation vehicles such as motorcycles and cars. There is no
saturation for refrigerators, air conditioning and cars. The ownership of these durables is
booming during the period of our study.
We use the evolution of the ownership stock to infer the flow of newly purchased goods,
our proxy for market size. To calculate such a flow we take into account that the per capita
stock of each durable good can change for three reasons: (i) some households acquire the
good for the first time (extensive margin); (ii) some households who already own units
of the good buy additional units (intensive margin); (iii) some households replace worn
out items (replacement demand). Assuming a constant replacement rate δj yields the
following annual flow of newly purchased goods (actual market size):
5See, among others, Benjamin et al. (2005), Benjamin et al. (2005b), Liu (2008). See Beerli (2010)
for a more detailed description of this data set.
6The population of China is from the Penn World Tables. More formally, we use the number of items
of a specific durable good j in wave t owned by household h, nrownedh,t, and the number of household
members, hhsizeh,t, to compute the average number of items per head, i.e.
[
1
Ht
∑Ht
h=1
(
nrownedh,t
hhsizeh,t
)]
,
where Ht is total number of households in period t. Then, we take the Chinese population size in year t
(China Version 1) from the Penn World Tables 7.0, Heston et al. (2011), to get Stockactualj,t .
7“Cycles” are the cumulative ownership of bicycles and tricycles. See Section 4.2.2 for detail.
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of Durable Good Stocks
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Notes: The figure shows the total items owned (in millions) for each durable good, Stockactualj,t , i.e. for
electric fans, refrigerators, air conditioners and cars. ”Cycles” is the cumulative ownership of bicycles and
tricycles. CHNS data 1989 to 2009, years between survey waves linearly interpolated.
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MSactualj,t,t+1 =
[
Stockactualj,t+1 − Stockactualj,t
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
new purchases
+ δj · Stockactualj,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
replacement purchases
Unfortunately, the CHNS provides no information about when households decide to
scrap existing durable goods. Nor could we find estimates of depreciation of durables for
China. We resort to using the depreciation estimates available for the US from the BEA
(2003). As shown in Table D.1 (Appendix D.1.3), the BEA (2003) oﬀers depreciation
estimates for a large variety of diﬀerent durable goods for the years 1925 to 1997.8 We
use the average over this long period. We check the robustness of the results to using
alternative depreciation rates. The results are robust to a large range of depreciation
rates. When the estimate of MSactualj,t,t+1 so calculated is smaller than one, we set MSactualj,t,t+1
to one.9
Figure 4.2 displays the evolution of market size for the five durable goods displayed
in Figure 4.1. The electric fan market is stationary; the market for cycles is shrinking;
finally the market for refrigerators, air conditioning and cars is increasing.
In our regression analysis below, we use market size over a multi-period horizon. More
formally, our market size measure is the yearly average over the relevant period (e.g.,
k = 4 means a five-year horizon taking into account the stock of goods between t and
t+ 4):
MSactualj,t,t+k =
1
k
k−1∑
s=0
[
MSactualj,t+s,t+s+1
]
.
4.2.2 Industrial Production
We use firm-level data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Production (ASIP) 1998-2007.
The survey is conducted by the Chinese government’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).
The ASIP is a census of all non-state firms with more than 5 million RMB in revenue
8The BEA (2003) estimates the length of service lives (in years) for a large variety of durable goods
for years 1925 and 1997. By definition, assets are ‘‘retired’’ from the stock at the end of their service
lives. Following the BEA (2003), we set δj equal to the inverse of the service life of a durable good j.
This represents the share of the total stock of a durable, which needs to be replaced each year, in order
to keep the total stock constant.
9While this adjustment is somewhat arbitrary, we prefer this route to eliminating negative observations
from the sample, as the latter would cause a major selection problem. In the case of negative growth, we
set MSactual to unity rather than to zero because in the regression analysis below we take the logarithm
of MSactual and this is not defined at zero. To keep the ranking of goods unchanged, this then requires
us to set all observations between zero and one to one. Note that this adjustment only concerns two
observations of MSactualj,t,t+1 of radios in 2004 and 2005. However, in our baseline regressions these two
observations are not included as we are interested in the market size eﬀect over a longer time horizon,
i.e. MSactualj,t,t+4.
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of Market Size of Durable Goods
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Notes: Actual market size is constructed as explained in the text, i.e. MSactualj,t,t+1 =[
Stockactualj,t+1 − Stockactualj,t
]
+ δj · Stockactualj,t where estimates for δj are taken from the BEA (2003).
CHNS data 1989 to 2009.
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(about $800,000 at the current exchange rate) plus all state-owned firms in manufacturing.
The raw data consists of over 150,000 firms in 1998 and grows to over 300’000 firms in
2007. The ASIP covers a wide range of information about the firm’s balance sheet, cash-
flow and ownership which provides us with a rich set of control variables. This data set
has been used extensively in the recent literature.10
We estimate total factor productivity (TFP) at the firm-level using data on value-
added, the stock of fixed assets, intermediate inputs and employment applying the estima-
tion procedure suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to account for the endogeneity
of factor input choices.11 We take TFP as a proxy for the investment in innovation.12
We check the robustness of our results by using labor productivity as a second measure
of innovation activities. This is sometimes preferred to TFP in the literature, due to its
superior stability (see also Crépon et al., 1998). The most natural measure of innovation
however, would be R&D expenditure. But unfortunately, we cannot use this measure as
it is only available for the years 2005 to 2007.
We link each durable good observed in the CHNS to the four digit manufacturing
industry producing it as a final household consumption good according to the NBS (2008)
description of the Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) system. A limitation of this
approach is that it neglects those industries which produce the durable goods as equipment
or intermediate inputs (as opposed to final goods) for other industries – this is however
quantitatively not very important for the durable goods we consider. We collapse the 22
categories of durable goods available from the CHNS into 16 manufacturing industries, as
in some cases diﬀerent durable goods are produced by firms belonging in the same four-
digit manufacturing industry.13 Following Brandt et al. (2011) we exclude all firms with
less then 8 employees and those with negative values of value-added and capital stock.14
Additionally, as noted by Feenstra et al. (2011), the NBS data are fairly noisy due to
mis-reporting and other sources of measurement error. Since measurement error is likely
to be larger among very small (e.g. family-managed) firms, which do not set up a formal
10A detailed description of the data set can be found in Brandt et al. (2011). Other recent papers
include, for instance, Feenstra et al. (2011) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
11The estimation of total factor productivity is explained in greater detail in Appendix D.1.2.
12Using TFP as a proxy for innovative investments is common in the literature. See among others,
Crépon et al. (1998) or Acemoglu et al. (2010).
13Since color TVs and DVD players are produced by the same four-digit manufacturing industries, we
created a new ownership variable for home video appliances which is simply the cumulative ownership
of those two goods irrespectively whether this is a color TV or a DVD player. We proceed in a similar
fashion in the case of the kitchen appliance industry as the cumulative of microwaves, rice cookers and
pressure cookers and in the case of the cycle industry being the cumulative of bicycles and tricycles. The
exact list of durable goods and matched industries can be found in Table D.3 in the data appendix.
14We also employ their procedure to link restructured firms over time, cf. the online appendix of Brandt
et al. (2011) for more details.
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accounting system, we exclude the smallest 10% of firms in terms of value-added (on a
yearly basis).15 We end up with a final sample of 30’883 firm observations in 16 durable
good industries over the years 1998–2007.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
4.3.1 Econometric Model
To study the eﬀect of market size on innovation we consider the following regression model
lnYi,j,t = α
(
lnMSactualj,t,t+4
)
+X′i,j,tβ + ψHHIj,t + ηj + λt + ϵi,j,t,
where i denotes a firm, j an industry (durable good) and t the time. The main goal is to
estimate the eﬀect of the future market size at the industry level, MSactualj,t,t+4, on the firm-
level measure of innovation activity, Yi,j,t. MSactualj,t,t+4 measures the annual average change in
the total number of items of a durable good j between t and t+4 adjusted for depreciation,
as discussed above. The five-year window benchmark is similar as in Acemoglu and Linn
(2004), as this is a plausible time horizon to determine firms’ investments in innovation.
Our main outcome variable is TFP, a proxy for the firm-level investment in technology
adoption. We perform robustness analysis using alternative proxies for innovation such
as labor productivity, as well as alternative windows for future market size.16
In all specifications, we include industry fixed eﬀects, ηj , to account for industry-
specific innovation intensities (e.g., the car industry is inherently more technology-intensive
than the bicycle industry). Time fixed eﬀects, λt, absorb aggregate shocks (e.g., business
cycle fluctuations, China joining the WTO, etc.). The vectorXi,j,t controls for unobserved
firm-level heterogeneity to ensure that estimates are not biased by omitted determinants
of investment in innovation.17 First, we control for the firm size using the log number
of workers as suggested in the literature. This is important since firm size could be a
determinant of its propensity to invest in innovation. Second, we control for the own-
ership structure of firms that can be important to determine firms’ financial structure
and innovativeness.18 Specifically, we take privately owned firms as the reference group
15Alternatively, Feenstra et al. (2011) suggest to exclude firms for which some key accounting identities
are not matched in the data. This results in a quite rigorous filtering, however, which would substantially
shrink our sample of durable good firms.
16Depending on the length of the time window, we have to exclude certain industries from the analysis,
e.g. since satellite dish ownership is only available from 2006 onwards, we have to exclude this industry
in our baseline analysis with the five-year time window.
17See Crépon et al. (1998) and Mairesse and Mohnen (2010) for a review of firm-level innovation
determinants.
18See for example Song et al. (2011).
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and introduce three dummy variables for whether a firm is foreign, state or collective
owned. Third, we add a dummy for firms that are older than six years (the median in
our sample) in order to control for the age of firms.19 Further, we include a dummy for
firms located in coastal provinces, worrying that firms in the booming coastal regions
might be overrepresented in some sectors. Finally, to control for diﬀerent intensities of
market competition across sectors, we introduce the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index, which
is defined as the sum of squared market shares of all firms within the sector.20 Summary
statistics on all variables are listed in Table D.4.
The coeﬃcient of interest, α, captures the eﬀect of future market size on a firm’s
investment in technology. The theory of directed technical change outlined in the intro-
duction predicts that α should be positive. As both our dependent variable and market
size are in logs, the coeﬃcient can be interpreted as an elasticity. We now discuss how we
address a number of econometric concerns.
4.3.2 Endogeneity and Potential Market Size
The most important econometric issue is the potential endogeneity of the market size
measure. Firms’ investments in technology adoption can influence the future stream of
durable good purchases by aﬀecting the prices or the quality of durable goods. For in-
stance, process innovation reduces production costs, whereas product innovation makes
available better varieties for which consumers are willing to pay more. Through these
channels, a higher intensity of innovation in an industry may increase the industry’s fu-
ture market size. Due to the endogeneity problem, OLS regressions may yield inconsistent
estimates of the parameter α. To address this problem, we instrument MSactualj,t,t+4 with a
measure of potential market size, MSpotentialj,t,t+4 which is independent of supply shocks aﬀect-
ing the prices or the quality of durable goods. The identification strategy is in close spirit
to the ony employed by Acemoglu and Linn (2004). They use demographic variables to
predict the evolution of market size for diﬀerent drugs, taking into account the usage pat-
tern across age groups in the population. Intuitively, a fast-aging population implies that
the market for drugs used to treat patients suﬀering from the Alzheimer syndrome grows
faster than that for drugs used to treat child obesity. Their demography-based measure
of potential market size is exogenous to innovative investments, and is therefore a valid
19Arnold and Hussinger (2005) for example argue that due to possible correlation between size and age
of a firm employing a dummy instead of the absolute age seems to be the correct estimation approach.
20Studies that specifically employ the HHI are for example Cotterill (1986), Farrell and Shapiro (1990)
and Farrell and Shapiro (1990). We define the HHI for industry j at time t as the sum of squared market
shares (in value-added) of all firms operating within this sector at time t. Since we calculate market shares
in percentage terms, (between 0 and 100), the HHI lies in the range between 0 and 10 000. We are aware
of the fact that the border of markets is less clear for globally operating firms. However, we consider the
HHI as the first best measure to capture market competition within the firm’s primary (home) market.
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instrument. Similarly, in our paper we assume that the market size of each durable good
depends on the evolution of income growth and the income distribution, given the diﬀu-
sion curve associated with each durable good. In particular, we assume that households
in diﬀerent income brackets purchase each durable good with a given probability that we
estimate. Then, we construct a measure of potential market size for each durable good
that depends only on macroeconomic variables (e.g. the growth of household income)
and not on supply-driven shocks. Under the assumption that macroeconomic changes are
exogenous to firms (and industries) investing in new technologies, market potential is a
valid instrument for the actual market size. Note that the exclusion restriction would be
violated if the innovative investments of firms producing a particular good could aﬀect
the future aggregate economic growth (or income distribution) in China. However, this
is unlikely to be the case since we focus on narrowly defined industries producing small
shares of the total income of China.21
More formally, we start from breaking down the Chinese population into four groups
using fixed income thresholds in constant 2009 Yuan.22 Figure 4.3 shows the evolution of
the population shares of the four income groups over the survey period. The population
share of the two poorer groups falls dramatically over time, especially between 2000 (85 %)
and 2009 (47%). Conversely, the share of high income households increases from almost
zero in 1997 to 20% in 2009. Together, the two upper income groups account to 52% in
2009.
Next, we construct the usage intensities, uj,g,t, by estimating the number of items
per capita of each durable good j owned by agents in income group g at time t. Table
D.2 in Appendix D.1.3 presents these usage profiles for the year 2009 in our dataset.
As expected, the usage profiles are upward sloping for all durable goods. Yet, there are
considerable diﬀerences between durable goods. Electric fans, for instance, feature the
largest increase in usage at the lower end of the income distribution whereas the usage of
cars increases the most as an individual switches from the second highest to the highest
group. These diﬀerences across usage patterns are the crux of our identification.
Finally, we construct our measure of potential market size as
21Also, although investments in innovation are correlated across industries, recall that we control for
time dummies in our regressions, so the identification comes from deviations from common trends in
TFP.
22Households are assigned to four income groups according to their household income per capita follow-
ing a classification of the WB (2009) Atlas method that assigns countries into 4 groups according to their
GNI per capita in 2009. With some adjustments to account for small sampling of the high income group,
the groups are: low income ( below 2’150 Yuan), lower middle income (2’150 - 8’514 Yuan), upper middle
income (8’515 - 16’499 Yuan), high income (16’500 Yuan or more). In constant 2009 $, this corresponds
roughly to: low income, US $ 2’149, low middle income, US $ 2’150 -US $ 4’167, high middle income, US
$ 4’168 - US $ 8’075, high income, US $ 8’076 or more. See Appendix D.1.1 details.
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of Income Groups According to WB Classification
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Notes: CHNS data 1989 to 2009. Households classified into four income groups according to their
household income per capita in constant 2009 Yuan: low income ( below 2’150 Yuan), lower middle
income (2’150 - 8’514 Yuan), upper middle income (8’515 - 16’499 Yuan), high income (16’500 Yuan or
more).
Chapter 4 113
MSpotentialj,t,t+1 =
(
Stockpotentialj,t+1 − Stockpotentialj,t
)
+ δj · Stockpotentialj,t ,
where
Stockpotentialj,t =
∑
g
uj,g · ig,t,
and ig,t is the number of people in income group g in year t and uj,g = uj,g,t=2009 is the
number of item of durable good j owned per head in income group g in the year 2009.23
Our measure exploits the fact that there are significant diﬀerences in the ownership of
durable goods across income groups. As the economy grows, more households enter higher
income groups and start purchasing durable goods. This process aﬀects asymmetrically
the demand of diﬀerent durable goods. As Table D.2 shows, durable goods whose diﬀusion
increases the most across low income groups (such as electric fans or motorcycles), diﬀuse
faster at an earlier stage of development. In contrast, for goods such as cars, the diﬀusion
is fastest as more households climb up into the highest income group. Note that there
are diﬀerences between MSpotentialj,t,t+1 and MSactualj,t,t+1. Part of these diﬀerences reflect changes
(typically, increases) in the usage intensities that apply to all income groups. Beerli
(2010), shows that a large part of these is explained by falls in prices.24 Price-driven
changes in demand, in turn, are likely to be related to supply-side shocks, e.g. technical
progress reducing the production cost. Our measure of potential market size abstracts
from such changes and is therefore immune from supply-side shocks. In other words,
changes in prices and quality of durable goods which may result from investments in
technology adoption, cannot cause over-time variation in MSpotentialj,t,t+1 .25 In fact, Figure
D.1 in Appendix D.1.4 reveals that income-specific usage rates are indeed changing due to
diﬀerential price dynamics. Moreover, the variation across industries shows the diﬀerential
speed of technological progress across industries.
23Note that the choice among diﬀerent CHNS waves as base-year is to some extent arbitrary. Because
the 2009 wave of the CHNS has the richest coverage of durable goods and the highest income group
is sampled more accurately than in earlier years, we pick 2009 as our best choice of a base-year. See
Appendix D.1.1 for a detailed discussion.
24An example is color TVs. Beerli (2010) shows that the rise in income levels can only explain about
one third of the total increase in color TV ownership for an average household between 1989 and 2006.
25We are particularly concerned that innovation activities of firms in year t may aﬀect future usage
intensities, i.e. uj,g,t+k with k > 0, and through this the expected market size in upcoming years,
MSactualj,t,t+k. Thus, a less conservative notion of potential market size would allow to use lagged usage
intensities for each given year. Yet, as innovation activities of firms show considerable serial correlation,
we take the most conservative approach possible and fix usage intensities to one specific year.
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4.3.3 Omitted Variables
The estimate could also suﬀer from an omitted variable bias. In this respect, we address
two important specific issues. First, while we focus on the expansion of the domestic
durable good market, Chinese firms also engage in a significant export activity. Thus,
investment in new technologies may be driven by foreign demand as well. We address
this issue in two ways: first, we include a dummy capturing whether a firm is engaged
in export activities. Second, to analyze whether exporting firms are significantly diﬀer-
ent from domestic-serving firms, we additionally include an interaction term between our
market size measure and the export indicator.
Another potential source of bias could be global technology shocks which aﬀect diﬀeren-
tially the propensity of firms to innovate in diﬀerent industries. An example could be the
rise of automation technology (compare e.g. Autor et al., 2003). To address this concern,
we control for an industry-specific measure of worldwide technology potential reported by
Swiss firms.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 OLS and IV Regressions
We start by estimating a set of standard OLS regressions, whose results are reported in
Table 4.1. All regressions include time and industry fixed eﬀects. Standard errors are
clustered at the industry-year level. Namely, we allow for correlation between error terms
related to observations belonging to the same industry in each given year.26
Table 4.1 reports the results. We do not report the estimated coeﬃcients for the full
set of control variables, which are deferred to the Appendix (see Table D.8 in Appendix
D.2). Column (1) yields the estimate of α in the baseline OLS regression without con-
trols. The coeﬃcient is positive and highly significant. Increasing the future market size
by one percent raises firms’ TFP by 0.19%. However, part of the eﬀect could be spuriously
driven by omitted time-varying firm characteristics. We then control for a large number of
firm-level variables including size, ownership, age, and location.27 We also control for the
Hirschmann-Herfindahl index for market competition at the industry level. Controlling
26We also consider an alternative clustering strategy allowing for correlation of the error terms at the
firm-level. Clustering at the industry-year level turns out to be generally more demanding. An even
more demanding strategy would be to cluster standard errors at the industry level. However, this is
not possible with our data, since the number of clusters would in this case be too small (see Angrist
and Pischke, 2009 for a discussion of the problems arising with too few clusters). Following Angrist and
Pischke (2009), we check the validity of our results by collapsing observations on the industry level.
27See Crépon et al. (1998) and Mairesse and Mohnen (2010) for a review of firm-level innovation
determinants.
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for these firm and industry characteristics causes a reduction in the size of the estimated
coeﬃcient, which falls to 0.6% turning statistically insignificant, see column (2) of Table
4.1. Clustering at the firm-level reduces the estimated standard error but the coeﬃcient
of interest remains insignificant (see column (3)).
Next, we run two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions to account for the endogeneity
of the actual market size measure. We use our measure of “potential market size” as an
instrument for the actual market size. As explained in Section 4.3.2, potential market
size is exclusively driven by future changes in the income distribution. This measure is
orthogonal to price or quality changes that could aﬀect changes in ownership patterns
and cause an endogeneity problem. Formally, for this to be a valid instrument, it must
be correlated with the actual market size and be uncorrelated with the error term.
The results of the 2SLS regressions are reported in columns (4)-(6) of Table 4.1. The
eﬀect of market size on firms’ TFP is larger and more precisely estimated than in the
OLS specification. Column (4) repeats the regression of column (1), where we control
only for industry and time fixed eﬀects. The estimated coeﬃcient is positive and highly
significant. Controlling for the firm- and industry level characteristics listed above yields
a lower coeﬃcient. However, this remains large and highly significant. The estimate in
column (5) - the analogue of the OLS regression in column (2) - implies that a one percent
exogenous increase in market size leads to an increase in TFP of 0.27%. This is a large
eﬀect (more than four times as large as the OLS estimate), suggesting the importance
of profit incentives as a driver of firms’ innovation activities. Column (6) completes the
picture by clustering the standard errors at the firm-level. This yields an even higher
p-value of the estimated coeﬃcient.28
Table 4.2 presents the results of the first stage regressions. Columns (1)-(2) show the
results corresponding to columns (4)-(5) in Table 4.1. Potential market size is significantly
correlated with the actual measure of market size and suggests that a one percent change
in potential market size (driven only by income changes) leads to a change in actual
market size by nearly 2%. The last row of Table 4.2 shows that the F-statistic of the
excluded instrument is well above the conventional threshold of 10.29 Column (3) repeats
the regression of column (2) clustering standard errors at the firm-level.
28The standard error of the estimated coeﬃcient blows up if we cluster residuals at the industry
level, rendering the estimated coeﬃcient insignificant. However, as discussed above, this approach is
problematic, and we do not emphasize it.
29Compare e.g. Staiger and Stock (1997) for details on the critical F-statistic that reveals a weak
instrument problem.
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Table 4.1: Eﬀect of Market Size on LN TFP
Dep. Variable lnTFPi,j,t
Mean 5.137 5.137 5.137 5.137 5.137 5.137
St.Dev. 1.161 1.161 1.161 1.161 1.161 1.161
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnMSactualj,t,t+4 0.188 0.0628 0.0628 0.549 0.272 0.272
[0.0813]** [0.0525] [0.0395] [0.185]*** [0.132]** [0.0828]***
Firm Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 20,167 20,160 20,160 20,167 20,160 20,160
R2 0.111 0.278 0.278 0.106 0.277 0.277
Clustering Industry x Year Industry x Year Firm Industry x Year Industry x Year Firm
No of Clusters 111 111 7662 111 111 7662
F-Stats 27.68 26.70 1480
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Observations below the 10 percentile
of value-added each year are excluded. All columns include year and industry fixed eﬀects. Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) include a set of firm-
and industry-level controls (the log of number of workers, age (measured by a dummy), a dummy for collective, state and foreign ownership,
coastal location, respectively and the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index). lnMSactualj,t,t+4 is instrumented with lnMS
potential
j,t,t+4 .
Table 4.2: First Stage Regression
Dep. Variable lnMSactualj,t,t+4
(1) (2) (3)
lnMSpotentialj,t,t+4 1.967 1.955 1.955
[0.374]*** [0.378]*** [0.0508]***
Firm controls No Yes Yes
Observations 20,167 20,160 20,160
R2 0.244 0.239 0.239
Clustering Industry x Year Industry x Year Firm
No of Clusters 111 111 7662
F-Stats 27.68 26.70 1480
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Observations below the 10 percentile
of value-added each year are excluded. All columns include year and industry fixed eﬀects. Columns (2)-(3) include a set of firm- and industry-
level controls (the log of number of workers, age (measured by a dummy), a dummy for collective, state and foreign ownership, coastal location,
respectively and the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index). The reported R2 reported equals the partial R2.
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Finally, Figure 4.4 summarizes our empirical findings by a convenient visualization.
We split our data sample at the median value of the change in potential market size
between 1998 and 2007.30 Then we plot the evolution of log productivity broken down
by above - and below median industries. Since we empirically stress the importance of
the market size eﬀect for firms’ innovation behavior, we expect TFP to increase faster
for firms within industries that are subject to a positive demand shock over the sample
period. The Figure shows that this is indeed the case. Productivity increased by 1.3
log points in industries above the median change in market size between 1998 and 2007
whereas industries below increased by 0.7 log points.
30We calculate the median value of the change in one-year potential market size between 1998 and
2007. For each industry, this value is ∆MSpotentialj,1998,2007 = lnMS
potential
j,2007,2008 − lnMSpotentialj,1998,1999. Looking
at the change in potential market size ensures that we ignore level diﬀerences of market size between
industries, as we do later in the regression when we use industry fixed eﬀects.
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Figure 4.4: Evolution of log productivity in industries above and below the median change
in potential market size between 1998 and 2007
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Notes: All ASIP data 1998 to 2007. Industries allocated to groups according to the change in market size
between 1998 and 2007, i.e. ∆MSpotentialj,1998,2007 = lnMS
potential
j,2007,2008 − lnMSpotentialj,1998,1999. Industries above the
median, ∆MSpotentialj,1998,2007 >= ∆MS
potential
1998,2007, are camera, air condition, computer, car, radio, refrigerator,
telephone and kitchen appliances. Industries below the median, ∆MSpotentialj,1998,2007 < ∆MS
potential
1998,2007, are
washing machine, sewing machine, home video appliances, cycles, electric fan, motorcycle, satellite dish.
The mean value of lnTFPj,t within groups was calculated using each industry’s value-added as weight.
The cellphone industry is omitted from this figure as it is only covered in the ASIP after 2003.
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4.5 Robustness
4.5.1 Trimming
In the regressions of Table 4.1, we use a trimmed sample excluding the smallest 10% of the
firms in terms of value-added on a yearly basis. The exclusion of small firms is motivated
by the fact that the TFP estimates of small firms are very noisy. In this section we show
the sensitivity of the results with respect to alternative trimming thresholds. Column (3)
of Table 4.3 shows the baseline 2SLS estimation (column (5) in Table 4.1), for reference,
while columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) show the results of the corresponding regressions un-
der diﬀerent thresholds.31 The coeﬃcient of interest becomes larger and more precisely
estimated the more we trim. No trimming at all yields a coeﬃcient of 0.17, statistically
insignificant (see column (1) of Table 4.3). Trimming 5% of the observations yields a
coeﬃcient of 0.23 (compared with 0.27 in the benchmark case) which is significant at the
10 percent level. Restricting the dataset further by trimming 25% and 50% respectively,
yields even larger coeﬃcients. Note also that the standard error of TFP decreases the
more we trim the sample, suggesting that measurement error may be more severe among
small firms.
Table 4.3: Robustness Analysis: Trimming
Dep. Variable lnTFPi,j,t
Mean 4.894 5.044 5.137 5.370 5.783
St.Dev. 1.395 1.215 1.161 1.085 1.007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnMSactualj,t,t+4 0.167 0.231 0.272 0.382 0.485
[0.131] [0.136]* [0.132]** [0.136]*** [0.137]***
Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 22,328 21,241 20,160 16,900 11,412
R2 0.303 0.287 0.277 0.249 0.212
Trimming 0% 5% 10% 25% 50%
F-Stats 27.32 26.95 26.70 27.27 28.41
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered
on the industry-year level jt) are given in parentheses. All columns include year and industry fixed eﬀects as well as a set of firm- and
industry-level controls (the log of number of workers, age (measured by a dummy), a dummy for collective, state and foreign ownership,
coastal location, respectively and the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index). lnMSactualj,t,t+4 is instrumented with lnMS
potential
j,t,t+4 .
4.5.2 Omitted Variables
A natural concern with our investigation is China’s export market. One might suspect
the export market to be a key driver of investments in an export-oriented economy like
China. As Table D.4 and Figure D.2 show, 49% of all firms in the durable good industries
31The corresponding first stage regressions are found in Appendix D.2.
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considered in our study engage in export activities. The export exposure varies consider-
ably across industries. For instance, the average fraction of sales going to foreign markets
is high for camera and radio manufacturers (60% and 58%, respectively), while it is fairly
low for car and refrigerator manufacturers (2% and 13%, respectively).32 In Table 4.4
we show that our previous results are robust to controlling for export behavior.33 Col-
umn (1) is the same as column (5) in Table 4.1. In column (2), we include among the
regressors an indicator for whether a firm has positive export sales. As expected, we find
that exporters are on average more productive than non-exporters; yet, the inclusion of
this dummy leaves the coeﬃcient of interested practically unchanged. In column (3), we
add an interaction term between the exporter dummy and the market size measure to
investigate whether the eﬀect of the domestic market is systematically diﬀerent between
exporters and non-exporters. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term shows that the eﬀect
of the domestic market on innovation is stronger for non-exporters than for exporters.
The diﬀerence is statistically significant. Alternatively, we estimate the market size eﬀect
separately for exporters and non-exporting firms. Again, we find the coeﬃcient of market
size to be highly significant (and substantially larger) for non-exporting firms only, while
exporting firms show no eﬀect (see Table D.9 in Appendix D.2). Both results are consis-
tent with the view that the expansion of the domestic market size is less important for
globally active firms.34
Another concern is that global technology shocks could aﬀect the innovation behavior
of firms and be correlated with the dynamic of the domestic market.35 To control for global
technology shocks, we include a survey measure of technological opportunities constructed
according to the assessment of Swiss firms as reported by the KOF Innovation Survey
(2012). In this survey, firms are asked to assess the worldwide availability of technological
know-how in private and public hands which could be used to generate marketable new
products.36 Swiss firms have traditionally occupied a strong position in international
science and technology activities (see OECD, 2013; Arvanities et al., 2010). Thus, the
32Detailed descriptive statistics on the industry level are found in Tables D.5 - D.7 in Appendix D.1.3.
33The corresponding first stage regressions are found in Appendix D.2.
34In fact, Figure D.2 shows that the distribution of firms ranked by their exportshare relative to total
sales is highly bimodal. Thus, firms seem to serve either only the domestic or exclusively the foreign
market, which explains the insignificance of the market size eﬀect for exporters.
35In a recent survey of the literature, Draca et al. (2006) show that there was a considerable impact of
ICT availability on productivity. Additionally, Bloom et al. (2012) show the eﬀect of IT on productivity
was diﬀerential even within industries depending on whether firms were US- or non-US-multinationals.
36The KOF Innovation Survey (KOF, 2012) covers a representative sample of Swiss firms in the manu-
facturing, construction and service sector on a three yearly basis since 1990. To the best of our knowledge,
the KOF Innovation Survey is the only publicly available innovation survey which can be used on a highly
disaggregate sector level (four digits). Additionally, we check for robustness of this measure using stan-
dard innovation measures such as R&D spending, the number of patents and new product outputs share
on the same industry level.
Chapter 4 121
information reported by Swiss firms reflect to a considerable degree these global trends in
technology. We match this technology potential measure to our durable good industries
on a fine grained three or two digit industry level. This variable shows considerable
variation across time and over industries (see Figure D.3).37 As can be seen in column
(4), controlling for global technology shocks does not aﬀect significantly the market size
eﬀect on TFP. Controlling for both technology shocks and exports (column (5)) has no
significant eﬀect on the coeﬃcient of market size either.
Table 4.4: Robustness Analysis: Controlling for Exports and Technology Supply Shocks
Dep. Variable lnTFPi,j,t
Mean 5.137 5.138 5.138 5.137 5.138
St. Dev. 1.161 1.160 1.160 1.161 1.160
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnMSactualj,t,t+4 0.272 0.274 0.288 0.265 0.267
[0.132]** [0.133]** [0.124]** [0.135]** [0.136]**
lnMSactualj,t,t+4 × 1(EXPi,j,t > 0) -0.152
[0.0286]***
1(EXPi,j,t > 0) 0.0539 2.635 0.0540
[0.0274]** [0.486]*** [0.0274]**
TECHPOTj,t -0.00541 -0.00558
[0.0236] [0.0240]
Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 20,160 20,147 20,147 20,160 20,147
R2 0.277 0.277 0.280 0.277 0.277
F-Stats 26.70 26.88 21.17 21.31
F-Stats1 40.31
F-Stats2 839.5
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered on the
industry-year level jt) are given in parentheses. Observations below the 10 percentile of value-added each year are excluded. All columns include
year and industry fixed eﬀects as well as a set of firm- and industry-level controls (the log of number of workers, age (measured by a dummy),
a dummy for collective, state and foreign ownership, coastal location, respectively and the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index). 1(EXPi,j,t > 0)
is one if a firm has positive export sales. lnMSactualj,t,t+4 is instrumented with lnMS
potential
j,t,t+4 and lnMS
actual
j,t,t+4 × 1(EXPi,j,t > 0) with
lnMSpotentialj,t,t+4 × 1(EXPi,j,t > 0). TECHPOTj,t is the world wide technology potential assessed by Swiss firms in the KOF Innovation
Survey.
4.5.3 Using Labor Productivity instead of TFP
In this section, we consider (the log of) labor productivity as an alternative dependent
variable. While labor productivity may increase due to capital deepening, rather than
investment in innovation, it has the advantage of being a less noisy measure than TFP.
Labor productivity is computed as the value-added per employee. Table 4.5 displays
the results.38 All regressions include the full set of control variables used in Table 4.1.
37To maximize accuracy and cross-industry variation, we use three digit industry levels whenever the
data allows us to do so. If an industry is not available in the Swiss firm sample we take the next higher
industry classification. This allows us to get variation over eight diﬀerent durable good industries.
38The corresponding first stage regressions are found in Appendix D.2.
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Column (1) shows the result of the OLS regression - the coeﬃcient of market size is now
positive and highly significant, contrary to Table 4.1. Column (2) shows our preferred
specification. The eﬀect is again positive and significant. An increase in market size
by one percent yields an increase of 0.4% in firm’s labor productivity. Again, the 2SLS
estimates are larger than the corresponding OLS estimate. Column (3) shows the results
when standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. Finally, column (4) of Table 4.5 shows
that results are robust to the inclusion of the additional controls for export behavior of
firms and the technology potential measure to account for supply-side drivers (as discussed
in Section 4.5.2).
Table 4.5: IV Regression on LN Laborproductivity
Dep. Variable lnLaborproductivityi,j,t
Mean 3.932 3.932 3.932 3.933
St.Dev. 1.148 1.148 1.148 1.148
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnMSactualj,t,t+4 0.178 0.401 0.401 0.424
[0.0696]** [0.160]** [0.0858]*** [0.171]**
1(EXPi,j,t > 0) No No No Yes
TECHPOTj,t No No No Yes
Method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 20,160 20,160 20,160 20,147
R2 0.178 0.176 0.176 0.177
Clustering Industry x Year Inustry x Year Firm Industry x Year
No of Clusters 111 111 7662 111
F-Stats 26.70 1480 21.31
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Observations below the 10 percentile
of value-added each year are excluded. All columns include year and industry fixed eﬀects and a set of firm- and industry-level controls (the
log of number of workers, age (measured by a dummy), a dummy for collective, state and foreign ownership, coastal location, respectively and
the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index). Column (4) in addition introduces a dummy for positive exports, 1(EXPi,j,t > 0) and the supply side
control, TECHPOTj,t. lnMSactualj,t,t+4 is instrumented with lnMS
potential
j,t,t+4 .
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4.5.4 Regressions on the Industry Level
Since our innovation measure comes from the firm-level dataset but the market size eﬀect
is identified at the industry level, there may be a risk of underestimating the standard
errors. Although we cluster standard errors at the industry-time level, a remaining concern
is that observations may be correlated at the industry level over diﬀerent periods. While
clustering at the industry level would resolve this issue, this avenue is not possible due to
an insuﬃcient number of clusters. As a way to mitigate concerns, we check if the results
are robust to collapsing all firm-level observations at the industry level and re-run our
baseline regressions using a weighted least squares approach, using the number of firms
within each industry as weights, as suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009). In addition,
we control for heteroscedasticity among error terms and report robust standard errors.
Table 4.6 displays similar regressions shown in Table 4.1 using either TFP (columns (1)-
(3)) or labor productivity (columns (4)-(6)) as the dependent variable.39 All specifications
include the full set of industry and time fixed eﬀects and the set of control variables of size,
age, region, market competition, ownership structures. Columns (3) and (6) additionally
control for export behavior and technology potential as supply side driver (see above).
In particular, the new set of controls is defined as the (unweighted) mean over all firm-
level variables within one industry and each year including the mean of dummies such as
ownership.40
The results are similar to those in Table 4.1. In our preferred 2SLS specification with
the full set of controls (see columns (3) and (6) of Table 4.6), an increase of industry’s
market size by one percent translates into an increase in TFP of about 0.68% and into an
increase in labor productivity of about 0.7%.41 These results are reassuring and provide
additional credibility to the firm-level analysis.
39In particular, we focus on the specifications that include the full set of firm-level controls.
40Corresponding first stage regressions are found in Table D.15 in Appendix D.2.
41Note that the F-statistics in columns (2) and (5) are below the conventional level of 10. Thus, these
regressions are subject to a mild weak instrument problem and we prefer the specification with all control
variables including export behavior and technology potential.
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Table 4.6: Eﬀect of Market Size on LN TFP
Dep. Variable lnTFPi,j,t lnLaborproductivityi,j,t
Mean 5.772 5.772 5.772 4.544 4.544 4.544
St.Dev. 0.597 0.597 0.597 0.641 0.641 0.641
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnMSactualj,t,t+4 0.184 0.643 0.678 0.400 0.579 0.709
[0.0720]** [0.238]*** [0.205]*** [0.0914]*** [0.255]** [0.200]***
Method OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 111 111 111 111 111 111
R2 0.961 0.942 0.939 0.959 0.956 0.952
F-Stats 7.459 15.25 7.459 15.25
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are given in
parentheses. Observations below the 10 percentile of value-added each year are excluded. All columns include year and industry fixed eﬀects
as well as the simple industry mean of the set of firm- and industry-level controls (the log of number of workers, age (measured by a dummy),
a dummy for collective, state and foreign ownership, coastal location, respectively and the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index). Column (3), (6) in
addition introduce a dummy for positive exports, 1(EXPi,j,t > 0) and the supply side control, TECHPOTj,t. lnMSactualj,t,t+4 is instrumented
with lnMSpotentialj,t,t+4 . Regressions are weighted by the number of firms within a sector.
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4.6 Conclusion
Much of the previous literature studying determinants of the spectacular growth perfor-
mance of the Chinese economy has focused on supply- and technology-factors, while the
role of demand forces is still poorly understood. This paper focuses on firm’s expecta-
tions about future market size as a potentially important channel that contributes to
our understanding of technical progress in the Chinese manufacturing sector. The basic
source of variation for potential market size comes from Chinese growth and its huge (and
predictable) impact on the Chinese income distribution. In 1990, 99 percent of Chinese
consumers had an income lower than 8500 Yuan (at constant 2009 prices) and were low-
or lower-middle income households according to World Bank Classification. By the year
2009, this fraction had fallen to 50 percent. The associated change in the Chinese income
distribution did not aﬀect industries equally. To the extent that the Engel-curves for the
industry’s various products is non-linear, industries are aﬀected diﬀerentially. It is this
source of variation that underlies our identification strategy.
To establish an empirical link between expected market size and technical progress, we
combine household-expenditure data from Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS)
and firm-level data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Production (ASIP). Looking
at 16 industries covering a substantial share of household expenditures for consumer
durables, CHNS data allows us to construct product-specific Engel-curves for the 16
consumer durables. Combining these income-driven changes in consumer behavior with
information on the income distribution (income-class specific population shares) allows us
to estimate a measure of expected market size, whose evolution over time is entirely driven
by income growth. Using firm-specific productivity data estimated from ASIP data, we
ask how firm performance is aﬀected by expected market size. Our findings suggest that
demand eﬀects are quantitatively important: a one percent increase in expected market
size increases firm-specific TFP by 0.27% and firm-specific labor productivity by 0.42%.
Firms in industries with a large expected local market are significantly more productive
today, and show higher levels of other measures of innovative activity. We think that, in
the future, the role of demand forces may become even stronger as a driver of Chinese
growth than they were in in the recent past. China’s share of private consumption in
total GDP is still quite low by international standards and may converge to international
levels in the future. Together with sustained economic growth, the size of the Chinese
home market will become as important as the export market making Chinese firms less
dependent on exports and let them focus more closely on the home market. Our results
suggest that these dynamics from the demand side may have important implications for
technical progress and may help to sustain high Chinese growth also in the years to come.
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A Appendix: Chapter 1
A.1 Theoretical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.1
Proof. Since the market of intermediates is competitive, the representative firm solves
min
χ(ωi,t),Li(t)
∫ Mi(t)
0
p(ωi, t)χ(ωi, t)dωi + Li(t)w(t), (A.1)
subject to (1.3) and a given output level yi(t). Calling the multiplier of constraint (1.3)
pi(t) the first order conditions are,
p(ωi, t) = χ(ωi, t)
− 1νLi(t)
1
ν pi(t), ∀ωi, (A.2)
w(t) =
1
ν − 1
[∫ Mi(t)
0
χ(ωi, t)
ν−1
ν dωi
]
Li(t)
−ν+1
ν pi(t). (A.3)
Due to the iso-elastic demand (A.2) it is optimal for the monopolist to set the price equal
to νν−1 times her marginal cost, ψi(t), resulting in (1.4). Substituting this optimal price
into (A.2) gives (1.5). Using this in (A.3) yields (1.6). Profit flows are given by quantity
times the mark-up, i.e. π(ωi, t) = χ(ωi, t) [p(ωi, t)− ψi(t)]. With (1.4)-(1.6) this reduces
to (1.7). Using (1.5) in (1.3) yields (1.8). Finally, the total amount of machines used in
industry i is given by
∫Mi(t)
0 χ(ωi, t)dωi = Mi(t)Li(t). Since each of these machines causes
variable cost of ν−1ν units of intermediate input yi(t), the total number of intermediate
inputs used to produce machines is given by (1.9).
Proof of Lemma 1.2
Proof. (1.11) highlights the fact that at each point in time, the value of a firm must be
equal to the R&D cost of creating a new one, pi(t)η , where we substitute pi(t) by (1.6).
(1.12) is just the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) representation of the zero ex-ante profit
condition, i.e. r(t)vi(t)− v˙i(t) = πi(t), where we make use of (1.11).
129
130 Appendix: Chapter 1
Proof of Lemma 1.4
Proof. The current Hamiltonian reads
H = V (E(t), PN(t)) + λ(t) [r(t)A(t) + w(t)L− E(t)] .
We can write the first-order conditions as
E(t)ϵ−1 − λ(t) = 0, (A.4)
r(t)λ(t) = ρλ(t)− λ˙(t). (A.5)
Taking the first derivative of (A.4) with respect to time and simplifying gives (1.19).
Proof of Proposition 1.1
Proof. The choice of numÈraire PD(t) = 1 implies (see (1.1) and (1.6))
1 = (ν − 1)w(t) exp
[
−
∫ 1
0
log [Mi(t)] di
]
. (A.6)
By diﬀerentiating this with respect to time we get∫ 1
0
M˙i(t)
Mi(t)
di =
w˙(t)
w(t)
. (A.7)
If we take the sum over all i ∈ [0, 1] of both sides of (1.12) and use the labor market
clearing condition, (1.22), we get
r(t)− w˙(t)
w(t)
+
∫ 1
0
M˙i(t)
Mi(t)
di =
ηL
ν
. (A.8)
Combining (A.7) and (A.8) yields
r(t) = r =
ηL
ν
.
This implies that in any equilibrium, the interest rate (in terms of durable goods) must
be constant over time. With a constant interest rate the Euler equation, (1.19), implies a
constant expenditure growth rate E˙(t)E(t) = g, where g > 0 because
ηL
ν > ρ. The asset market
clearing condition, (1.23), together with (1.11) implies A˙(t)A(t) =
w˙(t)
w(t) . Finally, substituting
this into the flow budget constraint, (1.18), implies A˙(t)A(t) = g. This proves (1.24) and
(1.25). For (1.26) note that (A.6) and the assumption Mi(0) = 1, ∀i implies w(0) = 1ν−1 .
Next, ci(t) and yi(t) are given by (1.9) and (1.8) and if we combine (1.10) and (1.12) we
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get zi(t) = Mi(t)
[
Li(t)−L
ν +
g
η
]
. Plugging this into the market clearing condition, (1.21),
implies
x˜i(t) = Mi(t)
[
Li(t)
ν − 1 +
1
ν
L− g
η
]
. (A.9)
Finally we obtain total consumption expenditures E(t) =
∫ 1
0 pi(t)x˜i(t)di, where pi(t) is
given by (1.6). E0 is strictly positive since ρ > ϵηLν . This assumption also ensures that the
transversality condition is fulfilled and that utility is finite.
Proof of Lemma 1.5
Proof. First, note that we can write E(t) = E0 exp [gt] (see (1.25) and (1.27)). If we use
this expression and (1.2) in (1.17), we obtain (1.28).
Second, let us prove equation (1.29): since the final consumption goods are produced
competitively with Cobb-Douglas technologies (implying output elasticities of the durable
and non-durable sector which are equal to unity and α(i)), we must have pi(t)x˜i(t) =
E(t)SN(t)α(i) + E(t) [1− SN(t)]. If we substitute pi(t), x˜i(t) in this equation by the
expressions (1.6) and (A.9) and use the definition of g and E0, we get
(ν − 1)w(t)
[
Li(t)− L
ν − 1 + E0
]
= E(t)SN(t)α(i) + E(t) [1− SN(t)] .
If we additionally substitute w(t) by (1.26) and E(t) by E0 exp [gt] and simplify terms, we
have
Li(t)− L = SN(t)(ν − 1) [α(i)− 1] E0. (A.10)
Now, if we use (1.24) and (1.25) in (1.12), we get
M˙i(t)
Mi(t)
=
η [Li(t)− L]
ν
+ g. (A.11)
Then, combining this with (1.6), (1.26) (and the fact that Mi(0) = 1, ∀i) we can write
pi(t) = exp
[
−η
ν
∫ t
0
(Li(τ)− L) dτ
]
.
If we substitute Li(τ)− L in this expression by the analog of equation (A.10) we obtain
equation (1.29).
132 Appendix: Chapter 1
Proof of Proposition 1.2
Proof. Substituting pi(t) in (1.28) by (1.29) and using the fact that
∫ 1
0 [α(i)− 1]2 di = σ2,
SN(t) = SN(0) exp
[
−γ∆t− ϵgt− γην − 1
ν
σ2E0
∫ t
0
SN(τ)dτ
]
. (A.12)
Diﬀerentiating both sides of this equations with respect to time we obtain the following
diﬀerential equation
S˙N(t)
SN(t)
= −γ∆− ϵg − γην − 1
ν
σ2E0SN(t). (A.13)
By solving this diﬀerential equation we obtain (1.32). Once we have solved for this,
(1.33)-(1.35) follow immediately from (1.17), (A.10) as well as (1.29) and (A.12).
Proof of Proposition 1.3
Proof. (1.38) ensures that (1.14) is fulfilled at date t = 0 (see (1.31)). Moreover, (1.36)
and (1.37) ensure that S˙N (t)SN (t) < 0, ∀t ≥ 0 (see (A.13)). Hence, SN(0) is smaller or equal to
one and it is falling over time. Consequently, (1.14) is fulfilled for all t ≥ 0.
A.2 Empirical Appendix
First Stage Regressions
Table A.1 displays the corresponding first stage regressions to Tables 1.3 and 1.4 in Section
1.4. Clearly, our instrumental variable, denoted by the potential market share, serves as
a strong instrument since the first stage regression coeﬃcients are significant at the one
percent level and the corresponding F-statistics are well above 10.
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Dependent Variable: Price Growth & TFP Growth
(1) (2) (3)
Log market share L.Log market share L2.Log market share
Log pot. market share 1.234***
(0.233)
L.Log pot. market share 1.246***
(0.213)
L2.Log pot. market share 1.274***
(0.221)
N 180 150 120
R2 0.472 0.527 0.526
F-statistic 28.13 34.23 33.33
Table A.1: First stage regressions corresponding to Tables 1.3 and 1.4
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (4-6 intervals) and industry fixed eﬀects (30 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1977-2007, but observations are averaged over five year time intervals. The instrumental variable
- denoted by Log potential market share - is constructed as described in Section 1.4, i.e. it is log s˜i(t− l). “L.” and “L2.” denotes a
one and two period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10). The reported R2 measures the marginal contribution of our instrument
when all control variables are already included in the model (it equals the partial R2).
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Robustness Checks
In the following we perform two additional robustness tests of our estimates. First, Table
A.2 and A.3 show the results if we additionally control for an industry’s labor income
share in value-added. Conditional on industry fixed eﬀects, we find the labor income
share being (most of the time) statistically significant. This in turn suggests that (the
scope for) mechanization is an important channel of technical progress. However, the
results of the market size eﬀect are still there (although the coeﬃcients are less precisely
estimated, especially in the case of the TFP growth rate). Moreover, note that especially
the OLS estimates drop in size and precision, suggesting that our IV estimate is less prone
to omitted variable bias and OLS underestimates the true market size eﬀect.
Dependent variable: Price Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L.Log market share -0.393** -0.506***
(0.162) (0.169)
L2.Log market share -0.205 -0.301**
(0.127) (0.153)
Log labor share -1.144** -1.310** -1.089** -1.239**
(0.517) (0.626) (0.494) (0.591)
N 150 120 150 120
R2 0.567 0.604 0.561 0.601
Method OLS OLS IV IV
Table A.2: Price growth – omitted variables
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (4-5 intervals) and industry fixed eﬀects (30 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1977-2007, but observations are grouped into five-year intervals. The independent variables are
averaged over five years, the dependent variable is calculated as the five-year log-diﬀerence. In columns 3 and 4 the Log market share
is instrumented by the structural change at the final consumption good level as described in Section 1.4. The corresponding first
stage regressions are found in Table A.4. “L.” and “L2.” denotes a one and two period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10 in
equation (1.43)).
In a second robustness check we take a closer look at the service sector. Establish-
ing the existence of a market size eﬀect in this sector is particularly interesting for two
reasons: (i) starting with Baumol’s influential study (1967) there exist enormous doubts
about the innovation potential of this sector, and (ii) being the main benefiter of mod-
ern structural change this sector has expanded tremendously (in nominal terms). Hence,
showing positive evidence for the market size eﬀect within the service industries will be
of growing importance for the future.
Table A.5 and A.6 show the main results if we split the economy in the “service sector”
and the “rest” and run the regressions separately.1 Given the restricted sample size of our
1For a classification of industries into services, non-services respectively the reader is referred to
regression output Tables A.5 and A.6.
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Dependent variable: TFP Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L.Log market share 0.154* 0.231**
(0.082) (0.109)
L2.Log market share 0.032 0.141
(0.103) (0.108)
Log labor share 0.774* 0.697 0.736* 0.616
(0.405) (0.437) (0.393) (0.417)
N 150 120 150 120
R2 0.634 0.644 0.630 0.638
Method OLS OLS IV IV
Table A.3: TFP growth – omitted variable
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (4-5 intervals) and industry fixed eﬀects (30 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1977-2007, but observations are grouped into five-year intervals. The independent variables are
averaged over five years, the dependent variable is calculated as the five-year log-diﬀerence. In columns (3) and (4) the Log market
share is instrumented by the structural change at the final consumption good level as described in Section 1.4. The corresponding
first stage regressions are found in Table A.4. “L.” and “L2.” denotes a one and two period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10 in
equation (1.43)).
Dependent Variable: Price Growth & TFP Growth
(1) (2)
VARIABLES L.Log market share L2.Log market share
L.Log potential market share 1.213***
(0.222)
L2.Log potential market share 1.205***
(0.207)
Log labor share 0.293 0.493
(0.235) (0.312)
N 150 120
R2 0.519 0.520
F-statistic 29.91 33.75
Table A.4: First stage regressions corresponding to Tables A.2 and A.3
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (4-6 intervals) and industry fixed eﬀects (30 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1977-2007, but observations are averaged over five year time intervals. The instrumental variable
- denoted by Log potential market share - is constructed as described in Section 1.4, i.e. it is log s˜i(t− l). “L.” and “L2.” denotes a
one and two period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10). The reported R2 measures the marginal contribution of our instrument
when all control variables are already included in the model (it equals the partial R2).
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subsamples and the demanding regression specification (including a full set of industry
- and time fixed eﬀects), we find positive evidence for the existence of a market size ef-
fect. As before, our IV estimate is significantly larger than the OLS estimate hinting to a
downward bias in OLS. Among services, we find that a one percent increase in market size
translates into an increase in the industry-specific TFP growth rate of 0.38 percentage
points over five years (see column (4) in Table A.5). In the non-service industries this
coeﬃcient is slightly smaller and insignificant. Thus, the application of our IV stratetgy
hints to an ex-ante surprising result of a stronger market size eﬀect on TFP growth within
services.
Service Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable price growth price growth TFP growth TFP growth
L.Log market share -0.222*** -0.485*** 0.132 0.385***
(0.061) (0.123) (0.100) (0.139)
N 70 70 70 70
R2 0.717 0.650 0.630 0.573
Method OLS IV OLS IV
Table A.5: Robustness check – sample split
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant
at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (5 intervals) and industry fixed eﬀects (14 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1977-2007, but observations are grouped into five-year intervals. The independent variables are
averaged over five years, the dependent variable is calculated as the five-year log-diﬀerence. In columns (2) and (4) the Log market
share is instrumented by the structural change at the final consumption good level as described in Section 1.4. The corresponding
first stage regressions are found in Table A.7. “L.” and “L2.” denotes a one and two period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10 in
equation (1.43)). Sectors E, G-O are classified as service sectors (NACE revision 1 classification).
Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing and Construction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable price growth price growth TFP growth TFP growth
L.Log market share -0.749** -0.857** 0.266 0.299
(0.316) (0.420) (0.205) (0.286)
N 80 80 80 80
R2 0.437 0.435 0.543 0.543
Method OLS IV OLS IV
Table A.6: Robustness check – sample split
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant
at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (5 intervals) and industry fixed eﬀects (16 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1977-2007, but observations are grouped into five-year intervals. The independent variables are
averaged over five years, the dependent variable is calculated as the five-year log-diﬀerence. In columns (2) and (4) the Log market
share is instrumented by the structural change at the final consumption good level as described in Section 1.4. The corresponding
first stage regressions are found in Table A.7. “L.” and “L2.” denotes a one and two period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10 in
equation (1.43)). Sectors A-D, F are classified as non-service sectors (NACE revision 1 classification).
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Dependent Variable: Price Growth & TFP Growth
(1) (2)
VARIABLES L.Log market share L.Log market share
L.Log potential market share 0.730*** 1.181***
(0.167) (0.294)
N 70 80
R2 0.303 0.466
F-statistic 19.17 16.10
Sectors Services Non-Services
Table A.7: First stage regressions corresponding to Tables A.5 and A.6
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (6 intervals) and industry fixed eﬀects (14-16 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1977-2007, but observations are averaged over five year time intervals. The instrumental variable
- denoted by Log potential market share - is constructed as described in Section 1.4, i.e. it is log s˜i(t− l). “L.” and “L2.” denotes a
one and two period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10). The reported R2 measures the marginal contribution of our instrument
when all control variables are already included in the model (it equals the partial R2).
138 Appendix: Chapter 1
The Channel of R&D Investments
An additional step in our empirical exercise is to analyze the channel through which a
change in market size aﬀects the evolution of relative productivity and consequently rela-
tive prices. Our theory suggests that R&D investments play the crucial role of determining
productivity growth and hence relative prices. Therefore, we turn to evaluating the eﬀect
of an increase in market share on industry-specific R&D expenditures. Since our dataset
on R&D stocks is limited in size and the flow of R&D expenditures is not as volatile as
TFP measures, we use annual observations for our next regression specification.2 As in
the main section above, our estimation specification looks as follows
di(t) = δ log si(t) + κi + φ(t) + ui(t), (A.14)
where di(t) now represents the growth rate of the industry-specific R&D stock. It is
calculated as the log-diﬀerences between two consecutive years t and (t− 1). si(t) is the
market size of industry i, κi and φ(t) represent a full set of industry and time fixed eﬀects
and ui(t) is an error term.
Table A.8 displays the results using the true market share as our independent variable.
As expected there seems to be an immediate eﬀect of market size on the industry-specific
R&D activity. For example, a 1 percent increase in the industry’s contemporaneous
market share increases the amount of investments into research by 0.072 percentage points,
while the past market share does not show any eﬀect. Note that the lagged market share
is computed as the market share in period (t−5). Due to the potential endogeneity of our
measure of market size, we again re-run the regression specification. Using our instrument,
column 1 of Table A.9 shows that the eﬀect increases to 0.15 percentage points. Again, we
find the eﬀect of R&D investments to be an immediate reaction to an increased market
size. Controlling for the industry-specific labor share increases the coeﬃcient further
to 0.164, (which remains significant at the significance level of ten percent). Although,
our coeﬃcients are not as robust as for TFP and Prices, we are convinced that R&D
investments are one of the main vehicles through which market size acts on an industry’s
TFP growth rate.3
2The autocorrelation between the R&D expenditure flow and its one-year lag is 0.90.
3Table A.10 shows the first stage regression results.
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Dependent variable: R&D Investment Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log market share 0.072** 0.100*** 0.080*
(0.032) (0.037) (0.046)
L.Log market share -0.054 -0.078
(0.048) (0.048)
Log labor share 0.032
(0.065)
N 345 315 315 345
R2 0.374 0.368 0.404 0.376
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
Table A.8: OLS regression of R&D investment growth
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant
at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (21-23 years) and industry fixed eﬀects (15 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1980-2003. The dependent variable is calculated as the two-year log diﬀerence in the industry’s
R&D stock. In concordance with the baseline regressions, “L.” denotes a one period lag (i.e. l = 5).
Dependent variable: R&D Investment Growth
(1) (2) (3)
Log market share 0.150* 0.164*
(0.0811) (0.0867)
L.Log market share 0.00418
(0.0567)
Log labor share 0.106
(0.0695)
N 345 315 345
R2 0.340 0.349 0.345
Method IV IV IV
Table A.9: IV regression of R&D investment growth
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant
at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (21-23 years) and industry fixed eﬀects (15 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1980-2003. The dependent variable is calculated as the two-year log diﬀerence in the industry’s
R&D stock. The Log market share is instrumented by the structural change at the final consumption good level as described in
Section 1.4. The corresponding first stage regressions are found in Table A.10. In concordance with the baseline regressions, “L.”
denotes a one period lag (i.e. l = 5).
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Dependent variable: R&D Investment Growth
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Log market share L.Log market share Log market share
Log pot. market share 0.842*** 0.756***
(0.187) (0.214)
L.Log pot. market share 0.852***
(0.138)
Log labor share -0.761***
(0.115)
N 345 315 345
R2 0.298 0.265 0.310
F-statistic 20.33 38.01 12.48
Note Incl. controls
Table A.10: First stage regressions corresponding to Table A.9
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant
at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (21-23 years) and industry fixed eﬀects (15 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1980-2003. The instrumental variable - denoted by Log potential market share - is constructed as
described in Section 1.4, i.e. it is log s˜i(t − l). “L.” denotes a one period lag (i.e. l = 5). The reported R2 measures the marginal
contribution of our instrument when all control variables are already included in the model (it equals the partial R2).
Chapter A 141
The Eﬀect on Patents
In a last exercise, we test the market size eﬀect using the log number of patents as de-
pendent variable. Similar to Acemoglu and Linn (2004), we use patents as an alternative
measure for R&D activity of industries. The advantage to TFP data is that patents do
not capture any other eﬀects apart from innovation behavior. The disadvantage is that
only specific inventions are captured by patent counts and thus we only cover 11 industries
with this data (mainly the manufacturing sector).
Let us denote the industry-specific number of patents by Ni(t), then our estimated re-
gression looks as follows
logNi(t) = δ log si(t− l) + κi + φ(t) + ui(t), (A.15)
where Ni(t) =
∑4
k=0Ni(t − k) measures the absolute number of patents attributed to
industry i within a five-year spell. si(t) measures again the market size of industry i in
value-added terms
si(t− l) = 1
5
4∑
k=0
vai(t− l − k)
GDP (t− l − k) .
κi and φ(t) represent a full set of industry and time fixed eﬀects and ui(t) is an error
term. Table A.11 displays the results using the true market share as our independent
variable. As for the baseline specification of TFP growth, the main eﬀect of an increased
market share on patents seems to come with a lag of five to ten years. For instance,
column (2) suggests that an increase in market size by one percent increases the number
of patents by 0.88 percent after 5 years. And although the contemporaneous market size
also shows a positive significant eﬀect (see column (1)), column (4) of Table A.11 reveals
that this is driven largely by the autocorrelation of the lagged and the contemporaneous
market share. Due to endogeneity of our actual market size measure, Table A.12 repeats
the approach using our instrumental variable. For instance, increasing the market share
by one percent increases the number of industry-specific patents by more than 2 percent
over the interval of five years (see column (2)).4 Although these findings are accurately
estimated, some care must be taken due to the small dataset we rely on. Nevertheless we
have confidence in these results as they tell the same story as our main specification and
more important are in line with our theory. The larger the relative market size, the larger
the industry-specific R&D investments and thus the productivity growth rate (measured
in TFP or patents).
4First stage results are displayed in Table A.13.
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Dependent variable: Log Number of Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log market share 0.878* 0.536
(0.478) (0.463)
L.Log market share 0.877** 0.615***
(0.370) (0.200)
L2.Log market share 0.744**
(0.375)
N 44 33 22 33
R2 0.993 0.996 0.998 0.996
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
Table A.11: OLS regression of patents
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (2-4 intervals) and industry fixed eﬀects (11 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1979-1999, but observations are grouped into five year time intervals. The independent variables
are averaged over five years, the dependent variable is calculated as the log number of patents received within five years. “L.” and
“L2.” denotes a one and two period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10).
Dependent variable: Log Number of Patents
(1) (2) (3)
Log market share 1.582***
(0.590)
L.Log market share 2.057***
(0.728)
L2.Log market share 1.913**
(0.872)
N 44 33 22
R2 0.991 0.991 0.996
Method IV IV IV
Table A.12: IV regression of patents
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant
at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (2-4 intervals) and industry fixed eﬀects (11
groups). The total sample period runs from 1979-1999, but observations are grouped into five year time intervals. The independent
variables are averaged over five years, the dependent variable is calculated as the log number of patents received within five years.
The Log market share is instrumented by the structural change at the final consumption good level as described in Section 1.4. The
corresponding first stage regressions are found in Table A.13. “L.” and “L2.” denotes a one and two period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5
and l = 10).
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Dependent variable: Log Number of Patents
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Log market share L.Log market share L2.Log market share
Log pot. market share 0.872***
(0.161)
L.Log pot. market share 0.655***
(0.196)
L2.Log pot. market share 0.531**
(0.217)
N 44 33 22
R2 0.460 0.369 0.323
F statistik 29.33 11.20 5.97
Table A.13: First stage regressions corresponding to Table A.12
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant
at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed eﬀects (4 intervals) and industry fixed eﬀects (11 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1979-1999, but observations are grouped into five year time intervals. The instrumental variable
- denoted by Log potential market share - is constructed as described in Section 1.4, i.e. it is log s˜i(t− l). “L.” and “L2.” denotes a
one and two period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10). The reported R2 measures the marginal contribution of our instrument
when all control variables are already included in the model (it equals the partial R2).
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A.3 Data Appendix
Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
First, we use the US National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), which are prepared
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), US Department of Commerce. Specifically,
NIPA tables 2.4.5 and 2.4.4 contain information about personal consumption expendi-
tures and the corresponding consumer good price index. Data on the production side of
the economy is extracted from NIPA tables 1.2.4 and 1.2.5, which tell us how diﬀerent
sectors contribute to aggregate GDP and contain information about the corresponding
producer price index. Finally, information on population measures is obtained from NIPA
table 7.1.5 Table A.14 shows the descriptive statistics of the NIPA data.
Second, to construct our instrument we use the 2002 US Benchmark Input-Output
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Total personal expenditures 84 2525.601 3263.124 45.9 11119.5
Non-durable expenditures 84 624.036 719.484 20 2563
Durable expenditures 84 316.775 388.72 3.8 1218.8
Rel. non-durable consumer’s price 84 0.592 0.232 0.399 1.366
Non-durable production 67 693.516 611.106 73 2175.7
Durable production 67 742.782 715.322 37.9 2278.7
Rel. non-durable producer’s price 67 0.680 0.198 0.498 1.209
Population (midyear) 84 207307 59564.71 121878 314278
Table A.14: Descriptive Statistics-NIPA Tables
Notes: The table shows descriptives for personal consumption expenditures, prices and population in the US between 1929-2012.
Due to availability, production data is given between 1946-2012. All data is given in nominal values and consumption and production
data is denoted in billions of US$.
Sources: BEA, NIPA tables 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 7.1.
Accounts from the BEA. In particular, we use the standard Make and Use tables after re-
definition, the Import matrix and the “Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) Bridge
Table”. All I-O tables are at the most detailed level which follows the 6-digit NAICS
classification and contain 430 industries.
Third, our main data source for the empirical section is the 2009 release of the EU KLEMS
database, which provides us with information about industry-specific value-added, inter-
mediate inputs, prices and TFP.6 For the US it spans from 1977-2007 and diﬀerentiates
5Further details are found in the NIPA handbook (2011): “Concepts and Methods of the US National
Income and Product Accounts”, ch.1-9, available at www.bea.gov.
6The source data comes from National Accounts and is obtained from National Statistical Institutes,
Eurostat and country specific EU KLEMS consortium partners. For the US this is the Groningen Growth
and Development Centre at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. O’Mahony and Timmer (2009)
provide an overview of the construction of the EU KLEMS database.
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the aggregate economy into 32 industries, whereof we exclude “private households with
employed persons” and “extra-territorial organizations and bodies” in our analysis. Table
A.15 displays the corresponding descriptive statistics.
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
TFP growth 180 0.043 0.181 -0.519 0.789
VAD price growth 180 -0.023 0.207 -0.785 1.255
Log value-added share 180 -3.758 0.900 -5.774 -2.115
Log expenditure share 180 -3.941 1.104 -6.453 -2.164
Log intermediate share 180 -0.720 0.296 -1.521 -0.125
Log labor share 180 -0.493 0.509 -2.82 -0.077
Table A.15: Descriptive Statistics - EU KLEMS database
Notes: The table shows descriptives for variables used in the empirical section. Log expenditure share denotes the instrumental
variable as described in Section 1.4. Log labor share is total labor income as its share in total gross output, share in total value-added
respectively. All data is given in nominal terms and grouped into five year intervals.
Source: EU KLEMS 2009 release for the US
Finally, for the robustness checks of our empirical results, we obtain data on industries’
R&D expenditures and patents from databases that are linked to the EU KLEMS.7 R&D
information was originally taken from the “OECD Research and Development in Industry
Database” (ANBERD), while patent statistics were derived from the NBER Patent Cita-
tions Data File (see Hall et. al, 2001). For the US, the R&D dataset covers 15 industries
(excluding “Market Services”) and spans from 1980-2003. The patent database covers 11
industries and spans from 1974-1999, whereof we use the data from 1979-1999. Note that
patents were assigned to years according to the date of application and to the “country
of first inventor”. Further, one patent may be assigned to multiple industries. Table A.16
and Table A.17 give descriptive figures for the relevant variables of the R&D dataset and
the patent datafile respectively.
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
R&D stock growth 345 0.029 0.050 -0.087 0.366
Log value-added share 345 -4.356 0.753 -5.930 -3.028
Log expenditure share 345 -4.649 0.813 -6.459 -3.314
Log labor share 345 -0.451 0.322 -1.495 -0.0001
Table A.16: Descriptive Statistics - R&D Expenditure
Notes: The table shows the descriptives of variables used in the regressions of R&D investment growth. R&D stock growth is
calculated as the two-year log diﬀerence and labor share denotes total labor income as its share in total value-added. Log expenditure
share denotes the instrumental variable as described in Section 1.4. All data is given in nominal terms.
Source: EU KLEMS Linked Data - 2008 Release.
7Detailed information can be found in O’Mahony et al. (2008), “EU KLEMS - Linked Data: Sources
and Methods”, available at www.euklems.net.
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Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Log patents 44 9.546 1.383 7.260 12.291
Log value-added share 44 -4.400 0.648 -5.722 -3.521
Log expenditure share 44 -4.603 0.693 -6.036 -3.339
Table A.17: Descriptive Statistics - Patent Accounts
Notes: The table shows the descriptives of variables used in the regressions of the number of patents. All data is grouped into
five year intervals and Log patents is the absolute number of patents received within five years. Log expenditure share denotes the
instrumental variable as described in Section 1.4. All data is given in nominal terms.
Source: EU KLEMS Linked Data - 2008 Release.
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Linking Final Expenditures to Industry Value-Added
Translating final good consumption expenditures into industry value-added can be split
into two main tasks. First, we use the PCE Bridge Table to match final good consumption
lines into I-O commodities. In the later step, we rely on the US specific total requirement
matrix that allows us to decompose the production of final goods into its intermediate
components.
The Application of the Personal Consumption Expenditure Bridge Table
As outlined in Section 3, the first task in translating consumption expenditures to in-
dustry value-added is to remove distribution costs from consumption expenditures and
to decompose expenditure on final goods into the shares that accrue to all intermediates.
The 2002 PCE Bridge Table now helps to resolve both issues, which we will visualize
with a brief example in the following. To best demonstrate the application of the Bridge
Table, suppose we have two diﬀerent consumption goods (think of cars and food), which
are denoted by j, and assume distribution costs only consist of transportation costs. On
the production side, there are three diﬀerent commodities, denoted by i, where one com-
modity corresponds to the transportation commodity and the others are steel and grain
for instance. Suppose it requires both intermediate goods, grain and steel, to produce one
unit of food but car is made only of steel. Then our example PCE Bridge table looks as
follows
PCE =
⎡⎢⎣PUi=grain,j=food PRi=grain,j=food Ti=grain,j=foodPUi=steel,j=food PRi=steel,j=food Ti=steel,j=food
PUi=steel,j=car PRi=steel,j=car Ti=steel,j=car
⎤⎥⎦ ,
where PUij indicates expenditures on consumer good j that accrues to commodity i (in
purchaser’s prices). PUj =
∑
i PUij are aggregate expenditures on good j that we observe
in the BEA, NIPA table 2.4.5. PRij denotes the aggregate value going to commodity i
through expenditures on good j (in producer’s prices), and Tij is the transportation cost
that is specific to good j and commodity i. As transportation costs are the diﬀerence
between producer’s and purchaser’s price, it must be that Tij = PUij − PRij . Let Cij
denote the share that goes to each commodity i, if 1 US$ is spent on good j, then Cij =
PRij
PUj
. Finally, the consumption good specific distribution margin equals DMj =
∑
i Tij
PUj
.
Using this information, we form a Final Bridge Table that later will be matched to the
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Domestic Total Requirement Matrix. In our example, the Final Bridge Table is given by
FBT =
⎡⎢⎣Ci=grain,j=food Ci=grain,j=carCi=steel,j=food Ci=steel,j=car
DMfood DMcar
⎤⎥⎦ .
Note from above that the final good of car is produced using only the intermediate of steel,
such that Ci=grain,j=car = 0 for our specific example. The Final Bridge Table then is a
commodity-by-consumption line matrix where rows are associated with commodities and
columns with the diﬀerent consumption goods (two in this case). Each entry in column j
shows the share of input of commodity i required to produce output of consumption good
j worth of one dollar.
Derivation of the Domestic Total Requirement Matrix (DTRM) in value-
added
To construct the matrix that links the consumption to the production side of the economy,
we will use the latest release of the 2002 Benchmark I-O Tables of the US In general, the
total requirement matrix serves this task, which however does not account for imports.
Sticking to our previous example, if all grain were imported from Mexico, an increase in
the demand for food would have no eﬀect on the US grain industry. Thus, we require
a total requirement matrix that “is cleaned” from imports. In the following we describe
how we construct the DTRM and how to convert it in value-added terms. For ease of
notation, we first define several necessary objects:8
• g: A (n× 1) vector that shows the total output of each industry.
• q: A (n× 1) vector that shows the total output of each commodity.
• X: A (n × n) commodity-by-industry matrix denoting the imports of each
commodity by industry.
• U : The middle portion of the Use Table, where each column shows for a given
industry the commodities used in the production process. The table is a (n × n)
commodity-by-industry matrix.
• U¯ : Denotes the (n× n) Domestic Use Table.
• V : The (n × n) industry-by-commodity Make Matrix. For a given commodity,
each column shows the amount produced in each industry.
8The notation and method follows chapter 12 of the manual (2009), “Concepts and Methods of the
US National Input-Output Accounts”, available at www.bea.gov.
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• B: The (n× n) commodity-by-industry Direct Requirement Matrix. Entries in
each column show the proportion of each commodity used by an industry to produce
output worth one dollar.
• W : A (n × n) industry-by-commodity matrix. For a given commodity, each
entry within a column shows the proportion of that commodity produced in each
industry.
• I: A (n× n) Identity matrix.
• e: A (n× 1) vector that shows final demand for each commodity.
• va: A (n × 1) vector that shows the value-added that is generated by final
expenditure.
• v: A (n× 1) vector that shows the value-added coeﬃcients of each industry.
• :ˆ If this symbol is placed over a vector it denotes a square matrix, which contains
the vector’s elements on its main diagonal and zeros elsewhere.
The first step is to remove intermediate imports from the Use Table (U) in order to derive
the Domestic Use Table (U¯)
U¯ = U −X.
From here we calculate the Domestic Direct Requirement Matrix (B) and using the in-
formation from the Make Table (V), we form the Market Share Matrix (W)
B = U¯ gˆ−1,
W = V qˆ−1.
The resulting matrices are used in I-O accounts to show the relation between input and
output within each economy. Namely, each economy is described by the following two
identities
q = Bg + e,
g = Wq.
The first identity says that the dollar amount of (domestically) produced output equals
the sum of the amount used by industries as intermediates plus final demand. The second
equation states that the output of each industry equals the sum of that industry’s share
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of production of all domestically produced commodities. Using this information, we solve
for q to obtain q = (I − BW )−1 e and substitute it back into the second equation. This
gives
g = W (I −BW )−1 e.
This identity states that the output of each industry equals the sum of the industry’s
inputs required to meet total final demand. The middle matrix, W (I − BW )−1, then
gives the Domestic Total Requirement Matrix (DTRM). Finally, denote the DTRM in
terms of value-added as DV , then
DV = vˆDTRM,
where DTRM = W (I − BW )−1.
While the Final Bridge Table shows which commodities are required in order to pro-
duce a certain consumption good, the Domestic Total Requirement Matrix in value-added
terms, DV , links demand for a certain commodity to value-added generated in industries.
Multiplication of both tables gives an industry-by-consumption line matrix where rows
are associated with industries and columns with final consumption goods. Entries in each
column show the value-added generated within industry i when consumption good j is
demanded. Denote the final matrix as DV B, then
DVB = DV · FBT,
which gives us a (430 × 76) matrix. By multiplying this matrix with the vector of final
consumption expenditures, we obtain the industry-specific market share (in terms of value-
added) that serves as our instrument. Finally, we use the original EU KLEMS - NAICS
2002 correspondence table to match our instrument to productivity measures from the
EU KLEMS database.9
TFP Growth at the Industry Value-Added Level
To construct a weighted measure of TFP growth for durables and non-durables, we use
the information obtained from the previous matrix, DVB. Entries in each column can
9The industries’ market share is classified according to the US 6-digit NAICS classification, whereas
the EU KLEMS uses its own classification (that closely follows the NACE 1.1 system). We obtained the
original EU KLEMS - NAICS 2002 correspondence table from the US specific EU KLEMS consortium
partner, the University of Groningen.
Chapter A 151
be interpreted as the industry-specific input coeﬃcients, αij , in the production of final
consumption good, j. Using the information on personal consumption expenditures from
the 2002 NIPA table 2.4.5 we sum up expenditures on all 76 consumption lines into total
expenditures on durables, non-durables and on services. Further, we construct expendi-
ture weights for each of the three aggregated lines (e.g. the share of total expenditure
on durables that accrues to cars, etc.). Using these information, we calculate the corre-
sponding input coeﬃcients, αij’s, on the level of the three consumption goods of durables,
non-durables and services. These new input coeﬃcients are then an expenditure share
weighted average over the original αij’s. The TFP growth rate in terms of durables
and non-durables is the weighted average of all intermediate industries’ value-added TFP
growth (where the weights are the newly constructed input-output coeﬃcients).
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A.4 Supplementary Appendix
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Figure A.1: Relative GDP and relative price of the non-durable sector
relative to the durable sector
Notes: The figure plots the relative nominal GDP of non-durables to durables (which includes investments) and the corresponding
producer price for the US between 1946-2012 on a logarithmic scale. In Panel (a), regressing the logarithmized relative GDP on a
constant and the year gives a slope estimate of -0.01074 with a standard error of 0.00057. In Panel (b) the coeﬃcients of regressing
the logarithm of the relative price on a constant and the year in level and squared gives the slope coeﬃcients -1.3364 (0.0616) and
0.00034 (0.00002), respectively, where standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: BEA, NIPA tables 1.2.4 and 1.2.5.
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Figure A.2: Personal consumption of non-durables quantities relative to
durables quantities
Notes: The figure plots the real personal consumption of quantities of non-durable goods relative to quantities consumed of durable
goods in the US for 1929-2012 on a logarithmic scale. The price indices of durable and non-durable goods are normalized to 1 in
2005. If we regress the logarithm of the relative quantity on a constant and the year, the slope coeﬃcient is -0.02522 with a standard
error of 0.00071.
Source: BEA, NIPA tables 2.4.4 and 2.4.5.
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Figure A.3: Diﬀerence between TFP growth rates of non-durables and
durables
Notes: The figure plots the diﬀerence between output share weighted TFP growth rates of non-durables and TFP growth of durables
for the US between 1977-2007. The classification refers to the one on the value-added level. Wood and of Wood and Cork; Other
Non-Metallic Mineral; Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal; Machinery, NEC; Electrical and Optical Equipment; Transport Equipment;
and Manufacturing NEC, Recycling are classified as durables whereas Food, Beverages and Tobacco; Textiles, Textile, Leather and
Footware; Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing; and Chemical, Rubber, Plastics and Fuel are non-durables. The slope of the fitted
line is given by -0.0043 with a standard error of 0.0011.
Source: EU KLEMS, own calculations.
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Figure A.4: Fraction of total goods expenditures devoted to durables for
rich and poor households
Notes: The figure plots the fraction of total goods expenditures devoted to durables for each income quartile of the US for the years
1987-2010 on a logarithmized scale. The following expenditure categories are considered as durable goods: entertainment, vehicles and
house furnishings & equipment expenses. Total goods expenditures are calculated as total expenditures minus service expenditures.
The following categories are considered as services: food away from home; shelter; utilities, fuels, and public services; other vehicle
expenses; public transportation; health care; personal care; education; cash contributions; personal insurance and pensions. The
remaining categories are considered as non-durable goods. The sample consists of expenditure data of 450,602 quarters (and 165,887
households). Observations with missing income reports, with non-positive food expenditures or with an expenditure share of goods
outside [0, 1] have been excluded. The quartiles refer to total household after tax labor earnings plus transfers per OECD-modified
equivalence scale. If we observe for a household more than one income report, the income data of the year in which the expenditure
quarter lies is taken.
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey.
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Figure A.5: Non-durable expenditure share and its relative price
Notes: The figure scatters the nominal expenditure share devoted to non-durables (as a fraction of total goods expenditures) against
the relative price of non-durables in the US for 1929-2012 on a logarithmic scale. The durable good price index was normalized to
1 in the year 2005. Regressing the logarithm of the expenditure share on a constant and the logarithm of the relative price yields a
slope coeﬃcient of -0.20828 with a standard error of 0.20967.
Source: BEA, NIPA tables 2.4.4 and 2.4.5.
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Figure A.6: Non-durable expenditure share and per capita goods expen-
ditures
Notes: The figure scatters the relative nominal expenditure share devoted to non-durables (relative to aggregate goods expenditures)
against aggregate goods expenditures per capita in terms of durable goods in the US for 1929-2012. The data is plotted on a logarithmic
scale and the durable good price index was normalized to 1 in the year 2005. Regressing the logarithm of the expenditure share on a
constant and the logarithm of the per capita expenditure in terms of durables yields a slope coeﬃcient of -0.11040 with a standard
error of 0.00624.
Source: BEA, NIPA tables 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 7.1.
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B Appendix: Chapter 2
B.1 Theoretical Appendix
This Appendix provides all formal proofs for the model.
Derivation of the Threshold Cut-oﬀ (equation (2.5))
From equation (2.5), we see that the threshold value J⋆ is such that,(
d2ω(Jt)
dJ2t
+
1− 2J
(Jt(1− Jt))2
)
< 0.
By Assumptions 2.2 and 2.4 the first term in brackets is always negative. The critical
threshold value, J⋆, must satisfy, J⋆ < 12 , since for any value J
⋆ ≥ 12 the expression is
unambiguously negative. Hence, J⋆ is given as the solution to ,
−d
2ω(J⋆)
d(J⋆)2
[
(J⋆)4 − 2(J⋆)3 + (J⋆)2]+ 2J⋆ − 1 = 0.
Above this threshold value, technological progress leads to a larger fall in the threshold,
the higher the initial threshold Jt is.
Proof of the Apprentice Productivity Schedule (condition (2.14))
Proof. The diﬀerential is,
d dJtd ln(Nt)
dλ
=
∂ dJtd ln(Nt)
∂Jt
dJt
dλ
+
∂ dJtd ln(Nt)
∂λ
=
d2Jt
dJtd ln(Nt)
dJt
dλ
−
(
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)2 d2ω(Jt)
dJtdλ
= −
(
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)2 [(d2ω(Jt)
dJ2t
+
1− 2J
(Jt(1− Jt))2
)( −1
αˆℓ(Jt)
dαˆℓ(Jt)
dλ
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
+
d2ω(Jt)
dJtdλ
]
.
The final equality follows from equations (2.5) and (2.12). Simplifying this expression
results in equation (2.14).
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Proof of Machine Adoption across Regions (equation (2.15))
Proof. The proof of the machine displacement across regions can be done separately for
each term. From equation (2.9), the first term is,
∂
(
∂ ln(Xt)
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
∂Jt
=
[
dJt
d ln(Nt)
(
1
x− Jt +
1
1− Jt
)
− d
2Jt
d ln(Nt)dJt
]
×
(
1
x− Jt −
1
1− Jt
)
< 0.
The first term in brackets is negative from equation (2.4) and Assumption 2.1. The second
term is positive from equation (2.5). Consequently, as long as Jt > J⋆, technical progress
in apprentice-regions leads to less machine adoption as the threshold drops at a slower
rate.1 In addition, from equation (2.12),
dJt
dλ
> 0,
making the indirect eﬀect negative for all Jt > J⋆. The second term of equation (2.15),
the direct eﬀect, is
∂
(
∂ ln(Xt)
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
∂λ
= −
(
1
x− Jt −
1
1− Jt
)(
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)2(
−∂
2ωˆ(Jt)
∂Jt∂λ
)
.
The sign of this expression depends on the exact αˆℓ(i)-slope. Collecting terms, for equation
(2.15) to be negative, it must be that[(
1
x− Jt +
1
1− Jt
)
+
(
d2ωˆ(Jt)
dJ2t
+
1− 2J
(Jt(1− Jt))2
)
dJt
d ln(Nt)
]
1
αˆℓ(i)
dαˆℓ(Jt)
dλ
>
∂2ωˆ(Jt)
∂Jt∂λ
,
which holds under condition (2.14).
Proof of Routine Displacement across Regions (equation (2.16))
Proof. The prove of routine displacement is analogous to machine displacement. That is,
the first term from equation (2.10), is
∂
(
∂ lnLRT,t
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
∂Jt
=
−x(2Jt − x)
J2t (Jt − x)2
dJt
d ln(Nt)
+
x
Jt(Jt − x)
d2Jt
d ln(Nt)dJt
> 0.
1Technically, this still holds for thresholds below J⋆, as long as the absolute value of the first term is
larger than the second term.
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The second eﬀect is negative and the first is positive for all Jt > J⋆. From equation (2.12),
dJt
dλ
> 0,
making the first term unambiguously positive. The direct eﬀect on routine displacement
is,
∂
(
∂ lnLRT,t
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
∂λ
=
x
Jt(Jt − x)
(
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)2(
−d
2ωˆ(Jt)
dJtdλ
)
.
The algebraic sign depends on the exact αˆℓ(i)-slope. Collecting terms, for equation (2.16)
to be positive, it must be that[(
(2Jt − x)
Jt(Jt − x)
)
+
(
d2ωˆ(Jt)
dJ2t
+
1− 2J
(Jt(1− Jt))2
)
dJt
d ln(Nt)
]
1
αˆℓ(i)
dαˆℓ(Jt)
dλ
>
d2ωˆ(Jt)
dJtdλ
,
which is always true under condition (2.14).
Proof of Low-Skilled Service Growth across Regions (equation
(2.17))
Proof. The first term of equation (2.17) is,
∂
(
∂ lnLLST,t
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
∂Jt
=
1
J2t
dJt
d ln(Nt)
− 1
Jt
d2Jt
d ln(Nt)dJt
< 0,
The first eﬀect is negative and the second is positive for all Jt > J⋆. Since, from equation
(2.12),
dJt
dλ
> 0,
the first term of equation (2.17) is negative. The direct eﬀect is,
∂
(
∂ lnLLST,t
∂Jt
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)
∂λ
= − 1
Jt
(
dJt
d ln(Nt)
)2(
−d
2ωˆ(Jt)
dJtdλ
)
.
The algebraic sign depends on the exact αˆℓ(i)-slope. Collecting terms, for equation (2.17)
to be negative, it must be that[(
1
Jt
)
+
(
d2ωˆ(Jt)
dJ2t
+
1− 2J
(Jt(1− Jt))2
)
dJt
d ln(Nt)
]
1
αˆℓ(i)
dαˆℓ(Jt)
dλ
>
d2ωˆ(Jt)
dJtdλ
,
which is always true under condition (2.14).
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B.2 Data Appendix
For the analysis we have two main data sources. First, it is based on the factually anony-
mous dataset of the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies - Regional File
1975-2008 (SIAB-R 7508), Nuremberg 2011. Specifically, we worked with a Scientific
Use File, obtained from the The Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal Employ-
ment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research. Second, we use the BIBB/IAB
Qualification and Career Survey (QCS) 1979 and 1999. These surveys were conducted
by the German Federal Institute for Vocational Training (BIBB) in conjunction with the
Research Institute of the Federal Employment Agency (IAB).
B.2.1 The SIAB Regional File 1975-2008
The SIAB Regional File 1975-2008 is a 2% random sample of the “Integrierte Erwerb-
sbiographien (IEB)” collected by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) that is
representative for the German workforce. It covers all currently employed individuals
that are subject to social security payments for the years 1975 to 2008. It excludes self-
employed, civil servants, individuals doing their military service and students. Marginally
employed are only considered after 1999. It also covers current job seekers and benefit re-
cipients, both are excluded for our analysis however. From there we extracted information
on individuals’ education, occupation, wages, region of work and personal characteristics.
B.2.1.1 Sample Selection and Variable Description
This Section summarizes sample selections regarding employment, education and wages.
Employment. The sample is restricted to males and females in West Germany. We
drop individuals whose status of employment is coded as “doing an apprenticeship/traineeship”,
“doing an internship” or those that have an undefined employment status. When com-
puting sampling weights we lack exact data on hours worked per individual. However, we
have information on whether a worker works part-time and hence follow Dustmann et al.
(2009) and weight part-time workers by 2/3.
Education. As in Dustmann et al. (2009) among others, our education variable is based
on extrapolated data following imputation method 1 in Fitzenberger et al. (2006). The
high-skilled are defined as workers who graduated from university or college, while middle
skill workers hold a high-school degree or an apprenticeship degree. All workers that enter
the labor market without a high-school degree are defined as low-skilled. Apprentices are
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classified as individuals that obtained an apprenticeship degree within the same broad
sector (of services or non-services) they currently work in.
Wages. When ranking occupations (see Figures 2.1a and 2.2a), we compute mean wages
for each occupation in 1979. We only consider full-time workers for this. Since wages are
top-coded, we follow the literature and impute censored wages by a fixed factor. Here
we follow Dustmann et al. (2009) and use the imputation factor of 1.2, which fits the
German data well according to the authors.
B.2.1.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table B.1 displays the descriptive statistics for main variables used in the empirical sec-
tion plus several control variables. Specifically, it shows the (unweighted) mean and the
standard deviation is given in parentheses. As expected, routine shares decreased over
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics 1979 and 2008 across Regions
1979 2007
RTI share 0.359 (0.061) 0.293 (0.055)
Routine Share 0.366 (0.064) 0.286 (0.061)
Manual Share 0.382 (0.055) 0.316 (0.056)
Abstract Share 0.340 (0.044) 0.427 (0.047)
PC Share 0.475a (0.044)
Service Share 0.420 (0.095) 0.602 (0.096)
Low Service Share 0.183 (0.029) 0.221 (0.029)
Apprentice Share 0.630 (0.043) 0.584 (0.033)
Female Share 0.363 (0.044) 0.443 (0.035)
Immigrant Share 0.072 (0.041) 0.060 (0.030)
Young Share 0.218 (0.038) 0.094 (0.016)
Age 37.1 (1.614) 42.5 (0.771)
Part-time Share 0.077 (0.020) 0.318 (0.036)
time, while abstract shares increased from 1979 to 2008. Manual tasks slightly decreased.
The PC measure comes from the BiBB data and is for the year 1999 (see B.2.2.1 for
details). The share of service sector employment increases, as well as the share of fe-
male workers.2 At the same time, the share of workers in part-time occupations rose,
which is highly related to female labor market participation. Average age increases due to
the demographic transition. This, together with higher university attendance rates, then
decreased the share of young workers (aged 25 and below) from 1979 to 2008 significantly.
2The low service share is computed using occupational information and following the definition of
Blossfeld (1985).
164 Appendix: Chapter 2
Table B.2 shows changes in broad occupation employment shares over time.3 As in
the US, the middle of the skill distribution, “Production/Craft-occupation” has seen a
fall. However, unlike the US the rise in “Services” has been small, and most of the fall
in production has been absorbed by a rise in professional occupation employment shares.
Using the same occupation classification, Table B.3 computes average task measures of
Table B.2: Employment Shares by Broad Occupation Class
Employment Shares Employment Changes
Occupation Class 1979 2008 ∆79−08 Growth79−08
Managers 0.023 0.031 0.008 33.4%
(Semi-)Professionals 0.043 0.092 0.049 113.8%
Technicians/Engineers 0.069 0.074 0.006 8.1%
Commercial/Administration 0.261 0.302 0.042 16.0%
Production/Craft 0.411 0.267 -0.144 -35.0%
Agricultural occupations 0.010 0.012 0.001 14.0%
Services 0.183 0.222 0.038 20.9%
routine, manual and abstract tasks by occupation. The Table uses the US task measures,
although as seen in the paper, the German and US task measures are similar. Again
Table B.3: Tasks by Broad Occupation Class
Occupation Class RTI Routine Manual Abstract
Managers 0.379 4.450 2.523 6.021
(Semi-)Professionals 0.358 4.318 3.051 6.125
Technicians/Engineers 0.408 5.105 3.852 5.451
Commercial/Administration 0.413 4.678 2.912 5.196
Production/Craft 0.477 6.433 5.903 4.091
Agricultural occupations 0.407 4.891 5.002 4.614
Services 0.438 5.197 4.532 4.380
in line with the theory, the occupations with the largest employment fall are the most
routine-intensive occupations. The occupations with the largest increase are the most
abstract occupations.
B.2.2 The Qualification and Career Survey
The QCS is a representative survey of employees carried out by the BiBB (“Federal
Institute for Vocational Education and Training”) and the IAB (“Institute for Employment
Research”). It contains four cross-sections carried out in 1979, 1985/86, 1991/92 and
3The definition of broad occupation classes in Tables B.2 and B.3 follow the definition by Blossfeld
(1985).
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1998/99, where each covers about 30,000 individuals. The newest cross section was carried
out in 2006 by the BiBB and the BAuA (“Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health”). Very similar to the four surveys before, the structure remained the same -
however, the number of individuals interviewed reduced to 20,000. For our analysis we
only make use of the 1979 and the 1999 waves. In particular, we these datasets to construct
the computer utilization measures. In addition we can compute occupation-specific task
measures from it (denoted by “BIBB”-measures in Section 2.3).
B.2.2.1 Computer Measure
People are asked whether they use personal computers (PCs) during their regular work.
From this information we construct an occupation k specific PC measure as the average
share of workers within each occupation that use a PC. Moreover, since PC usage varies
extensively between diﬀerent sectors, we diﬀerentiate between the broad sector of services
and non-services (sector is denoted by s, occupation by k, individual by i):
PC99sk,t=1999 =
(
S∑
s=1
I∑
i=1
Liskt · 1 [PCuseiskt = ”Y ES”]
)(
S∑
s=1
I∑
i=1
Liskt
)−1
.
Using the SIAB-R 7508 panel and using regional employment shares of each occupation
in 1999 as weights, a weighted mean of PC usage within a region is computed. A region’s
j specific PC measure is,
PC99j,t=1999 =
(
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
Ljskt · PC99sk,t=1999
)(
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
Ljskt
)−1
.
B.2.3 Further Datasources
Figure 2.1a for the US uses the 1980 and 2000 census. The sample includes all work-
ing individuals, that are not institutionalized, in school or in active-military duty. All
observations are weighted by there US census weight multiplied by their annual hours
worked.
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B.3 Supplementary Appendix
B.3.1 The SIAB Regional File 1975-2008: Further Information
Table B.4 shows the distribution of skills for Germany as a whole in 1979 and 2008
respectively. Column (3) of the Table gives the change (in percentage points) over the
29-year time interval. As expected, in 1979 the share of high-skilled is very low, less than
Table B.4: Skill Shares within Germany between 1979-2008
Employment share 1979 2008 ∆79−08
Highskilled 0.0479 0.1431 0.0951
Apprenticeshare 0.6325 0.5600 -0.0725
5 percent of the German workforce went to university or a technical college. 29 years
later the share had almost tripled. Although the share of apprentices fell by 7 percentage
points, it is still substantial.
Column(1) of Table B.5 shows the ten regions with the highest apprentice share (rel-
ative to their total workforce). Wolfsburg, Kassel and Nordhorn are the three regions
that are most apprentice-intensive in 1979. This seems to be driven by the type of their
industry structure, e.g. Volkswagen has its headquarter in Wolfsburg. Kassel has large
automotive and (light) metal industries. It is also home to several armament industries.
Nordhorn has a large consumer goods industry, e.g. textiles. Regions dominated by man-
ufacturing industries are more prone to train and employ apprentices than the service
sector. Column (2) shows the regions that are most intensive in routine jobs (using the
compounded routine measure RTI). These cities seem to be rather heterogeneous in their
characteristics, indicating that routine task shares can stem from diﬀerent occupations.
Routine tasks are either routine manual (dominant in industrial jobs) or routine cognitive
tasks (found in clerk and sales occupations). Luedenscheid and Wolfsburg are industrial
cities, while Balingen’s largest employer is EDEKA (general partnership of supermarkets).
Column (3) displays the regions with the highest employment share in abstract-intensive
occupations. All cities are large cities and their industry structure shows that they tend
to have a much larger service sector and less specialization in one specific industry.
Table B.6 shows the ten occupations with the lowest and highest mean wage in 1979.
The mean daily wage of a full-time employee within that occupation is provided. Not
very surprisingly, the lowest paid jobs would classify as low-skilled service jobs such as
hairdressers, household cleaners or attending on guests. In contrast, scientists, engineers
and entrepreneurs are at the top of the wage distribution. The daily wage rate shows
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Table B.5: Regional Variation in Task Shares in 1979
The 10 most intensive regions in
Apprentices RTI Employment Abstract Tasks
Wolfsburg Balingen Muenchen
Kassel Kronach Mainz
Nordhorn Rottweil Frankfurt/Main
Emden Coburg Hamburg
Leer Schwandorf Muenster
Heide Wolfsburg Goettingen
Itzehoe Luedenscheid Bonn
Hoexter Weiden Wiesbaden
Husum Tuttlingen Duesseldorf
Hersfeld Dingolfing Hannover
that the highest paid occupations earn more than three times as much as the low-skilled
occupation.
Table B.6: Lowest and Highest Paying Occupations in 1979
Lowest Paying Jobs 1979 Highest Paying Jobs 1979
Occupation Wage Occupation Wage
Hairdresser 19.74 Scientists 72.28
Household cleaners 26.00 Physicians, pharmacists 71.79
Cutters 27.39 Mechanical,motor engineers 71.00
Attending on guests 27.62 (Land) Surveyor 70.34
Medical receptionists 27.64 Electrical engineers 69.53
Salespersons 28.16 Architects 66.55
Housekeeping managers 28.90 Entrepreneur, managing directors 66.45
Laundry workers 29.38 Economists, social scientists 64.28
Booksellers 31.49 Member of parliament 61.65
Agricultural workers 31.66 Data processing specialist 61.02
B.3.2 The Qualification and Career Survey: Further Information
B.3.2.1 Occupation Specific Tasks
To construct occupation-specific task intensities we use the 1979 survey, since these should
reflect “initial” task requirements prior to computerization.4
To form task measures for each occupation that is specified in the SIAB-R 7508
datafile, the 1979 QCS occupation classification can be matched to the oﬃcial 1988 3-
4Compare Spitz-Oener (2006) for a detailed description of the dataset and evidence that task-
requirements changed within occupations over time.
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digit classification of the German Federal Employment Bureau (Bundesanstalt fuer Arbeit,
1988), which form the basis for the SIAB-R 7508 regional file occupation classification.
The 1979 QCS covers 29,737 employees of German citizenship between the age of 15
to 65. Soldiers and the federal border guard are excluded. The individual’s occupation
is classified according to the 6-digit level based on the 1970 classification system. For
our purpose, we define occupations on the 3-digit level (called “Berufsordnungen”). This
is done for two reasons: (1) forming a representative task measure for each occupation
requires information from a suitable number of employees within each occupation; and
(2) the definition of an occupation has to be consistent over time.5 After dropping unclas-
sifiable occupations, 318 occupations and 28,459 individual observations are left. Similar
to the US DOT measures, four measures are computed from the QCS,
1. Routine task : Routine intensity is measured by how often single work steps repeat
themselves. The repetitiveness of jobs is classified from 1 to 5, i.e., from very
repetitive to not at all.
2. Manual task : Manual task intensity is measured by the intensity of dexterity (“Handgeschick
und Fingerfertigkeit”) the job requires. It is measured on a scale from 1 to 5, from
“(almost) always required” to “hardly any dexterity required.”
3. Non-routine interactive task : Classified by the intensity of required planning and
coordination skills. Measured on the scale 1 to 5, from very intense in coordination
requirements to not at all.
4. Non-routine analytic task : Measured by the occupations’ math requirements. Tasks
are classified into five categories from very basic arithmetic operations to very ad-
vanced arithmetic knowledge including diﬀerential calculus, integrals and algebra.
Each task is re-classified on a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 being the highest task intensity.
Although the original SIAB dataset uses the oﬃcial 1988 Bundesanstalt fuer Arbeit,
1988 occupation classification, for the regional file these detailed diﬀerentiated occupa-
tions have been aggregated to a broader level. There are 120 occupations in the regional
file. The SIAB-R 7508 occupation-specific task measure is computed as the weighted
mean of individual task measures from the QCS. Following Autor et al. (2003) we use
full-time equivalent hours of labor supply as weights.6
5The 1979 datafile includes 12 occupations that cannot be matched to the classifications of the Bun-
desanstalt fuer Arbeit (1988). These are occupations wrongly coded or that have become obsolete.
6The full-time equivalent hours of labor supply are calculated as the product of sampling weights times
weekly working working hours.
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C.1 Theoretical Appendix
C.1.1 Solution of the Laissez-Faire Equilibrium
In each country at each period t the intermediate good producer maximizes profits ac-
cording to
max[xijt;Lijt]
⎧⎨⎩pijtY ijt − wijtLijt −
1∫
0
pijmtx
i
jmtdm
⎫⎬⎭ , (C.1)
from where optimal demand for each machine jm, xijmt, and demand for labor input, Lijt
is found. For each intermediate machine jm one entrepreneur has access to the most
eﬃcient technology and thus will enjoy monopoly power. Let pijmt denote the monopoly
price charged by the entrepreneur. The maximization problem for an entrepreneur of
machine m in sector j at time t reads as
πijmt = (p
i
jmt − ψ)xijmt.
Together with the iso-elastic demand function, the optimal price chosen by the monopolist
of machine m in sector j at time t will be pijmt = ϕ/α = α. That at hand, aggregate
demand for each machine as given by
xijmt =
(
pijt
) 1
1−α LjtAjmt, (C.2)
and monopoly’s profits are as given in (3.12). Using the first order condition w.r.t. labor
pins down wages for manufacturing labor as
wijt = (1− α)pijt
(
Lijt
)−α (
Aijt
)1−α (
xijt
)α
. (C.3)
Observe that the wage in sector j increases in the price of this sectoral good, the stock
of production technology and the amount of machine inputs. On the other hand due
to diminishing returns, the more labor is working within the sector, the lower the wage.
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Using xijmt gives the relative wage as
widt
wict
=
(
pidt
pict
) 1
1−α Aidt
Aict
. (C.4)
Now since the input factors are substitutes an increase in the relative knowledge of dirty
production increases the wage in the dirty sector for σ > 1. However, since labor is
mobile across sectors and labor markets have to clear, in equilibrium wages are equal
across sectors, which implies
pidt
pict
=
(
Aidt
Aict
)−(1−α)
. (C.5)
Moreover sectoral output is given by
Y ijt =
(
pijt
) α
1−α LijtA
i
jt. (C.6)
Combining (C.6) and (3.12) gives the relative prices as
pidt
pict
=
(
AidtL
i
dt
AictL
i
ct
)− 1−ασ
, (C.7)
and finally using (C.5) gives the relative labor inputs as
Lidt
Lict
=
(
Aidt
Aict
)σ−1
. (C.8)
Whenever σ > 1 an increase in relative productivity draws labor to the same sector in
order to oﬀset the change in wages due to the productivity rise. σ = ϵ(1 − α) + α > 0
denotes the elasticity of substitution between factors. As long as intermediate goods are
substitutes, the factors are substitutes as well and σ > 1.
Finally equilibrium aggregate output within country i at point t is given by
Y it =
[(
Aict
)−(σ−1)
+
(
Aidt
)−(σ−1)] 1σ−1
AidtA
i
ct. (C.9)
Turning to pollution and utility, within both countries pollution increases at a positive
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rate. The growth rate of pollution is given by
gNp ≈ ln(Pt+1/Pt) = ln
(
1 + γNd
1 + δNt
)
= ln
(
1 + γNd
) 1
φ , (C.10)
gSp ≈ ln(Pt+1/Pt) = ln
(
1 + γNd
1 + δSt
)
= ln
[
(1 + γSd )(1 + γ
N
d )
δ
φ
] 1
δ+φ
, (C.11)
using the specification for abatement techniques and pollution given. Not surprisingly, as
the North grows at a faster rate, also pollution is increasing faster within the Northern
countries. Global pollution then is rising at a strictly positive rate larger than gSp and
smaller than gNp and utility approaches its lower bound.
gGp = ln(P
N
t+1 + P
S
t+1)− ln(PNt + P St ), (C.12)
U it (C
i
t , P
G
t →∞) = −∞. (C.13)
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Equilibrium Allocation of scientists
Proof. Define the ratio of obtainable profits that governs the entrepreneurs’ decision as a
function of scientists sict working in the clean sector
f(sict) =
(
1 + sictγ
i
c
1 + (1− sict)γid
)σ−2
1 + γic
1 + γid
(
Aic,t−1
Aid,t−1
)σ−1
.
Depending on the substitutability between inputs in the two sectors: σ = ϵ(1 − α) + α,
the expression is either strictly increasing (for σ > 2) or strictly decreasing (for σ < 2) in
the number of workers in the clean sector sict.
Then for sict ∈ [0, 1] it is Π
i
ct
Πidt
= f(sict). If f(1) > 1, clearly sict = 1 is an equilibrium, while
for f(0) < 1 then sict = 0 is an equilibrium and finally for f(sict) = 1 with 0 < sict < 1
then sict is an equilibrium.
1. If σ < 2 then f(sict) is strictly decreasing in its argument. Thus it follows if
• f(1) > 1 then sict = 1 is the unique equilibrium;
• if f(0) < 1 then sict = 0 is the unique (corner) solution;
• if f(0) > 1 > f(1) then by continuity of the function there exists an interior
solution such that f(sict) = 1.
2. If σ > 2 then f(sict) is strictly increasing in its argument. It follows that
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• if 1 < f(0) < f(1) then sict = 1 is the only equilibrium;
• if f(0) < f(1) < 1 then sict = 0 is the unique solution;
• if f(0) < 1 < f(1) then there exist multiple equilibria: an interior solution
such that f(sict) = 1, sict = 0 and sict = 1.
3. If σ = 2 then f(sict) := f is constant in sict.Then if f > 1 sict = 1 is the equilibrium
and if f < 1 then sict = 0 is the unique equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. First, the parameter assumptions (1 + γic) < (1 + γid)
σ−1+φ
φ(σ−1) ensure the existence of
the dirty laissez-faire steady state. Note that this assumption is derived from the fact that
the laissez-faire technology ratio is strictly smaller than the critical threshold, which would
induce entrepreneurs to invest in clean technologies. Although this specific expression is
derived from the North, it also ensures the existence of the equilibrium in the South.
In order to prove uniqueness of the dirty laissez-faire equilibrium, I show (i) Northern
and Southern scientists all invest in the dirty technologies throughout and (ii) the form
of technological progress is innovation in the North and imitation in the South. First,
Assumption 1 together with Lemma 3.1 ensure that all entrepreneurs invest in dirty
technologies in the first period. From (3.3) it is clear that A
i
c,t=1
Aid,t=1
decreased whenever
Aic,t=0
Aid,t=0
>
(
Aic
Aid
)LF
, where
(
Aic
Aid
)LF
denotes the steady state technology ratio under the
dirty regime. Clearly then, clean technologies will fall backwards even more. On the other
hand, whenever A
i
c,t=0
Aid,t=0
<
(
Aic
Aid
)LF
, clean technologies rise initially. However, they will never
exceed the steady state technology ratio, which guarantess a dirty investment strategy
under the stated parameter conditions. Hence, all research investments are channeled into
the dirty sector initially, throughout and in both countries. Second, under Assumption
2 the North constitutes the technological leader within both sectors and innovates in the
first period. Since both countries invest in the same sector and γNd > γSd the North must
remain the technological leader throughout.
C.1.2 Long-run Steady States under Environmental Regulation
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is trivial for the North: Assumption 4
gives the unique equilibrium distribution of scientists by construction and since γSd < γNd
it must be that the North remains the technological leader. For the South existence and
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uniqueness of the “dirty imitation equilibrium” requires Π
SS
c
ΠSSd
(sSSc = 1) < 1 since σ > 2.
This is ensured by the given parameter condition in Proposition 3.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. Assumption 4 gives the unique equilibrium distribution of scientists for the North.
The form of technical progress is not straight however since γSc < γNc < γSd . (3.22) shows
that aSSd > aSSc > 1 (for γSd > γNc ) such that the South has overtaken the technological
frontier and the Northern scientists imitate the clean technologies. Finally, existence and
uniqueness of the “dirty innovation equilibrium” in the South requires Π
SS
c
ΠSSd
(sSSc = 1) < 1
since σ > 2. This is ensured by the given parameter condition in Proposition 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. The parameter condition in Proposition 3.4 ensures that it is optimal for all en-
trepreneurs to invest in the clean sector both within the North and the South. This
ensures existence and together with Assumption 3 it ensures uniqueness of a “clean equi-
librium” within both countries. Finally, since γSc < γNc it must be that the North remains
the technological leader throughout.
C.1.3 Transition and Dynamical Equations
The transitional dynamics will depend on relative technology ratios between countries as
well as between sectors. The following Lemma summarizes the dynamical system in the
most general way:
Lemma C.1. Denoting the country-specific technology ratios as ASt := A
S
ct
ASdt
and ANt :=
ANct
ANdt
, the dynamics are described by the following equations:
adt − ad,t−1 = (1 + sSdtγSd )a1−δ−φd,t−1
(
ASmax,t−1
ANmax,t−1
)φ
− ad,t−1,
act − ac,t−1 = 1 + s
S
ctγ
S
c
1 + γNc
a1−δ−φc,t−1
(
ASmax,t−1
ANmax,t−1
)φ
− ac,t−1,
ANt − ANt−1 = (1 + γNc )AN1−δ−φt−1
(
A¯c,t−1
A¯d,t−1
)δ(ANmax,t−1
ANmax,t−1
)φ
− ANt−1,
ASt − ASt−1 = 1 + s
S
ctγ
S
c
1 + sSdtγ
S
d
AS1−δ−φt−1
(
A¯c,t−1
A¯d,t−1
)δ (ASmax,t−1
ASmax,t−1
)φ
−ASt−1,
where δ = 0 if {∃ j ∈ {c, d} : ajt $ 1} and δ > 0 otherwise.
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Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proof. From Lemma C.1, and starting from a point, where there are only R&D invest-
ments in the dirty sector, sSc,t=0 = 0, the derivation of AStrap as given in equation (3.27) is
straight forward. In fact, starting within the dirty equilibrium requires that ASt=0 < k¯.
Now, three diﬀerent transitional paths are possible: first, if ASt=0 < AStrap < k¯, the
relative stock of technologies rises along the transition but remains below the critical
threshold value that would trigger a shift to clean technologies also for the South. Sec-
ond, if ASt=0 < k¯ < AStrap, again along the transitional path the ratio of clean tech-
nologies is increasing for the South. In contrast to the case before however, Southern en-
trepreneurs switch to investing in the clean sector as soon as ASt = k¯. Finally, whenever
AStrap < ASt=0 < k¯, the ratio, ASt, falls along the transitional path. In particular, the
adjustment is instantaneously such that the ratio of clean technologies drops immediately,
before rising again in conjunction with the Northern relative stock of clean technologies.
Note that the equilibrium outcome depends on the exact parameter specification, but in
either case is a unique long-run equilibrium. Finally, since γSd < γNc , the South will be
imitating technologies, independent of the sector it invests in.
Proof of Proposition 3.6
Proof. The first part of the proof resembles the proof of 3.5. Starting from a point,
where ASt=0 < k¯, the relative ratio of clean technologies will move towards AStrap. Since,
this value is the maximum long-run value of the Southern technology ratio, whenever
AStrap < k¯, Southern entrepreneurs never switch to the clean sector. However, in contrast
to before, since γSd > γNc , they will perform innovation and thus determine the growth
rate of the world technological frontier. If AStrap > k¯, two possible scenarios can arise
depending on the initial distance to the frontier for the Southern dirty sector, ad,t=0.
From the dynamical system in Lemma C.1, it is clear that as soon as the South overtakes
the dirty technological frontier it starts innovation. Then the ratio of clean technologies,
ASt starts to decrease again, which makes the switch to the clean sector impossible. As
innovation starts within the South, the channel of technological transfers across countries
is shut down and the clean sector does not profit anymore from the expanding clean
frontier defined by the North. Denote T 1 the number of periods the South needs to reach
the dirty frontier (after the introduction of regulations in the North). Starting from the
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dirty regime, that is ASmax,t−1 = ANmax,t−1 = Ad,t−1, T 1 is implicitly defined by
ad,T 1 = (1 + γ
S
d )a
(1−δ)
d,T 1−1,
ad,T 1 = (1 + γ
S
d )(1 + γ
S
d )
(1−δ)a(1−δ)
2
d,T 1−2
⇒
1 =
(
1 + γSd
)∑(T1−1)
(i=0) (1−δ)i a(1−δ)
T1
d,t=0 .
Equivalently denote T 2 the number of periods it takes the ratio of technologies to reach
the threshold value that induces a shift to clean technologies. Then T 2 is indirectly defined
by:
AST 2 =
1
(1 + γSd )
AS1−φ−δT 2−1 AN
δ
T 2−1,
AST 2 =
1
(1 + γSd )
(
1
(1 + γSd )
)1−φ−δ
AS(1−φ−δ)
2
T 2−2
(
(1 + γNc )AN
1−φ
T 2−2
)δ
⇒
k¯ =
(
1 + γSd
)∑(T2−1)
(i=0)
−(1−φ−δ)i
AS(1−φ−δ)
T2
t=0
[(
1 + γNc
)∑(T2−2)
(i=0)
(1−φ)i
AN (1−φ)
(T2−1)
t=0
]δ
if T 2 > 1.
and for T 2 = 1:
k¯ =
1
(1 + γSd )
AS1−φ−δt=0 AN
δ
t=0.
Then, whenever T 1 < T 2, the dirty technological frontier will be reached first and the
economy converges to the “dirty innovation equilibrium”. If in turn, T 1 > T 2 the economy
switches out of the dirty regime as soon as AStrap = k¯ and converges to the “clean imitation
equilibrium”.
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C.2 Data Appendix
USA
European Union
China
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Figure C.1: Evolution of CO2 Emissions per capita
Notes: The figure shows the per capita CO2 emissions on a log-scale for China, the European Union and the US. While levels are
still lower in emerging markets, they are growing at a rapid rate. The slope coeﬃcients are given by 0.042 (0.002), 0.003 (0.001) and
0.001 (0.001) respectively.
Source: worldbank.org (database)
D Appendix: Chapter 4
D.1 Data Appendix
D.1.1 Market Size & CHNS
Definition of Income Groups
Household income and household income per capita is provided by the CHNS in longi-
tudinal data-files including the latest wave 2009.1 Household disposable income in the
CHNS is conceptualised as the sum of all sources of market and non-market incomes or
revenues minus expenses on the household or individual level. We use houehold income
deflated to constant 2009 Yuan, using the price deflator provided by the CHNS (2012a,b)
which is based on a standard NBS consumer basket allowing for price diﬀerences between
urban and rural areas.
We split the income distribution into g = 1, ..., G groups setting fixed income thresholds
in constant 2009 Yuan and calculate the population share ig,t of each income group g for
each survey year t.
In our baseline, we take inspiration from the World Bank’s (WB, 2009) classification
of countries2 and divide households into four (G = 4) income groups: low income, lower
middle income, upper middle income and high income. To account for sampling artifacts
in the 2006 survey, we project household incomes per capita between 1997 and 2009
using the growth rate of average household income per capita in this period. The World
Bank’s thresholds in constant 2009 dollars and were converted into constant 2009 yuan.
All dollar figures where converted into constant 2009 Yuan using the exchange rate and
PPP adjustment factors.3 To account for the small number of observations in early waves
1See Beerli (2010) for a more detailed description.
2The World Bank (2009) classifies economies according to their 2009 GNI per capita, calculated using
the World Bank Atlas method. The following thresholds are set: low income, US $ 995 or less; lower
middle income, US $ 996 - US $ 3’945; upper middle income, US $ 3’946 - US $ 12’196; and high income,
US $ 12’196 or more.
3Dollar values are converted to constant 2009 using the China Version 2 exchange rate and PPP
adjustment factor from the Penn World Tables 7.0, i.e. threshold× XRATPPP . With some adjustments to
account for small sampling of high income groups, this yields the following thresholds in constant 2009
Yuan: low income (2’149 Yuan), lower middle income (2’150 - 8’514 Yuan), upper middle income (8’515
- 16’499 Yuan), high income (16’500 or more).
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in some higher income groups, we slightly adjusted these thresholds with the largest
adjustment for the threshold of the high income group.4
Usage Profiles and Base-Year
The choice of a base-year for ownership profiles implies diﬀerent assumptions about en-
trepreneurs expectations, on the one hand, and accuracy considerations on the other hand.
Taking ownership profiles from a survey year at the beginning of our panel, e.g 1997, we
assume that entrepreneurs base their expectations about ownership profiles on durable
good prices and qualities from 1997. As Beerli (2010) shows in his analysis of durable
good ownership between 1989 and 2006, depending on the durable good, ownership rates
were generally increasing across the income distribution mainly explained by a substantial
fall in durable goods prices but also by improvements in public service provision and other
factors. Additionally, ownership rates increased unevenly across the income distribution
with poor households gaining much more from price changes compared to richer income
groups. This implies that the aggregate, potential ownership stocks based on the year
1997 will underestimate the true market size substantially. With respect to accuracy,
picking 1997 as a base-year involves the problem that there are relatively few rich house-
holds (i.e. less than 1%) which makes the information about their ownership profiles
relatively inaccurate.5 Taking the latest survey year available, i.e. 2009, on the other
hand, assumes that entrepreneurs form their expectations (about the future development
of durable good sales) based on durable good prices and qualities from 2009. Since own-
ership rates generally increased over time, our potential ownership stock measure based
on the year 2009 overestimates the true market size. Yet, since there are many more rich
households in 2009 than in earlier years, their ownership profile should be estimated more
accurately. Thus, independently from the choice of the base-year, potential stocks will
be either over- or underestimated. Moreover, it means that potential sales, the diﬀerence
between two years, will generally be lower than actual sales.6
Population Measure Implications
In the CHNS we observe a household’s ownership and change in ownership status of a
specific durable good variety j and without having information on its price and quality.
4The adjusted thresholds are: low income, US $ 2’149, low middle income, US $ 2’150 -US $US 4’167,
high middle income, US $ 4’168 - US $ 8’075, high income, US $ 8’076 or more.
5Another problem is that some durable goods become available only in later survey years, e.g. cell-
phones from 2004.
6This is in line with the findings of Beerli (2010) who finds that the share of changes in aggregate
ownership explained by income can diﬀer substantially between diﬀerent durable goods, being only 31%
for color TVs.
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Dealing with such a population measure of market size has some implications.7 First,
we can not distinguish between a car acquisition of one household to another household
on a quality or price dimension8. All acquisition within the same durable good variety j
receive the same (population) weight.9 Thus, we think of the new car acquisition, which
we observe in the CHNS, as an average car bought or a count measure of sales whose
magnitude can only be compared across durable goods. Second and related, we can not
distinguish between sales values of similar magnitude between diﬀerent durable goods.
A 1 percentage point sale of cars and a 1 percentage point sale of bicycles aﬀects their
respective industries with a similar magnitude although an average car diﬀers from an
average bicycle to a large extent in value terms.
D.1.2 Construction of Total Factor Productivity at the Firm-level
To construct a measure of firm-level productivity we follow an estimation procedure sug-
gested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). They propose taking intermediate inputs as a
proxy for unobserved shocks aﬀecting a firm’s input choice instead of investment as sug-
gested by Olley and Pakes (1996). One advantage of this approach is strictly data driven
as investment is zero for many firms in our dataset whereas intermediate inputs are not.
As Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) show, taking investment as proxy for unobserved produc-
tivity shocks is only valid for firms reporting non-zero investment. We use the STATA
implementation levpet to estimate the parameters of the production function:
yi,t = β0 + βlli,t + βkki,t + βmmi,t + ωi,t + ηi,t
using the logarithm of real intermediate inputs, mi,t, as proxy variable. yi,t denotes the
logarithm of real value-added of firm i in year t, li,t denotes the logarithm of the number
of workers, ki,t the logarithm of the real capital stock, ωi,t represents the unobserved
productivity component and ηi,t is an error term that is uncorrelated with input choices.
The real capital stock variable was constructed following a procedure suggested by Brandt
et al. (2011). Nominal values of value-added and the capital stock measure were deflated
using the input- and output-deflators provided by Brandt et al. (2011).
The estimation yields βˆl = 0.176 and βˆk = 0.36. According to Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003), estimated productivity for firm i at time t is then given by
7Note that Acemoglu and Linn (2004) use a similar population measure of drugs used in a certain age
group.
8This also includes second hand markets.
9Note that also acquisitions across time cannot be distinguished, although a car bought in 1989 and
one bought in 2009 might, technically speaking, be a very diﬀerent durable good.
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ωˆi,t = exp
(
yi,t − βˆlli,t − βˆkki,t
)
.
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D.1.3 Tables
Table D.1: Table: Service Life and Depreciation Rates of Durable Goods
Durablegood Service Life Lj Category in BEA (2003)
air condition 11 other household appliances
camera 10 photographic equipment
car 8 other motor vehicles
cellphone 9 computer and peripheral equipment
computer 9 computer and peripheral equipment
cycles 10 wheel goods
electric fan 10 other durable house furnishings
refrigerator 11 kitchen and other household appliances
homevideo appliances 9 video and audio products
kitchen appliances 11 kitchen and other household appliances
motorcycle 8 other motor vehicles
radio 9 video and audio products
satellite dish 10 other durable house furnishings
sewing machine 10 other durable house furnishings
telephone 10 other durable house furnishings
washing machine 11 kitchen and other household appliances
Notes: Source: BEA (2003).
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Table D.2: Usage Profiles, uj,g, of Income Groups According to WB (2009) Classification,
Base-year 2009
Usage intesity in income group
(Increase in usage intensity from lower group) Income Group
Durable Good Low Low Middle High Middle High with Largest Increase
air condition 0.054 0.075 0.154 0.311
(0.021) (0.079) (0.157) high
camera 0.013 0.021 0.058 0.132
(0.008) (0.036) (0.074) high
car 0.009 0.013 0.020 0.046
(0.004) (0.007) (0.026) high
cellphone 0.283 0.372 0.508 0.642
(0.089) (0.136) (0.133) high middle
computer 0.030 0.048 0.099 0.192
(0.019) (0.051) (0.092) high
cycles 0.176 0.236 0.319 0.347
(0.060) (0.083) (0.028) high middle
electric fan 0.390 0.487 0.580 0.646
(0.096) (0.093) (0.066) low middle
fridge 0.124 0.148 0.255 0.336
(0.024) (0.106) (0.081) high middle
homevideo 0.316 0.364 0.463 0.561
(0.048) (0.100) (0.097) high middle
kitchen appliances 0.338 0.423 0.618 0.832
(0.084) (0.195) (0.214) high
motorcycle 0.076 0.111 0.117 0.107
(0.035) (0.006) (-0.009) low middle
radio 0.039 0.056 0.112 0.161
(0.017) (0.056) (0.048) high middle
sat_dish 0.029 0.035 0.029 0.040
(0.006) (-0.006) (0.011) high
sewingm 0.073 0.077 0.110 0.120
(0.004) (0.033) (0.010) high middle
telephone 0.107 0.142 0.228 0.304
(0.035) (0.086) (0.076) high middle
washing 0.159 0.180 0.258 0.336
(0.021) (0.078) (0.078) high middle
Notes: All data are from CHNS, wave 2009. Households are grouped according to household income per capita in constant in constant 2009
Yuan: low income (2’149 Yuan), lower middle income (2’150 - 8’514 Yuan), upper middle income (8’515 - 16’499 Yuan), high income (16’500
or more). The first row of each durable good shows usage intensities (the u¯j,g = uj,g,t=2009s), i.e. the average number of goods per capita,
and the second row shows the increase in the usage intensity (in brackets) moving from the income group below into the income group of that
column.
Chapter D 183
Ta
bl
e
D
.3
:
C
or
re
sp
on
de
nc
e
be
tw
ee
n
C
H
N
S
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
d
C
at
eg
or
ie
s
an
d
A
SI
P
In
du
st
rie
s
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
d
in
C
H
N
S
In
du
st
ry
N
am
e
in
C
IC
C
IC
pr
e
20
03
C
IC
p
os
t
20
03
In
du
st
ry
in
A
na
ly
si
s
ai
r
co
nd
it
io
n
H
om
e
ai
r
co
nd
it
io
ne
r
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
40
65
39
52
ai
r
co
nd
it
io
n
bi
cy
cl
e
B
ic
yc
le
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
37
40
37
41
cy
cl
es
ca
m
er
a
C
am
er
a
an
d
eq
ui
pm
en
t
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
42
54
41
53
ca
m
er
a
ca
r
A
ut
om
ob
ile
m
an
uf
ac
to
ri
ng
37
21
-3
72
5
37
21
ca
r
ce
llp
ho
ne
M
ob
ile
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
an
d
te
rm
in
al
eq
ui
pm
en
t
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
-
40
14
ce
llp
ho
ne
co
lo
ur
T
V
H
om
e
vi
de
o
eq
ui
pm
en
t
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
41
71
40
71
ho
m
ev
id
eo
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
co
m
pu
te
r
C
om
pu
te
r
m
ac
hi
ne
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
41
41
40
41
co
m
pu
te
r
dv
d
H
om
e
vi
de
o
eq
ui
pm
en
t
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
41
71
40
71
ho
m
ev
id
eo
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
el
ec
tr
ic
fa
n
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
of
ho
us
eh
ol
d
el
ec
tr
ic
al
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
ve
nt
ila
ti
on
40
64
39
53
el
ec
tr
ic
fa
n
re
fr
ig
er
at
or
H
ou
se
ho
ld
re
fr
ig
er
at
in
g
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
40
63
39
51
re
fr
ig
er
at
or
m
ic
ro
w
av
e
H
ou
se
ho
ld
ki
tc
he
n
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
40
66
39
54
ki
tc
he
n
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
m
ot
or
cy
cl
e
M
ot
or
cy
cl
e
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
37
31
37
31
m
ot
or
cy
cl
e
pr
es
sc
oo
ke
r
H
ou
se
ho
ld
ki
tc
he
n
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
w
it
h
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
40
66
39
54
ki
tc
he
n
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
ra
di
o
H
om
e
au
di
o
eq
ui
pm
en
t
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
41
72
40
72
ra
di
o
ri
ce
co
ok
er
H
ou
se
ho
ld
ki
tc
he
n
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
40
66
39
54
ki
tc
he
n
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
sa
te
lli
te
di
sh
R
ad
io
an
d
te
le
vi
si
on
re
ce
iv
in
g
eq
ui
pm
en
t
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
41
30
40
32
sa
te
lli
te
di
sh
se
w
in
g
m
ac
hi
ne
Se
w
in
g
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
36
74
36
53
se
w
in
g
m
ac
hi
ne
te
le
ph
on
e
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
te
rm
in
al
eq
ui
pm
en
t
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
41
13
40
13
te
le
ph
on
e
tr
ic
yc
le
B
ic
yc
le
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
37
40
37
41
cy
cl
es
w
as
hi
ng
m
ac
hi
ne
H
ou
se
ho
ld
cl
ea
ni
ng
el
ec
tr
ic
al
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
40
61
,4
06
2
39
55
w
as
hi
ng
m
ac
hi
ne
184 Appendix: Chapter 4
Table D.4: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. # Observations
lnTFPi,j,t 5.245 1.150 1.440 10.643 30883
lnLaborproductivityi,j,t 4.025 1.141 -1.214 9.694 30883
lnMSactualj,t,t+4 16.918 0.974 14.630 18.543 111
lnMSpotentialj,t,t+4 16.879 0.927 14.869 18.274 123
SIZEi,j,t 5.437 1.309 2.079 12.145 30883
1(FOEi,j,t = 1) 0.375 0.484 0 1 30883
1(SOEi,j,t = 1) 0.072 0.259 0 1 30883
1(COEi,j,t = 1) 0.268 0.443 0 1 30883
1(DPEi,j,t = 1) 0.281 0.449 0 1 30883
1(AGEi,j,t > AGE) 0.535 0.498 0 1 30876
1(COASTi,j,t = 1) 0.845 0.361 0 1 30883
HHIj,t 568.085 459.197 99.2 2863.28 30883
1(EXPi,j,t > 0) 0.491 0.499 0 1 30866
TECHPOTj,t 2.618 0.521 1.111 4 155
Notes: lnTFPi,j,t denotes log of total factor productivity of firm i in industry j and year t, estimated as described in Appendix D.1.2.
lnLaborproductivityi,j,t is measured as the log of firm’s value added over its number of employees. SIZEi,j,t the log of number of workers.
lnMSactualj,t,t+4 and lnMS
potential
j,t,t+4 are actual and potential market size measured in log-terms, respectively and over a five year time horizon
as described in the text. 1(FOEi,j,t = 1), 1(SOEi,j,t = 1), 1(COEi,j,t = 1) and 1(DPEi,j,t = 1) indicate whether a firm is foreign
owned, state owned, collectively owned or a domestic private enterprise, respectively. 1(AGEi,j,t > AGE) indicated whether a firm is above
the median age of all firms in the sample. 1(COASTi,j,t = 1) is a dummy for whether a firm is located in a coastal province. HHIj,t is
the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index as described in the text. 1(EXPi,j,t > 0) is a dummy for whether a firm has positive export sales and
TECHPOTj,t is the world wide technology potential assessed by Swiss firms in the KOF Innovation Survey. Data is based on the 10%
trimmed sample (see Section 4.2.2).
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Table D.7: Summary Statistics at Industry Level (part 3)
1(EXPi,j,t > 0) EXPSHi,j,t TECHPOTj,t
Industry Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
aircond 0.380 0.486 0.149 0.292 2.566 0.353
camera 0.763 0.426 0.604 0.429 2.488 0.333
car 0.214 0.410 0.019 0.096 2.827 0.093
cellphone 0.517 0.500 0.280 0.381 2.368 0.127
computer 0.411 0.492 0.280 0.421 3.466 0.380
cycles 0.539 0.499 0.331 0.409 2.570 1.113
electric fan 0.493 0.500 0.352 0.430 2.566 0.353
fridge 0.392 0.488 0.134 0.269 2.566 0.353
homevideo 0.605 0.489 0.412 0.433 2.440 0.115
kitchenappl 0.529 0.499 0.359 0.427 2.566 0.353
motorcycle 0.391 0.488 0.134 0.258 2.570 1.113
radio 0.691 0.462 0.578 0.450 2.574 0.440
satellite dish 0.497 0.500 0.339 0.418 2.440 0.115
sewingm 0.496 0.500 0.237 0.330 2.754 0.013
telephone 0.462 0.499 0.302 0.414 2.440 0.115
washing 0.559 0.497 0.271 0.370 2.566 0.353
All industries 0.491 0.500 0.297 0.404 2.618 0.522
Notes: 1(EXPi,j,t > 0) is a dummy for whether a firm has positive export sales and EXPSHi,j,t is the share of export sales on total sales
of a firm. TECHPOTj,t is the world wide technology potential assessed by Swiss firms in the KOF Innovation Survey. Data is based on the
10% trimmed sample (see Section 4.2.2).
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D.1.4 Figures
Figure D.1: Dynamic in Usage Intensities for Given Income Groups
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Notes: CHNS data. Usage per head on the y-axis (diﬀerent scales), the four income groups on the x-axis in ascending order. The solid line
represents the usage profile, uj,g,t, in the first survey period available before our analysis period. For most goods this is 1997 whereas it is
2004 for cellphones and 2006 for satellite dishes. The dashed line represents the usage profile for the latest wave available in the CHNS. For
most goods this is 2009 whereas it is 2006 for radios. Income groups are defined as described in Section 4.3.2.
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Figure D.2: Share of Firms Engaging in Exports
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Notes: The figure plots the number of firms (in percentage terms) as a function of the export share relative to total firm sales.
Data is based on the 10% trimmed sample (see Section 4.2.2). Source: ASIP dataset.
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Figure D.3: Dynamic of Technology Potential
Notes: KOF Innovation Survey matched to ASIP data.
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D.2 Empirical Appendix
Further Regressions
Table D.8: Eﬀect of Market Size on LN TFP including Controls
Dep. Variable lnTFPi,j,t
Mean 5.137 5.137 5.137 5.137 5.137 5.137
St.Dev. 1.161 1.161 1.161 1.161 1.161 1.161
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnMSactualj,t,t+4 0.188 0.0628 0.0628 0.549 0.272 0.272
[0.0813]** [0.0525] [0.0395] [0.185]*** [0.132]** [0.0828]***
Size 0.346 0.346 0.344 0.344
[0.0135]*** [0.0112]*** [0.0133]*** [0.0113]***
Admin_FE 0.134 0.134 0.132 0.132
[0.0277]*** [0.0270]*** [0.0274]*** [0.0270]***
Admin_SOE -0.741 -0.741 -0.740 -0.740
[0.0373]*** [0.0523]*** [0.0370]*** [0.0523]***
Admin_COE 0.0351 0.0351 0.0313 0.0313
[0.0219] [0.0256] [0.0222] [0.0257]
Age -0.237 -0.237 -0.236 -0.236
[0.0177]*** [0.0193]*** [0.0174]*** [0.0193]***
Region 0.0410 0.0410 0.0414 0.0414
[0.0281] [0.0366] [0.0286] [0.0366]
HHI 1.60e-05 1.60e-05 6.36e-06 6.36e-06
[2.15e-05] [2.30e-05] [2.69e-05] [2.33e-05]
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 20,167 20,160 20,160 20,167 20,160 20,160
R2 0.111 0.278 0.278 0.106 0.277 0.277
Clustering Industry x Year Industry x Year Firm Industry x Year Industry x Year Firm
No of Clusters 111 111 7662
F-Stats 27.68 26.70 1480
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Observations below the 10 percentile
of value-added each year are excluded. All columns include year and industry fixed eﬀects. lnMSactualj,t,t+4 is instrumented with lnMS
potential
j,t,t+4 .
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Table D.9: Robustness Analysis: Controlling for Exports and Technology Supply Shocks
Dep. Variable lnTFPi,j,t
Mean 5.137 5.138 4.957 5.355 5.137 5.138
St. Dev. 1.161 1.160 1.102 1.191 1.161 1.160
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnMSactualj,t,t+4 0.272 0.274 0.408 -0.164 0.265 0.267
[0.132]** [0.133]** [0.141]*** [0.169] [0.135]** [0.136]**
1(EXPi,j,t > 0) 0.0539 0.0540
[0.0274]** [0.0274]**
TECHPOTj,t -0.00541 -0.00558
[0.0236] [0.0240]
Sample All All Non-Exporters Exporters All All
Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 20,160 20,147 10,980 9,167 20,160 20,147
R2 0.277 0.277 0.206 0.368 0.277 0.277
F-Stats 26.70 26.88 42.25 15.87 21.17 21.31
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered on
the industry-year level jt) are given in parentheses. Observations below the 10 percentile of value-added each year are excluded. All columns
include year and industry fixed eﬀects as well as a set of firm- and industry-level controls (the log of number of workers, age (measured
by a dummy), a dummy for collective, state and foreign ownership, coastal location, respectively and the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index).
1(EXPi,j,t > 0) is one if a firm has positive export sales. lnMSactualj,t,t+4 is instrumented with lnMS
potential
j,t,t+4 . TECHPOTj,t is the world
wide technology potential assessed by Swiss firms in the KOF Innovation Survey.
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First Stage Regressions
Table D.10: First Stage Regression including Controls
Dep. Variable lnMSactualj,t,t+4
(1) (2) (3)
lnMSpotentialj,t,t+4 1.967 1.955 1.955
[0.374]*** [0.378]*** [0.0508]***
Size 0.00529 0.00529
[0.00136]*** [0.00135]***
Admin_FE -0.00228 -0.00228
[0.00414] [0.00431]
Admin_SOE -0.00329 -0.00329
[0.00607] [0.00775]
Admin_COE -0.00435 -0.00435
[0.00576] [0.00435]
Age -0.00276 -0.00276
[0.00572] [0.00364]
Region -0.000619 -0.000619
[0.00432] [0.00458]
HHI 1.75e-05 1.75e-05
[6.05e-05] [6.47e-06]***
Observations 20,167 20,160 20,160
R2 0.968 0.968 0.968
Clustering Industry x Year Industry x Year Firm
No of Clusters 111 111 7662
F-Stats 27.68 26.70 1480
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Observations below the 10 percentile
of value-added each year are excluded. All columns include year and industry fixed eﬀects. The reported R2 reported equals the partial R2.
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Table D.11: First Stage Regression - Trimming
Dep. Variable lnMSactualj,t,t+4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnMSpotentialj,t,t+4 1.990 1.970 1.955 1.951 1.907
[0.381]*** [0.380]*** [0.378]*** [0.374]*** [0.358]***
Observations 22,328 21,241 20,160 16,900 11,412
R2 0.244 0.241 0.239 0.241 0.247
Trimming 10% 0% 5% 25% 50%
No of Clusters 111 111 111 111 111
F-Stats 27.32 26.95 26.70 27.27 28.41
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustred on the
industry-year level jt) are given in parentheses. All columns include year and industry fixed eﬀects as well as a set of firm- and industry-level
controls (the log of number of workers, age (measured by a dummy), a dummy for collective, state and foreign ownership, coastal location,
respectively and the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index). The reported R2 reported equals the partial R2.
Table D.12: Robustness Analysis: First Stage Regression
Dep. Variable lnMSactualj,t,t+4
lnMSactualj,t,t+4 × 1(EXPi,j,t > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnMSpotentialj,t,t+4 1.955 1.957 1.956 1.951 1.954
[0.378]*** [0.378]*** [0.375]*** [0.424]*** [0.423]***
lnMSpotentialj,t,t+4 × 1(EXPi,j,t > 0) -0.0217
[0.00584]***
1(EXPi,j,t > 0) No Yes Yes No Yes
TECHPOTj,t No No No Yes Yes
Observations 20,160 20,147 20,147 20,160 20,147
R2 0.239 0.240 0.248 0.223 0.223
R22 0.885
F-Stats 26.70 26.88 21.17 21.31
F-Stats1 40.31
F-Stats2 839.5
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered on
the industry-year level jt) are given in parentheses. Observations below the 10 percentile of value-added each year are excluded. All columns
include year and industry fixed eﬀects as well as a set of firm- and industry-level controls (the log of number of workers, age (measured by
a dummy), a dummy for collective, state and foreign ownership, coastal location, respectively and the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index). The
reported R2 reported equals the partial R2. In Column (3) F-Stats1 and the R2 are on the first stage of lnMSpotentialj,t,t+4 , and F-Stats2 and
R22 are w.r.t. lnMS
potential
j,t,t+4 × 1(EXPi,j,t > 0).
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Table D.13: Robustness Analysis: First Stage Regression
Dep. Variable lnMSactualj,t,t+4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnMSpotentialj,t,t+4 1.955 1.957 1.559 2.258 1.951 1.954
[0.378]*** [0.378]*** [0.391]*** [0.347]*** [0.424]*** [0.423]***
1(EXPi,j,t > 0) No Yes - - No Yes
TECHPOTj,t No No No No Yes Yes
Sample All All Exporters Non-Exporters All All
Observations 20,160 20,147 9,167 10,980 20,160 20,147
R2 0.239 0.240 0.152 0.335 0.223 0.223
F-Stats 26.70 26.88 15.87 42.25 21.17 21.31
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered on
the industry-year level jt) are given in parentheses. Observations below the 10 percentile of value-added each year are excluded. All columns
include year and industry fixed eﬀects as well as a set of firm- and industry-level controls (the log of number of workers, age (measured by
a dummy), a dummy for collective, state and foreign ownership, coastal location, respectively and the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index). The
reported R2 reported equals the partial R2.
Table D.14: First Stage Regression - LN Laborprod
Dep. Variable lnMSactualj,t,t+4
(1) (2) (3)
lnMSpotentialj,t,t+4 1.955 1.955 1.954
[0.378]*** [0.0508]*** [0.423]***
Observations 20,160 20,160 20,147
R2 0.239 0.239 0.223
Clustering Industry x Year Firm Industry x Year
No of Clusters 111 7662 111
F-Stats 26.70 1480 21.31
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Observations below the 10 percentile
of value-added each year are excluded. All columns include year and industry fixed eﬀects and a set of firm- and industry-level controls (the
log of number of workers, age (measured by a dummy), a dummy for collective, state and foreign ownership, coastal location, respectively and
the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index). Column (4) in addition introduces a dummy for positive exports, 1(EXPi,j,t > 0) and the supply side
control, TECHPOTj,t. The reported R2 reported equals the partial R2.
Table D.15: First Stage Regression on the Industry Level
Dep. Variable lnMSactualj,t,t+4
(1) (2)
lnMSpotentialj,t,t+4 1.224 1.590
[0.448]*** [0.407]***
1(EXPi,j,t > 0) No Yes
TECHPOTj,t No Yes
Observations 111 111
R2 0.08 0.12
Observations 111 111
F-Stats 7.459 15.25
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are given in
parentheses. Observations below the 10 percentile of value-added each year are excluded. All columns include year and industry fixed eﬀects as
well as the industry mean of the set of firm- and industry-level controls (the log of number of workers, age (measured by a dummy), a dummy
for collective, state and foreign ownership, coastal location, respectively and the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index). Regressions are weighted by
the number of firms within a sector. The reported R2 reported equals the partial R2.
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